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Abstract 
When should we accommodate religious practices? When 
should we demand that religious groups instead conform to social 
or legal norms? Who should make these decisions, and how? These 
questions lie at the very heart of our contemporary debates in the 
field of Law and Religion.  
Particularly thorny issues arise where religious practices may 
impose health-related harm to children within a religious group 
or to third parties. Unfortunately, legislators, courts, scholars, 
ethicists, and medical practitioners have not offered a consistent 
way to analyze such cases, so the law is inconsistent. This Article 
suggests, first, that the lack of consistency is a troubling artifact of 
our political system, and, second, that it raises serious 
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constitutional questions that lie at the intersection of the Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.  
To resolve these problems, we offer and develop a test to 
determine whether such a religious practice should be 
accommodated by legislators, courts, and medical practitioners. 
Our test is sensitive to the institutional strengths and weaknesses 
of differently situated decision makers and is designed to be 
flexible enough to account for these differences. Consequently, it 
has distinctive applications for legislators, administrative 
officials, judges, and medical practitioners. Further, although the 
test was developed specifically to address religious practices that 
may impose health-related harms to children and third-parties, it 
also has potential implications in other contexts as well, such as 
the debate over whether sexual orientation non-discrimination 
laws should accommodate religious dissent. 
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I. Introduction 
To accommodate or not to accommodate religious beliefs—
that is the question that dominates the field of Law and Religion 
918 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915 (2016) 
today.1 It is a question that confronts all modern liberal societies, 
and the space for accommodating religious objections to general 
legal obligations is increasingly contested in contemporary 
American legal, political, and ethical discourse.  
This problem is especially acute where the majority culture 
perceives a religious practice or requirement to impose risks, 
harms, burdens, or costs on children.2 A parent’s refusal to 
supply medical treatment to a child may lead to the death of the 
child.3 Parents who refuse to vaccinate a child due to the 
demands of their religion or conscience can put their child at 
grave risk, as well as other children across society who cannot be 
vaccinated.4 Opponents of ritual male infant circumcision 
controversially assert that it causes intolerable pain, inhibits 
future sexual pleasure, and violates autonomy.5 Many more 
                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., Hillel Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities’ Political Power, 
48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1617, 1619 (2015) [hereinafter Levin, Rethinking 
Religious Minorities] (noting several recent court cases involving religious 
accommodation).  
 2. See, e.g., Allan J. Jacobs, Do Belief Exemptions to Compulsory 
Vaccination Programs Violate the Fourteenth Amendment?, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 
73, 76 (2011) (explaining that exemptions from vaccination can result in an 
epidemic); Lesley Stone, Lance Gable & Tara Gingerich, When the Right to 
Health and the Right to Religion Conflict: A Human Rights Analysis, 12 MICH. 
ST. J. INT’L. L. 247, 305 (2004) (explaining that religious exemptions reduce 
immunization rates, making it more difficult to protect public health); Eliana 
Dockterman, Faith-Healing Parents Jailed After Second Child’s Death, TIME 
(Feb. 19, 2014), http://time.com/8750/faith-healing-parents-jailed-after-second-
childs-death/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2015) (reporting that parents were sent to jail 
after their second child died as a result of their refusal to take him to the doctor) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 3. See, e.g., Dockterman, supra note 2 (describing the case of the Schaible 
family, whose two young sons died from pneumonia when their parents refused 
to provide medical care). 
 4. See Jacobs, supra note 2, at 79 (“Vaccination of an individual benefits 
not just the vaccinated person but all susceptible persons in the community.”); 
Stone, Gable & Gingerich, supra note 2, at 305 (“Religious exemptions from 
immunization requirements reduce these immunization rates and may make it 
difficult to achieve the necessary levels of immunity to protect public health. An 
under-immunized population is more susceptible to an infectious disease 
outbreak. Indeed, the risk of an outbreak increases as immunization rates 
decrease.”). 
 5. See Martha Groves, Male Circumcision Opponents Propose Ballot 
Measure in Santa Monica, L.A. TIMES (May 25, 2011), http://articles. 
latimes.com/2011/may/25/local/la-me-circumcision-ban-20110525 (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2015) (stating that opponents to male circumcision believe it is a 
painful and unnecessary procedure, and that the children should be protected) 
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attack female genital alteration6 on similar grounds.7 Some 
oppose the practice of homeschooling children, ostensibly out of 
concern that school attendance provides necessary socializing and 
educational experiences.8 Should society give religious groups 
and individuals special exemptions in such circumstances?  
Unfortunately, there is little consistency in either the politics 
or the law surrounding such questions. Neither courts nor 
scholars have offered systematic approaches for resolving these 
questions in a manner that dignifies the competing underlying 
values in the debate—religious minorities’ right to practice 
according to their beliefs versus society’s interest in protecting 
the vulnerable and in enforcing its rules evenhandedly.  
Moreover, these conflicts also have important constitutional 
dimensions. On the one hand, religious believers may look to the 
Free Exercise Clause9 (as well as related federal and state 
statutes and state constitutional provisions), the constitutional 
right to raise one’s children as one sees fit, and constitutional 
principles of non-discrimination for support for their religious 
liberty claims.10 On the other hand, there are serious 
                                                                                                     
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 6. See generally I. Utz-Billing & H. Kentenich, Female Genital Mutilation: 
An Injury, Physical and Mental Harm, 29 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 225 (2008) (providing an overview of female genital alteration). 
 7. See generally Kavita Shah Arora & Allan J. Jacobs, Female Genital 
Alteration: A Compromise Solution, 42 J. MED. ETHICS 148 (2016) (reviewing the 
ethics and policy surrounding female genital alteration); Edith M. Lederer, 
United Nations Calls for Global Ban on Female Genital Mutilation, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/27/un-committee-
calls-for-ba_0_n _2198244.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2015) (stating that the 
opponents of female genital mutilation describe it as “harmful and a serious 
threat to the psychological, sexual, and reproductive health of women and girls”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). But see generally Arora & 
Jacobs, supra note 7 (describing forms of female genital alteration with little 
effect on the recipient). 
 8. See Judith G. McMullen, Behind Closed Doors: Should States Regulate 
Homeschooling?, 54 S.C. L. REV. 75, 83 (2002) (describing the argument that 
homeschooling deprives children of social interaction and inhibits development 
of teamwork and collaboration skills). 
 9. See U.S. CONST. amend I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). 
 10. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (concluding that 
Nebraska’s state statute prohibiting the teaching of a foreign language to 
someone who had not yet passed the eighth grade infringed upon a person’s 
liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 
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Establishment Clause concerns with accommodating religious 
believers in a manner that harms others.11  
This Article aims to correct this deficiency by offering a test 
to balance our society’s commitment to pluralism and liberty 
against our interest in protecting children and third parties in a 
principled and consistent manner. Although the test was 
developed in the healthcare and childcare contexts, it also has 
potential implications for other kinds of conflicts between religion 
and state as well.12 It provides, for example, a possible approach 
to the politically polarizing question of whether 
antidiscrimination laws that protect people on the basis of sexual 
orientation should include religious exemptions.13 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II briefly reviews the 
constitutional and statutory law of religious accommodation and 
the related academic debates.14 It also shows that American law 
is inconsistent in the way in which it balances the values 
implicated in the debate over accommodation versus 
non-accommodation. Part III considers some troubling aspects of 
this inconsistency.15 This Part also applies insights of public 
choice theory to assess why lawmakers sometimes over-embrace 
religious accommodation by permitting minority religious 
practices to persist even when they harm third parties, but 
sometimes under-embrace it by prohibiting minority religious 
practices that impose few costs on society. This Part concludes by 
calling for a principled approach to these questions. 
                                                                                                     
268 U.S. 510, 536 (1925) (concluding that Oregon’s Compulsory Education Act 
unreasonably interfered with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the 
upbringing and education of their children); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 
101–02 (2000) (concluding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not permit a state to infringe on the fundamental right of 
parents to make child-rearing decisions). 
 11. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1682–83 
(describing the complex issues associated with balancing religious liberty and 
the general public interest).  
 12. See infra Part IV (establishing a balancing test that considers certain 
religious practices and resulting health and safety concerns). 
 13. Infra Part IV. 
 14. Infra Part II. 
 15. Infra Part III. 
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Part IV proceeds to articulate and develop a test for resolving 
these conflicts.16 It shows how the test may be used by differently 
situated decision-makers in a manner that plays to their 
institutional strengths. It explores how the test appropriately 
mediates between the competing philosophical values at stake 
and aids in sorting out the complex interplay between different 
constitutional norms. This Part concludes by illustrating 
application of the test in a variety of contexts. Part V considers 
several implications and limitations of, as well as possible 
objections to, the test. The Article concludes by highlighting 
several benefits of the test.  
II. To Accommodate or Not to Accommodate? 
Every society must choose whether and how to accommodate, 
celebrate, or undermine religious sub-communities’ distinctive 
identities and practices within the larger polity.17 In this Part, we 
                                                                                                     
 16. Infra Part IV. 
 17. Two related issues that we will not address are (1) what constitutes 
religion and (2) which religions deserve government recognition. Religion may 
be regarded alternatively as theistic belief systems, in which a Divine presence 
with a will governs or influences the world. See, e.g., Genesis 1:3 (“And God said, 
Let there be light: and there was light.”); John 3:16 (“For God so loved the 
world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him 
should not perish, but have everlasting life.”). Other belief systems involve 
transcendental or numinous concepts, see, e.g., CHARLES TALIAFERRO, A 
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 640–41 (2d ed., 2010) (discussing the 
reincarnation and karma belief systems), or any entity or belief that “speak[s] of 
the depths of your life, of the source of your being, of your ultimate concern, of 
what you take seriously without any reservation.” United States v. Seeger, 380 
U.S. 163, 187 (1965) (quoting PAUL TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 
57 (1948)). We do not choose among these and other alternative definitions. 
As for the question of which religions deserve government recognition, the 
Establishment Clause forbids the government from officially recognizing or 
privileging any religion or religious group over others. See U.S. CONST. amend. I 
(“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). Further, as we will discuss, a single 
religion may have different groups, sects, or denominations within it, all of 
which are owed equal treatment by the government. Id. Cases have suggested 
that even idiosyncratic religious beliefs, if sincerely held, are entitled to the 
same respect as established religions. See Ben-Levi v. Brown, 136 S. Ct. 930, 
932 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting) (stressing that the lower courts improperly 
found that Ben-Levi’s religious exercise was not burdened because he 
“misunderstands his own religion”); Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015) 
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(noting that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act protects 
‘‘‘any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by or central to a system of 
religious belief’” (citation omitted)); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723–24 
(2005) (upholding the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(RLUIPA) where inmates from non-mainstream religions challenged the 
prison’s refusal to accommodate their religious needs). Some cases and scholars 
have gone so far as to suggest that non-transcendental beliefs of conscience are 
also to be treated as “religious” for statutory or constitutional purposes. See 
generally Seeger, 380 U.S. at 187; Kent Greenawalt, The Significance of 
Conscience, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 901, 917–18 (2010). For a brief review of the 
literature about the relationship between freedom of conscience claims and 
freedom of religion claims, see Nathan S. Chapman, Disentangling Conscience 
and Religion, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1457, 1459–61 (2013). Chapman’s Article goes 
on to thoughtfully address this relationship in greater detail. Id. 
On the other hand, some contemporary Western states recognize official 
religions and thus have a relatively narrow definition of which religions deserve 
government recognition. Other states, such as those in the former Soviet bloc, 
place open religious expression that does not take place under the aegis of 
government-sanctioned religious groups at serious legal disadvantage (e.g., 
Russia, Hungary). See International Religious Freedom Report for 2014, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE (2014), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index. 
htm#wrapper (last visited Feb. 12, 2016) (noting the difficulties faced by 
non-government sanctioned religious groups) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). More liberal states have, at times, discriminated against 
religious bodies that do not fully accept government legitimacy (e.g., Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, Scientology). See generally Keturah A. Dunner, Comment, 
Addressing Religious Intolerance in Europe: The Limited Application of Article 9 
of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 30 
CAL. W. INT’L. L.J. 117 (1999) (noting discriminatory actions taken by the 
government against perceived “dangerous” religious groups). Our focus in this 
Article, however, is on American law, which does not assign some religious 
bodies greater legitimacy than others. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
There is a rich scholarly literature debating these issues and the difficult 
questions they raise. See, e.g., Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed 
Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 234 (1989) (“In spite 
of the concept’s antiquity, courts and scholars continue to battle over what does 
and does not constitute a religion.”); Jeffrey Omar Usman, Defining Religion: 
The Struggle to Define Religion Under the First Amendment and the 
Contributions and Insights of Other Disciplines of Study Including Theology, 
Psychology, Sociology, the Arts, and Anthropology, 83 N.D. L. REV. 123, 126 
(2007) (debating what exactly constitutes religion in the United States). In the 
spirit of candor, we note that even the authors of this Article have different 
instincts concerning these issues. One of us has a provisionally narrow view of 
what constitutes “religion” in American law, while the other two lean toward a 
broader or even maximalist definition. All of us recognize the difficulties in each 
possible approach. 
In any event, the focus of this Article is not on defining religion. Instead, we 
address a different question: given a practice that is understood to be religious—
under any specific operative definition—when should the government tolerate 
the practice if it imposes harms on the children of the religious practitioners or 
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review the scholarly literature and the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on how American constitutional law should and 
does resolve these questions. Because these debates and doctrines 
are familiar to scholars and students, our review of the literature 
and law is brief. 
We conclude this Part by suggesting that the United States 
has privileged accommodationism over non-accommodationism in 
constitutional and statutory law as compared with other Western 
democracies, though its accommodationist stance is 
inconsistent.18 
A. Accommodation vs. Non-Accommodation: The Scholarly 
Debates 
From a broad and abstract perspective, the question of 
whether to accommodate religious groups’ special needs and 
practices can be seen as part of a broader question. Should society 
generally demand conformity and assimilation to liberal norms 
and policies preferred by the majority, or—taking a “live and let 
live” approach—should the law allow minority and nonconformist 
groups and individuals to live their lives and order their 
communities as they see fit? This question extends well beyond 
the issue of accommodation of religious practices. The broader 
question is one of political philosophy, and political philosophers 
and others have had a good deal to say about it.19 It follows that 
                                                                                                     
on third parties? 
 18. Compare infra notes 31–43, 125–129 and accompanying text (noting 
that Congress enacted—with near unanimity—the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act (RLUIPA), which subject even incidental restrictions on religious 
groups to strict scrutiny, thereby requiring frequent special accommodations 
and exceptions for religious groups), with infra notes 44–47, 130–141 and 
accompanying text (noting issues and situations where American law is not so 
deferential to religious beliefs, such as those involving discrimination, animus, 
mistrust, indifference, lack of awareness, or political self-interest). 
 19. Paul Weithman characterizes liberal democracy as entailing “moral 
commitments which are in some way normative for its citizens. Among the most 
important of these are commitments to liberty and equality, religion toleration, 
self-government, majoritarianism, the rule of law, and some measure of 
church-state separation. The precise content and implications of these 
commitments are matters of disagreement.” PAUL J. WEITHMAN, RELIGION AND 
THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 1 (2002). While all self-described liberals would 
924 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915 (2016) 
                                                                                                     
likely agree with each of these principles in the abstract, when the principles 
conflict with one another—as they do in the conflicts between majority practices 
and non-conformists’ groups practices—different philosophical instincts lead in 
different directions. See generally GREGORY FERNANDO PAPPAS, PRAGMATISM IN 
THE AMERICAS 231 (2011). 
Two liberal–democratic impulses, those that enshrine majority rule and 
equality together reflect a general privileging of the non-accommodationist 
viewpoint, which roughly correlates with the familiar “melting pot” metaphor 
for social integration. See id. at 231 (“For the cultural monist, the idea of the 
‘melting pot’ ought to be the model for dealing with newcomers to American 
culture.”). Society, through its elected leaders, determines its own values and 
makes laws consistent with those values. Those laws, in turn, apply equally to 
all, regardless of the individual’s own views as to the relative merits of the laws 
and their underlying values. 
But two of liberalism’s other core values are personal autonomy and 
freedom. Even those who do not adhere to the Millian harm principle would 
likely regard personal liberty as at least a prima facie good. See JOHN STUART 
MILL, ON LIBERTY 6 (1913) (“[T]he only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, 
is to prevent harm to others.”). Even those espousing the most 
non-accommodationist position would temper these pure majority rules and 
equality instincts with a concern for individual rights and freedoms. More 
controversial is multiculturalism—the idea that groups themselves have rights 
or prerogatives. See generally CHARLES TAYLOR, EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF 
RECOGNITION IN MULTICULTURALISM 25 (Amy Gutmann ed. 1994) (explaining 
multiculturalism and its different implications). This can be manifested in one 
of several ways. Groups may have powers over their members, such as religious 
control over family law in some nations. Id. Individuals within those groups may 
either deserve exemption from general laws, for example, by being allowed to 
use their own language, or may not be entitled to protection of the laws against 
some actions of their cultural group or its members. Id.  
However, liberal monists—what Richard Shweder calls imperial liberals—
insist that liberal ways of life “are objectively more valuable than illiberal ways 
of life and should replace them.” Richard A. Shweder, Shouting at the Hebrews: 
Imperial Liberalism v. Liberal Pluralism and the Practice of Male Circumcision, 
5 L., CULTURE & HUMAN. 247, 247 (2009). Consequently, if a group’s practices 
are deemed to be inconsistent with liberalism by the majority, they would not be 
accommodated. Id. at 247. That is, sub-communities that reject the liberal 
commitments to individual autonomy, freedom, and a degree of social equality 
represent a threat to liberal ideals and to their predominance, and are 
consequently disfavored by liberal monists. See id. at 248 (asserting that liberal 
monists believe that practices they deem as “illiberal” should be disallowed in 
society). For these reasons, scholars whom we would characterize as liberal 
monists tend to see the ideal state as a secular liberal democracy that generally 
rejects religious accommodation when accommodation would be at odds with 
liberal commitments. Id. They would favor predominance of the central state 
over intermediate organizations with thick beliefs, including, but not limited to, 
religion. See generally Robert Audi, Moral Foundations of Liberal Democracy, 
Secular Reasons, and Liberal Neutrality Toward the Good, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L., 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 197 (2005) (explaining the normative foundations of a 
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liberal democracy). 
A related tenet that theoreticians of liberal democracy may espouse is that 
the state should vigorously protect a wide panoply of individual rights not only 
against government but also against non-state actors, including families. See 
generally James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking 
the Doctrine of Parents’ Rights, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1371 (1994) (proposing that 
children’s rights, as opposed to parents’ rights, should be the basis for protecting 
the legal interests of children, and that parents should be confined to having 
only child-rearing privileges, limited to actions that do not harm the child’s 
interests). Thus, parents are said not to have rights with regard to their 
children. See generally id. (arguing that children must be protected by the state from 
their parents); Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature Citizens and the State, 2010 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1055, 1078 (2010) (arguing that the state must protect the 
immature by not giving parents unchecked authority over them).  
In contrast to liberal monists, liberal pluralists “make room for 
practices . . . whose moral foundations must be understood on more than, or 
other than, liberal terms,” religious or not. Shweder, supra note 19, at 253. In 
other words, liberal pluralism, which roughly correlates with the “salad bowl” 
vision of social integration and diversity, accepts some practices that do not 
comport with a liberal worldview. See id. at 261 (noting that the logic of liberal 
pluralism leaves room for the toleration of illiberal practices and does not 
demand a moral judgment calling for the universal replacement of illiberal 
practices by liberal ones). There are two kinds of justifications for such liberal 
pluralism: idealist and pragmatic. See id.at 265 (“[A] balance must be struck 
between liberal and illiberal values to sustain any particular way of life.”). 
Broadly speaking, idealist justifications suggest that pluralism is desirable, 
either in the abstract or in the particular circumstances of a given society, 
whereas pragmatic justifications suggest that regardless of whether pluralism is 
desirable, it may nevertheless be necessary for a state to achieve its larger 
goals. See id. (“[A]ny society that tried to keep everyone’s options open 
everywhere and all the time would be following a recipe for producing chaos, 
frustration and endless failures of trust and cooperation among members of the 
same society . . . .”). To be sure, it is not always clear which category a 
justification fits into, and some may have characteristics of both. 
One clearly idealist justification for liberal pluralism asserts a principled 
commitment to diversity. William A. Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, 105 
ETHICS 515, 523 (1995). As William Galston notes, “[L]iberalism is about the 
protection of diversity.” Id. In this view, diversity itself is a valuable and 
desirable end, and even groups that espouse illiberal positions must be 
tolerated. Id. A related idea is that preserving rights of conscience serves as a 
bulwark against moral totalitarianism. See Chapman, supra note 17, at 1494–99 
(arguing that protection of conscience’s values promotes personal integrity and 
undermines the totalization of morality by the government). From a pragmatic 
standpoint, pluralism and accommodation may be necessary for the state to 
maintain its legitimacy, which is necessary for ensuring broad obedience of the 
law. See Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 
57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 376–77 (2006) (asserting that a State’s legitimacy is 
largely dependent on the population’s feelings toward its leaders and whether 
the people feel that the State leaders are entitled to rule). That is, if the State 
does not accommodate minority groups’ practices and preferences, the 
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legal assertions in this area are likely to have a tacit or explicit 
basis in political theory. In practical terms, the laws of a diverse 
democratic state must provide a compromise among individuals 
and groups with diverse viewpoints in this area, and we do not 
attempt to resolve the basic philosophical differences. 
Rather, we are concerned with the narrower question of 
whether the law should provide special accommodations for 
practices that are motivated by religious conscience. That is, does 
religion have features entitling people who act out of sincere 
religious belief to receive special dispensation from the state 
under circumstances in which those who undertake similar 
actions for non-religious reasons would be punished? Here, too, 
the literature is rich.20 Proponents of religious accommodation 
                                                                                                     
legitimacy of the State may corrode. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS 
AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 
xxviii (William Rehg trans., 1988) (“[T]he law employed by the State . . . must 
itself be legitimated through a broader discourse of citizens and their 
representatives.”); see also Jonathan Jackson et al., Why Do People Comply with 
the Law? Legitimacy and the Influence of Legal Institutions, 52 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 1051, 1054 (2012) (arguing that citizens are more likely to obey 
State officials when they believe that the institution acts according to their 
shared moral purposes). 
 20. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 50 (2007) (arguing for a neutral approach to 
religion); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 1 
(2013) (arguing for protection of both religion and conscience claims under the 
Free Exercise Clause); BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 8 (2013) 
(arguing that religious claims of conscience should not be given preferential 
treatment to secular claims of conscience); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm 
Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. 
LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555, 572–74 (1998) (arguing that there are no plausible 
explanations supporting religious exemptions); Micah Schwartzman, What If 
Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1378 (2012) (arguing that 
religion deserves no special treatment from a moral perspective). But see 
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response 
to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 689–94 (1992) (arguing that religion is 
special and must be treated with more than formal neutrality); Michael W. 
McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 3 (2000) 
(“My thesis is that ‘singling out religion’ for special constitutional protection is 
fully consistent with our constitutional tradition.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
God Is Great, Garvey Is Good: Making Sense of Religious Freedom, 72 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1597, 1609 (1997) (reviewing JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE 
FREEDOMS FOR? (1996)) (commenting that the core reason for religious liberty is 
that the founding generation singled out religion for special protection because 
of its intrinsic importance). 
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argue that religion is indeed special.21 Micah Schwartzman has 
summarized their arguments as follows: 
[T]he main normative argument for religious 
accommodation is based on the idea that religious believers 
have an inalienable right to pursue salvation according to the 
dictates of their consciences. The explicitly religious premise of 
this argument is that God, or some transcendent authority, 
has imposed duties on mankind and that fulfillment of those 
duties takes priority over complying with positive law . . . . To 
avoid infringing on [the duty to obey God], the state should 
minimize conflicts between legal and religious duties, which it 
can do partly by granting exemptions from laws that burden 
religious practices. 
A second and related argument for religious accommodation 
is that when religious believers are forced to choose between 
their religious and legal duties, they experience greater 
suffering than nonbelievers faced with similar moral conflicts. 
Because believers affirm the existence of a transcendent 
authority and fear extratemporal punishments, they are 
anguished in ways that nonbelievers are not.22 
On the other hand, opponents of religious accommodation 
argue “that privileging religious over secular claims violates a 
fundamental principle of neutrality,” because in “singling out 
religion for special treatment, the government discriminates 
impermissibly against nonbelievers and sends a message that 
their views have an inferior status in the law.”23 Thus, for 
example, Eisgruber and Sager assert that the state is not obliged 
“to accept a religious believer’s judgment about the importance of 
her religious interests as compared to the legitimate secular 
interests of the state.”24 In this view, religious values and actions 
flowing from them should never be privileged over secular ones.25 
                                                                                                     
 21. See, e.g., Schwartzman, supra note 20, at 1365–66 (providing 
arguments and reasoning used by proponents of religious accommodation in 
support of the proposition that religion deserves accommodation in society). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 1374.  
 24. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of 
Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1286 (1994).  
 25. See id. (“[T]he deep interests of individuals figure into but do not 
override the secular concerns of the state . . . .”). 
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B. Accommodation vs. Non-Accommodation: Tracing the Supreme 
Court’s Approach 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof.”26 The Supreme Court has vacillated in its 
understanding of what the latter guarantee, the Free Exercise 
Clause, requires in terms of religious accommodation.27 In its 
case of first impression, Reynolds v. United States,28 decided 
ninety years after the First Amendment was enacted, the Court 
held that the Free Exercise Clause does not require special 
accommodations for religious believers.29 Thus, the Reynolds 
Court held that states could enforce a statute criminalizing 
bigamy even against defendants whose bigamy was motivated by 
sincere religious beliefs.30  
However, in its seminal 1963 decision in Sherbert v. Verner,31 
the Court interpreted the Free Exercise Clause more robustly and 
announced that strict scrutiny would apply to any law that 
substantially—though incidentally—interfered with a person’s 
religious beliefs or religiously-motivated conduct.32 Under this 
new rule, to interfere with religious practices, the government 
would have to articulate a compelling interest and demonstrate 
that there was no less intrusive means of achieving the state’s 
interest.33  
                                                                                                     
 26. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 27. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–68 (1878) 
(concluding that the Free Exercise Clause does not require special 
accommodations for religious believers); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402–
03 (1963) (finding that government may not infringe upon religious beliefs 
without a compelling purpose).  
 28. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 29. See id. at 167 (reasoning that to “permit this [religious exemption] 
would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law 
of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. 
Government could exist only in name under such circumstances”). 
 30. See id. (concluding that a person cannot be excused from committing a 
crime simply because he does so in the name of religion).  
 31. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).  
 32. See id. at 402 (“The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly 
closed against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs . . . .”). 
 33. See id. at 403 (noting that the government may regulate if certain 
religious beliefs or practices pose a substantial threat to public safety, peace, or 
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Subsequent opinions eroded the Court’s commitment to strict 
scrutiny.34 In Goldman v. Weinberger,35 the Court rejected the 
application of strict scrutiny in the military context, where the 
plaintiff argued that the military’s dress policy interfered with 
his right to wear a yarmulke on his head.36 In O’Lone v. Estate of 
Shabazz,37 the Court ruled that strict scrutiny also did not apply 
in the prison context.38 Cases involving American Indians, 
including Bowen v. Roy39 and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Ass’n,40 further weakened the strict scrutiny regime.41 
To be sure, the Supreme Court frequently carves out denials to 
servicemen and prisoners that it permits to other citizens on the 
grounds that servicemen have waived and prisoners have 
forfeited some of their liberties;42 and cases involving American 
Indians may also be seen as unique, as the rights claimed by 
                                                                                                     
order). 
 34. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509–10 (1986) 
(concluding that the First Amendment does not require the military to 
accommodate certain religiously held practices if it would not be in the 
military’s best interest); O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987) 
(reasoning that the First Amendment does not prevent prisons from exercising 
their best judgment in running a prison). 
 35. 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
 36. See id. at 509–10 (“[T]he First Amendment does not require the 
military to accommodate such practices in the face of its view that they would 
detract from the uniformity sought by the dress regulations.”). 
 37. 482 U.S. 342 (1987). 
 38. See id. at 353 (“[C]oncerns of prison administrators provide adequate 
support for the conclusion that accommodations of respondents’ request to 
attend Jumu’ah would have undesirable results in the institution. These 
difficulties also make clear that there are no obvious, easy alternatives to the 
policy adopted by petitioners.”). 
 39. 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
 40. 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
 41. See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 695–98 (requiring appellants to obtain a Social 
Security card for their daughter even though appellants claim it violates their 
Native American religious beliefs); Lyng, 485 U.S. at 441–42 (finding that the 
First Amendment did not preclude appellants from completing a road or from 
permitting timber harvesting on Indian religious grounds because those 
religious practices must yield to higher consideration). 
 42. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 525 (1986) (“Except as 
otherwise required by ‘interests of the highest order,’ soldiers as well as civilians 
are entitled to follow the dictates of their faiths.”); O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 348 
(citing cases that note that lawfully imprisoned individuals give up at least 
some constitutional rights). 
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American Indians have a political component as well as a 
religious component because of treaties that Indian tribes signed 
ceding some, but not all, of their sovereignty to the federal 
government.43 
Eventually, in 1990, the Court reversed Sherbert and rolled 
back strict scrutiny for all persons under its jurisdiction in its 
opinion in Employment Division v. Smith.44 Smith had argued 
that he should not be fired from his job for ingesting peyote, a 
hallucination-inducing drug, as part of a religious ceremony.45 In 
rejecting this claim, the Court promulgated a new standard, 
holding that the Constitution does not require strict scrutiny of 
general laws with secular intent that are neutrally applied and 
that only incidentally interfere with religious practices.46 Because 
the prohibition on peyote was neutrally applied to all, and was 
neither intended to burden nor applied to discriminate against 
religious users, it was presumptively valid; the Free Exercise 
Clause did not protect Smith.47 
The Court has continued to adhere to Smith’s general rule 
but has refined it.48 In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
                                                                                                     
 43. See, e.g., Philip J. Prygoski, From Marshall to Marshall: The Supreme 
Court’s Changing Stance on Tribal Sovereignty, AM. BAR ASS’N (1995), 
http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home/gp
_solo_magazine_index/marshall.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2016) (discussing the 
effects of treaties between the United States and Native American tribes on 
tribal sovereignty) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 44. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith 494 U.S. 872, 886–87 (1990) (“It is no more 
appropriate for judges to determine the centrality of religious beliefs before 
applying a compelling interest test in the free exercise field, than it would be for 
them to determine the importance of ideas before applying the compelling 
interest test in the free speech field.”). 
 45. Id. at 874. 
 46. See id. at 892 (“The Court today extracts from our long history of free 
exercise precedents the single categorical rule that if prohibiting the exercise of 
religion . . . is . . . merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and 
otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.”). 
 47. See id. at 879 (“Subsequent decisions have consistently held that the 
right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply 
with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law 
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).”). 
 48. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520, 531–32 (1993) (striking down an ordinance that was not neutral or 
generally applicable and did not contain a compelling government interest). 
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City of Hialeah,49 the Court struck down a local ordinance that 
interfered with animal sacrifice by members of the Santeria 
religion.50 The Court reasoned that the ordinance in question, 
though perhaps facially neutral, was not neutral in effect because 
it had been deliberately crafted to target a religious practice.51 
Most recently, in Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC,52 the Court 
incorporated a ministerial exception into its Free Exercise 
doctrine, holding that anti-discrimination laws, though neutral 
and generally applicable, could not apply to restrict a religious 
organization’s decisions concerning employment of its ministers, 
defined as “those who will personify [a church’s] beliefs.”53 
This is essentially where constitutional doctrine stands 
today. Truly neutral laws of general applicability do not violate 
the Free Exercise Clause and are presumptively valid, except in 
the context of religious organizations’ ministerial employment 
decisions, and perhaps their internal regulations and behavior 
more broadly.54 
C. Beyond Philosophy and Constitutionalism: 
Accommodationism Today 
In navigating between the poles of accommodation and 
non-accommodation, all modern liberal societies have staked out 
middle grounds, seeking to balance the interests on both sides. 
American politics have generally produced a more 
accommodationist stance than those adopted by some other 
                                                                                                     
 49. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 50. Id. at 547. 
 51. See id. at 534 (“Official action that targets religious conduct for 
distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the 
requirement of facial neutrality. The Free Exercise Clause protects against 
governmental hostility which is masked as well as overt.”). 
 52. 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 53. Id. at 697. 
 54. See id. at 702 (allowing religious groups to shape their own faith and 
mission through its ministerial appointments); Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872 (1990) (concluding that neutral and generally applicable laws do not violate 
the Free Exercise Clause).  
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liberal democracies even though this has not been required since 
Smith.55 
For example, Scandinavian attitudes tend to lean toward 
non-accommodation, as expressed in the compulsory education 
requirements in Finland,56 Denmark bans on both the Jewish 
and Islamic ritual slaughter of animals on the grounds that 
“animal rights come before religion,”57 and Danish and Swedish 
medical associations’ recommendation to ban ritual male infant 
circumcision, though the governments of these countries have not 
banned circumcision currently.58 France has banned religious 
clothing—veils, turbans, yarmulkes, hijabs, and so on—from the 
public classroom and has outlawed veils that cover one’s face in 
most public places.59 Scandinavian countries come to 
non-accommodation of minority religions in part from their 
tradition in Christianity, whereas France has a long history of 
                                                                                                     
 55. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 872 (finding that a law prohibiting the ingestion 
of peyote was neutral, generally applicable—not targeting any specific religion—
and therefore valid). 
 56. See Peter Wilby, Finland’s Education Ambassador Spreads the Word, 
THE GUARDIAN (July 1, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/ education/2013/jul/ 
01/education-michael-gove-finland-gcse (last visited Jan. 16, 2016) (explaining 
Finland’s education system, including the requirement that children attend 
school from the age of seven to sixteen) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 57. Adam Withnall, Denmark Bans Kosher and Halal Slaughter as 
Minister Says ‘Animal Rights Come Before Religion’, THE INDEP. (Feb. 18, 2014), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/denmark-bans-halal-and-
kosher-slaughter-as-minister-says-animal-rights-come-before-religion-
9135580.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 58. See Lydia Smith, Sweden and Denmark Recommend Ban on 
Non-Medical Circumcision of Boys, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2014), 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/sweden-denmark-recommend-ban-non-medical-
circumcision-boys-1434354 (last visited Jan. 16, 2016) (“In Denmark, the Danish 
College of General Practitioners penned a statement that denounced 
circumcision was akin to abuse and mutilation. In a poll undertaken by the 
newspaper BT, it was revealed that 87% were in favour of a ban on the 
procedure.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 59. See Elaine Ganely, French School Bans Muslim Girl from Wearing 
Long Skirt, Prompting Twitter Backlash, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 29, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/29/french-muslim-skirt-
ban_n_7170140.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2016) (explaining why a girl was 
banned from class for wearing religious clothing) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
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freedom of religious belief combined with exclusion of religion 
from the public sphere.60 
In contrast, the United States seems to lean more toward 
accommodationism even in the absence of any constitutional 
obligation.61 Lupu and Tuttle have observed that “[r]eligious 
activity and pluralism in the United States far outstrip that of 
any other Western nation, yet religious strife has played no 
significant part in our history.”62 Our anti-totalitarian country is 
one of hyphenated identities, multiculturalist and tolerant ethos, 
and individualist self-conception.63 This pluralist impulse extends 
beyond just religious accommodationism, though it is perhaps 
most evident and pronounced in that context.64 
Our accommodationist tendencies may arise from political 
and cultural attitudes and discourse that date back to our 
country’s founding ideals and immigrant history.65 As George 
Washington wrote to the Jewish community of Newport, Rhode 
Island, “the United States, which gives to bigotry no sanction, to 
persecution no assistance, requires only that they who live under 
its protection should demean themselves as good citizens.”66 
                                                                                                     
 60. See Andrew M. Greeley, Religious Decline in Europe?, AM. NAT’L 
CATHOLIC REV. (Mar. 1, 2004), http://americamagazine.org/issue/475/ 
article/religious-decline-europe (last visited Jan. 16, 2016) (stating that religion 
in France is declining, while there are high rates of atheism and nonaffiliation) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 61. See generally Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 
1617 (addressing the surprising degree of religious accommodation adopted by 
elected officials). 
 62. Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities 
in Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 39 (2002). 
 63. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1660 
(suggesting that religious tolerance is “deeply embedded in our collective 
identity”). 
 64. See id. (positing that Americans’ customs involving religious 
accommodation spill over into other areas of life). 
 65. See id. (discussing American history and self-identity). 
 66. Letter from George Washington to Touro Synagogue (1790), AM. 
TREASURES OF THE LIB. OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/ 
trm006.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). This, of course, begs the question of what is a good citizen. 
Requiring more of a good citizen than generally obeying the laws and not 
knowingly working against the interests of the nation would exclude many 
people who are not ordinarily thought of as bad citizens, but who are simply 
indifferent to public affairs. Using as minimal a test as bothering to vote would 
still exclude many people from the ranks of good citizens. See Lawrence Ezrow 
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As we will demonstrate, the structure of our government and 
the nature of interest group politics also contribute to this 
tolerant and accommodationist dynamic.67 All of that said, this 
general embrace of pluralism is hardly complete or consistent.68 
1. Constitutional Expressions of Accommodationism and Their 
Limits 
Those parts of the Bill of Rights that most clearly reflect the 
accommodationist mindset include the First Amendment’s 
Establishment Clause,69 Free Exercise Clause,70 and Free Speech 
Clause.71 Each of these stands, at least, for two propositions: That 
individuals cannot be compelled to conform to a particular 
religious or secular viewpoint, and that they retain sufficient 
autonomy to reject the beliefs and values of the majority or of the 
government itself.72  
                                                                                                     
& Georgios Xezonakis, Satisfaction with Democracy and Voter Turnout: A 
Temporal Perspective, PARTY POL. 1, 3 (2014), http://privatewww.essex. 
ac.uk/~ezrow/publications/Satisfaction%20with%20Democracy%20and%20Voter%
20Turnout.pdf (documenting that voter turnout in twelve democracies in 
Western and Southern Europe from 1976 to 2011, and ranging from 60% to 
85%); see also Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2012—
Detailed Tables, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2012), http://www.census.gov/ 
hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2012/tables.html (last updated May 8, 
2013) (last visited Jan. 16, 2016) (documenting that fewer than 65% of eligible 
Americans in the United States voted in the most recent presidential election) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 67. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1657 (“[The 
United States] is among the most religiously tolerant and accommodating 
country in the world, with religious minority groups enjoying overwhelming 
liberty, thanks largely to the beneficence of the majoritarian branches of 
government.”).  
 68. See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the road blocks the First Amendment 
places on state and federal government action in the interest of preserving 
freedom of speech and religion). 
 69. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting Congress from making any law 
“respecting an establishment of religion”). 
 70. See id. (denying Congress the power to prohibit the free exercise of 
religion). 
 71. See id. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press . . . .”). 
 72. The consistent overruling of government action even where 
governmental interests would appear to be strong demonstrates the high value 
placed on such propositions. See infra notes 75–89 and accompanying text 
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Education law offers an illuminating example of the embrace 
of religious exercise and individualist expression.73 Schooling is 
one of the few widely shared experiences in our society and is, to 
boot, a formative experience for future participants in our 
political and social culture. Enormous resources are devoted to 
our public schools,74 in part because an educated citizenry is 
widely considered fundamental to the viability of our national 
project.75 If ever the state had an interest in conformity and 
enforced participation in its pursuit of the public good, 
compulsory public education with a common curriculum would be 
a superb expression of this interest.76 
Yet the Supreme Court has read the Speech and Religion 
Clauses to drastically constrain the ability of the state to 
inculcate even the most basic civic values when doing so conflicts 
with parents’ religious or philosophical commitments and 
affiliations. For instance, the state is prohibited from mandating 
attendance at public schools,77 from restricting the subjects that 
may be taught to children,78 from limiting even information 
                                                                                                     
(comparing cases in which the government survived and failed First 
Amendment challenges). 
 73. See infra notes 77–87 and accompanying text (citing cases ruling—
fairly consistently—in favor of freedom of religion and speech, except where 
plaintiffs failed to establish an actual burden or the state action was neutral 
with respect to religion). 
 74. See generally Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Financing Adequate 
Educational Opportunity, 14 J.L. & POL. 483 (1998) (discussing the amount of 
resources poured into public education but lamenting the discrepancies in 
funding across public schools). 
 75. See id. at 484  (“[Education] is required in the performance of our most 
basic responsibilities . . . . It is the very foundation of good citizenship.” (quoting 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954))). 
 76. See infra notes 77–81 and accompanying text (discussing mandatory 
public school attendance laws). 
 77. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (finding Wisconsin’s 
compulsory school attendance law to unduly burden defendant’s rights under 
the Free Exercise Clause). While Wisconsin did have an interest in ensuring 
that children are “self-reliant and self-sufficient” members of society, the Court 
found that the additional two years mandated by the law “would do little to 
serve those interests.” Id. at 221–22. 
 78. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987) (finding Louisiana’s 
Creationism Act—forbidding the teaching of the theory of evolution without also 
teaching “creation science”—violative of the Establishment Clause because it 
lacked a “clear secular purpose”).  
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deemed transgressive that is available to students,79 or from 
demanding expressions of fealty and allegiance to the 
government.80 Parents are allowed to send their children to 
non-government schools,81 and the state may even provide cash 
vouchers82 and tax deductions for private school—including 
religious school—tuition.83 
More generally, although the precise contours of the 
Constitution’s speech and religion guarantees are subject to 
contention, all would at least agree with the fundamental 
proposition that the government is constitutionally barred from 
imposing on its citizens any single ideological vision, religious or 
secular.84 Thus, the courts have been clear that the guarantee of 
freedom of speech protects expression of even the most 
marginalized and disagreeable ideas.85 If a public institution 
                                                                                                     
 79. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 868 (1982) (finding the Board of 
Education’s rejection of books it deemed “anti-Christian,” “anti-American,” etc. 
violative of the First Amendment). 
 80. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) 
(invalidating a state statute mandating students to salute the American flag in 
school). The plaintiffs’ religion forbade worshipping a symbol—in the present 
case, the American flag. Id. Therefore, by mandating the salute, the law violated 
the First Amendment by compelling plaintiffs to act against their faith. Id. But 
see Mozert v. Hawkins Cty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1068 (6th Cir. 1987) 
(upholding the use of certain textbooks in school because plaintiffs failed to 
show that reading the textbooks posed an actual burden on their free exercise of 
religion). 
 81. Compare Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–36 (1925) 
(declaring an Oregon statute—requiring public school attendance and 
forbidding private school attendance—unconstitutional), with Jonathan L. v. 
Superior Court, 165 Cal. App. 4th 1074, 1101 (2008) (declaring that there is no 
absolute constitutional right to home school one’s children), and El Paso Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. McIntyre, 457 S.W.3d 475, 499 (Tex. App. 2014) (same). 
 82. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653–54 (2002) (finding a 
state plan subsidizing private school tuition neutral with respect to religion 
because aid was granted based on secular criteria). 
 83. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390–91 (1983) (validating a state 
law granting deductions for expenditures on school supplies that predominantly 
benefitted parents of children attending parochial schools). 
 84. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (“[N]o official, high or petty, can prescribe 
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”). 
 85. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) 
(declaring a California statute banning the rental of violent video games to 
minors unconstitutional and noting that video games qualify for First 
Amendment protection); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010) 
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chooses to rent its facilities to private groups, it is prohibited 
from excluding religious groups or groups with disfavored views 
from the opportunity to rent the facilities.86 If a legislative body 
chooses to permit a religious invocation during proceedings, it 
may not select speakers based on the degree to which their beliefs 
or expressions comport with the state’s own values.87 If a 
religious display is erected on public property, it will only be 
upheld as constitutional if enough secular or competing religious 
symbols are included to make clear to the viewer that the 
message being conveyed is one of pluralism.88 Religious non-profit 
organizations, as well as intimate and expressive associational 
groups, generally are not subject to anti-discrimination laws that 
interfere with their own core values and autonomy.89 And under 
our Constitution, there are no officially recognized religious 
                                                                                                     
(invalidating a federal law aimed to illegalize the distribution of depictions of 
animal cruelty); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002) (finding 
a portion of a statute banning the production of virtual child pornography 
unconstitutional because the material was neither obscene nor “‘intrinsically 
related’ to the sexual abuse of children” (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 
747, 759 (1982))); Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 226 (4th Cir. 2009) (allowing 
an anti-homosexual demonstration near a service member’s funeral); Robb v. 
Hungerbeeler, 370 F.3d 735, 745 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that the regulation that 
prevented the Ku Klux Klan from adopting a highway was unconstitutional); 
Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1210 (7th Cir. 1978) (invalidating prohibitions 
that prevented Nazi demonstrations). But see generally Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (upholding a statute banning material support to 
designated terrorist organizations). In Humanitarian Law Project, instructing 
terrorist group members how to use the law to settle disputes was considered 
“material support;” and the Court therefore found that the statute was not 
unconstitutional as applied. Id. at 25–28.  
 86. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (holding that a school 
that created a forum open to student groups could not exclude religious groups 
from using the facilities). 
 87. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983) (holding that 
Nebraska’s practice of opening its legislative sessions with a prayer was not a 
violation of the Establishment Clause because “there is no indication that the 
prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to 
disparage any other, faith or belief”). 
 88. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (allowing a city to 
display a crèche because it also has a secular purpose). 
 89. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338–40 (1987) (holding that a religious 
exemption to the prohibition against religious discrimination in employment 
does not violate the Establishment Clause because religious organizations have 
an interest in autonomy in selecting their leaders and employees). 
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spokespeople or representatives.90 Each person is entitled to her 
own religious views and commitments, however idiosyncratic, 
and is thus entitled to the same religious freedoms as anyone 
else.91 
Beyond the First Amendment, other constitutional 
guarantees also resonate with a broadly tolerant approach. 
Lawrence v. Texas92 held that under the Due Process Clause, the 
state may not legislate on the basis of morality alone.93 The Due 
Process Clause and other constitutional provisions have been 
held to fundamentally guarantee a measure of bodily and sexual 
autonomy, privacy, and the right to parent one’s children.94 These 
rights reinforce the limits of the state’s ability to impose the 
majority’s moral values on the minority.95  
Even the Constitution’s basic structural elements protect 
dissenters. Our federalist structure allows different states to 
preserve their different characters.96 State constitutions and 
statutes further devolve governmental authority to 
municipalities, counties, and local school boards.97 Thus, 
                                                                                                     
 90. This is likely the result of the Constitution’s Establishment Clause. 
U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 91. See id. (prohibiting any law dealing with the establishment of religion). 
 92. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 93. See id. at 578–79 (“The State cannot demean [petitioners’] existence or 
control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.”).  
 94. See id. at 573–74 (stating that the laws give protection to “decisions 
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child 
rearing, and education” (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 851 (1992))); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (finding 
a statute outlawing teachers from teaching students languages other than 
English “arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within the 
competency of the State”). 
 95. This proposition is best exemplified by Lawrence. See Lawrence, 539 
U.S. at 582 (finding that “moral disapproval is [not] a legitimate state interest 
to justify by itself a statute that bans homosexual sodomy, but not heterosexual 
sodomy”). 
 96. See William G. Buss, Essay, An Essay on Federalism, Separation of 
Powers, and the Demise of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 83 IOWA L. 
REV. 391, 396 (1998) (“A most elementary principle of American constitutional 
law is that the United States Constitution creates a ‘federal system,’ under 
which sovereign power is divided between the national government and state 
governments.” (citation omitted)). 
 97. See GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, paras. I–II (giving legislative power to 
counties and cities). 
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returning to the education law context, it would be exceedingly 
difficult for the federal government to impose any uniform 
curriculum or character on the public school system.98 
Additionally, the counter-majoritarian structural features of the 
federal government—small states enjoy equal representation in 
the Senate99 and overrepresentation in the Electoral College’s 
vote for President100—and the requirements of bicameralism and 
presentment101 together make it difficult for the government to 
pass laws over strong minority opposition. This further works to 
protect minorities and dissenters—religious and otherwise—from 
having a monist vision imposed upon them. 
To be sure, the constitutional embrace of tolerance, 
pluralism, diversity, and accommodationism is not absolute, nor 
can it be.102 Unfettered, it would result in chaos and anarchism, 
as each individual or group would be left free to follow its own 
will and practices, unrestrained by any governmental 
authority.103 Law and organized society would be impossible in 
the face of unbridled pluralism; courts have struggled to balance 
the promise of individual freedom against the needs for law and 
order, the equal application of law to all groups, and the 
protection of individuals throughout society.104 This has proven 
                                                                                                     
 98. See generally JACOB T. LEVY, RATIONALISM, PLURALISM, AND FREEDOM 
(2014) (comparing and contrasting the tensions between the state and 
intermediate groups such as religious groups and universities). 
 99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
 100. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
 101. Id. art. I, § 7, cls. 2–3. 
 102. Content-based restrictions on speech are perfect examples of such 
logical limitations. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 
(1942) (affording no First Amendment protection to “fighting words”); Schenck v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The most stringent protection of free 
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing 
a panic.”); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982) (excluding child 
pornography from First Amendment protection). 
 103. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990) (stating that every 
regulation of conduct that does not protect a religious interest cannot be 
presumptively invalid because it “would be courting anarchy”). 
 104. For example, courts have attempted to address these issues with 
varying levels of scrutiny analyses in the Equal Protection context. See Clark v. 
Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“At minimum, a statutory classification must be 
rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Classifications based 
on race or national origin, and classifications affecting fundamental rights are 
given [strict] scrutiny . . . . [I]ntermediate scrutiny . . . applie[s] to discriminatory 
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even more elusive in the context of the state’s relationship with 
religion.105  
For example, in Locke v. Davey,106 the Court held that a state 
is permitted to exclude students studying religion from a 
scholarship program that supported all other courses of study.107 
This seems to reflect the relatively non-accommodationist 
viewpoint that laws may favor the study of secular subjects over 
that of religious subjects. Even more significantly, in Christian 
Legal Society Chapter of the University of California v. 
Martinez,108 the Court held that a state university could condition 
its support for a student group on its willingness to allow all 
students to participate equally in the group’s activities and 
governance, even where doing so would conflict with a group’s 
religious or expressive viewpoint.109 This, too, expressed a 
non-accommodationist approach, for it allows the state to 
privilege its own vision of inclusivity over a religious or 
expressive group’s preference for exclusivity, even to the extent of 
allowing public universities to require as a condition for 
recognition that religious organizations admit members who do 
not belong to the religion to whose purposes the group is 
dedicated. And, as we have already seen, in some cases even 
before Employment Division v. Smith, when strict scrutiny 
purportedly applied to laws that conflicted with minority 
religious practices, the Court nonetheless upheld the government 
policy.110 Finally, in its decision in Smith, the Court struck a 
                                                                                                     
classifications based on sex or illegitimacy.”). 
 105. See supra notes 77–87 and accompanying text (citing cases that discuss 
freedom of religion). 
 106. 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
 107. See id. at 725 (“Given the historic and substantial state interest 
[against the establishment of religion] at issue, it cannot be concluded that the 
denial of funding for vocational religious instruction alone is inherently 
constitutionally suspect.”).  
 108. 561 U.S. 661 (2010). 
 109. See id. at 698 (allowing a state university to require that a Christian 
group allow non-Christians the opportunity for full participation as a condition 
for university financial support). 
 110. See supra notes 106–109 and accompanying text (finding alleged 
encumbrances on the exercise of religion valid in limited public forums—where 
the institution’s policies are reasonable and viewpoint neutral—as well as in 
distribution of scholarship aid); see also United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254 
(1982) (upholding the constitutionality of mandatory social security taxes even 
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powerful blow against constitutionally guaranteed religious 
accommodationism, holding that lawmakers need not specially 
accommodate religious groups under the Free Exercise Clause as 
long as the law is neutral and generally applicable.111 Such laws 
thus are presumptively valid despite their intrusion on a person’s 
ability to live in accordance with her own religious practices.112  
In short, a greater degree of tolerance, minority protection, 
and religious accommodationism is embedded in the American 
constitutional framework than in those of some other Western 
democracies, but the Court’s commitment to such a reading of the 
Constitution has hardly been absolute or consistent. 
2. Statutory Expressions of Accommodationism and Their Limits 
The majoritarian branches of government have gone far 
beyond what the Supreme Court has required in accommodating 
religious freedom.113 For instance, the Tax Code gives favorable 
treatment to religious organizations, whether or not they share 
the majority’s values.114 From the time of the founding, Congress 
has allowed conscientious objectors to refuse to be drafted into 
the military, determining that even when it comes to society’s 
basic need to provide for its own protection, dissenting groups 
                                                                                                     
when it violated the Amish taxpayer’s religion). 
 111. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (finding that the Free 
Exercise Clause permits a state to deny unemployment benefits to a person 
discharged for drug use—even if the drug is used for religious purposes—if it is 
a valid and neutral law of general applicability). 
 112. See id. at 888 (“[W]e cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively 
invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that 
does not protect an interest of the highest order.”). 
 113. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1642–56 
(discussing the interplay between the legislative and judiciary branches in 
accommodating, as well as hindering, religious freedom); see also James E. 
Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic 
Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1445–46 (1992) (finding that there were over 
2,000 religious exemptions to generally applicable laws and stating that the 
political process was protective of religious freedom). 
 114. See id. at 1456 (“The tax laws contain numerous exemptions for 
religious groups and allow deductions for contributions to religious 
organizations.”). But see Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 598–99 
(1983) (holding that a racially discriminatory private school may not enjoy tax 
exemptions). 
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should not be compelled to violate their religious or philosophical 
worldviews.115 
More recently, federal and state legislatures have provided 
similar conscience clauses to allow medical professionals to 
decline to perform sterilization or pregnancy termination 
procedures or even to prescribe contraceptives on the basis of 
their religious beliefs.116 Similarly, states may require 
vaccination of children, but all but three have religious or 
philosophical exemptions to vaccination requirements.117 Such 
exemptions put children at risk and have the potential to 
contribute to epidemics outside the community that refuses 
vaccination.118  
                                                                                                     
 115. See Paul M. Landskroener, Note, Not the Smallest Grain of Incense: 
Free Exercise and Conscientious Objection to Draft Registration, 25 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 455, 455 (1991) (noting that draft exemptions for conscious objectors in the 
United States have existed since colonial times). 
 116. See 42 U.S.C. § 238n (2012) 
The Federal Government, and any State or local government that 
receives Federal financial assistance, may not subject any health care 
entity to discrimination on the basis that . . . (1) the entity refuses to 
undergo training in the performance of induced abortions, to require 
or provide such training, to perform such abortions . . . .  
42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (“Prohibition of public officials and public authorities from 
imposition of certain requirements contrary to religious beliefs or moral 
convictions [with regard to abortions or sterilization] . . . .”); Levin, Rethinking 
Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1650 (discussing state and federal statutes 
allowing medical professionals to refuse to provide care related to abortion or 
sterilization). 
 117. See Vaccine Laws, NAT’L VACCINE INFO. CTR., 
http://www.nvic.org/vaccine-laws.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2016) (listing West 
Virginia and Mississippi as the only states that do not provide a religious 
exemption to vaccination) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 118. See Allan J. Jacobs, Needles and Notebooks: The Limits of Requiring 
Immunization for School Attendance, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 171, 175–77 (2010) 
(providing the scientific reasoning for vaccination). See also generally Amy A. 
Parker et al., Implications of a 2005 Measles Outbreak in Indiana for Sustained 
Elimination of Measles in the United States, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 447 (2006) 
(discussing the vaccination of measles and its effects). At the time these Articles 
were published, only Mississippi and West Virginia had no non-medical 
exemptions; California recently enacted a statute, SB277, requiring full 
immunization as a condition for a child to attend a school or child care facility, 
with only medical exemptions permitted. See Michelle M. Mello, David M. 
Studdert & Wendy E. Parmet, Shifting Vaccination Politics—The End of 
Personal-Belief Exemptions in California, 373 NEW ENG. J. MED. 785, 785–87 
(2015) (discussing California’s tighter policy on mandatory vaccinations in light 
of SB277’s passage). 
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Reflecting a similarly accommodationist approach, all states 
allow parents to homeschool their children, though there may be 
good reasons to limit homeschooling.119 The Supreme Court has 
never interpreted the Constitution to require such 
accommodation, which may constrain a child’s options in life and 
interfere with society’s interest in developing a uniformly 
educated and acculturated citizenry.120 Nevertheless, all states 
give parents the right to homeschool their children.121 
Likewise, Congress—not the Court—acted to ensure that 
religious service members would be permitted to wear religious 
symbols.122 Indeed, in a variety of areas, Congress, state 
legislatures, and administrative agencies have gone well beyond 
what the Court has required in accommodating the unique needs 
of diverse religious minority groups, such as Native Americans, 
Amish, and Orthodox Jews.123 There are thousands of statutory 
provisions—and many more administrative and local policies—
that protect and assist religious minority groups by granting 
them special treatment and accommodations, further reflecting a 
broadly pluralist viewpoint—at least, legislatively.124  
Most important, after the Supreme Court rolled back 
protections of religious groups’ practices in its Smith decision—
finding that religious groups are not constitutionally entitled to 
legislative accommodation125—Congress responded by enacting 
                                                                                                     
 119. See McMullen, supra note 8, at 83 (noting that homeschooling may 
stunt the development of social skills in children). 
 120. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (comparing cases discussing 
mandatory public school attendance laws and homeschooling issues). 
 121. See State Laws, HSLDA, https://www.hslda.org/laws/ (last visited Jan. 
19, 2016) (providing a map of the United States, color coding states in 
accordance with varying levels of homeschooling regulation) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 122. See 10 U.S.C. § 774 (2012) (“[A] member of the armed forces may wear 
an item of religious apparel while wearing the uniform of the member’s armed 
force.”). 
 123. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1647 
(discussing Congress’s response to different Supreme Court cases involving 
religious exceptions for Native Americans, Amish, and Orthodox Jews). 
 124. See id. (identifying the legislature as the driving accommodationist 
force behind religious freedom). 
 125. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (“[T]o say that a 
nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is 
desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required . . . .”). 
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(with near unanimity) the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA)126 and subsequently, the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).127 Several states enacted 
parallel measures.128 These statutes starkly reveal firm 
commitment to religious pluralism by subjecting even incidental 
restrictions on religious groups to strict scrutiny, thereby 
requiring frequent special accommodations and exceptions for 
religious groups.129 
Here too, though, the embrace of accommodation has its 
limits. Some limits are uncontroversial; for example, organized 
society cannot accommodate a religious group’s obligation to 
commit ritual murder, no matter how sincerely held the religious 
belief is.130 Thus, RFRA and the other laws modeled on it do not 
impose a universal requirement that lawmakers accommodate 
religious practices.131 Where a law is the least restrictive means 
of achieving a compelling interest, the statute satisfies RFRA 
despite its substantial interference with religious practices.132 To 
be sure, opinions differ as to what constitutes a compelling 
interest and how to apply the “least restrictive means” test.133 
                                                                                                     
 126. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 
Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (1994)). 
 127. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 
106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc—2000cc-5 (2000)). 
 128. See generally Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A 
Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466 (2010) (discussing state RFRAs). For 
an updated list of state RFRAs, see State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, 
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 5, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/re 
search/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 129. See Lund, supra note 128, at 5 (providing the operative part of 
Arizona’s RFRA statute establishing a strict scrutiny analysis requirement). 
 130. As compared to a state law establishing neutral and generally 
applicable laws that also hinder a group’s practice of an essential religious 
ritual. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (disqualifying certain 
individuals, who ritually consumed peyote, from unemployment benefits). 
 131. They do, however, limit governmental interference. See Lund, supra 
note 128, at 5 (“Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of 
religion only if . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 132. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (“Government may substantially burden a 
person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the 
burden to the person . . . is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest.”). 
 133. Id.  
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The large volume of litigation attests to the magnitude of 
disagreement on the extent of protection offered by RFRA and 
similar statutes.134 
Federal antidiscrimination laws further demonstrate the 
limits of statutory pluralism in the United States. The federal 
Civil Rights Act, the Fair Housing Act, and so on, include no 
exceptions for religious groups and individuals, and state laws in 
these areas have mostly followed suit.135 Recent legislative 
debates concerning extending such laws to protect people on the 
basis of sexual orientation often revolve around whether, when, 
and how to accommodate religious objectors,136 but most states 
that have passed such statutes have declined to include religious 
exceptions (except to religious non-profit institutions).137 At 
times, courts have held that the Constitution protects some 
groups’ rights to discriminate on the grounds of speech interests 
or religious freedom but in these cases, the legislatures have 
largely decided that the state’s interest—whether economic, 
philosophical, or dignitary—in prohibiting certain forms of 
discrimination overrides the general commitment to religious 
accommodationism.138 
Finally, lawmakers sometimes reject requested religious 
accommodations and restrict religious practices for a variety of 
other reasons: animus, mistrust, indifference, lack of awareness, 
                                                                                                     
 134. See generally, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 
2785 (2014) (finding that the RFRA protected closely-held for-profit corporations 
from the HHS contraceptives mandate); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita 
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (interpreting the RFRA to 
allow an exemption from the Controlled Substances Act for the use of hoasca).  
 135. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012); Fair 
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2012). 
 136. See, e.g., Nick Smith, Sexual Orientation Discrimination Bill Debated, 
BISMARCK  TRIB. (Mar. 23, 2015), http://bismarcktribune.com/news/local/govt-
and-politics/sexual-orientation-discrimination-bill-debated/article_12dba165-
95e8-5230-81e9-9eda8b517049.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2016) (discussing the 
debate about a sexual discrimination bill and its effects on religious freedom) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 137. See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013) 
(holding that the New Mexico Human Rights Act does not provide an exception 
for a photographer that refuses to photograph a commitment ceremony between 
two women). 
 138. See id. (finding that the New Mexico Human Rights Act does not violate 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment because it is a neutral law of 
general applicability). 
946 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915 (2016) 
political self-interest, and so forth.139 The more countercultural 
and foreign the religious practice—the more “different” in other 
words—the more it is at risk.140 Lawmakers violate the 
Constitution when they attempt to impose restrictions on 
religious practices for some or all of these reasons,141 but the 
existence of such cases reflects the degree to which our dominant 
accommodationist tendencies are inconsistently embraced in the 
majoritarian branches. 
III. Understanding Inconsistency: Religious Accommodation and 
Non-Accommodation in the Political Economy 
As we have seen, the United States is a fairly accommodating 
nation for religious groups, but those accommodations are 
inconsistently granted.142 We now identify certain troubling 
aspects of this lack of consistency and consider the political forces 
that produce it. We conclude this Part by arguing that a greater 
degree of consistency is necessary for ethical and legal reasons. 
                                                                                                     
 139. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1672 
(discussing how the ordinance banning animal sacrifice was a result of mistrust 
or animus towards adherents of Santería (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534–39 (1993))). 
 140. See id. (finding a facially valid law unconstitutional as applied when 
town officials specifically removed Jewish banners from public street poles while 
leaving other banners in place (citing Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, Inc. v. Borough of 
Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 178 (3d Cir. 2002))); see also Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 
1111, 1116–18 (stating that Oklahoma passed a constitutional amendment 
preventing courts from considering Sharia law (Islamic religious law)); Laurie 
Goodstein, Across Nation, Mosque Projects Meet Opposition, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/08/us/08mosque.html?pagewanted=all 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2016) (discussing the zoning arguments against mosques) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 141. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520, 579 (1993) (holding that a city ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifice was 
unconstitutional because it was directed at adherents of Santería); see also infra 
note 269 and accompanying text (noting that Jehovah’s Witnesses refuse blood 
transfusions primarily because of their obedience to God). 
 142. See supra Part II.C (comparing the differing approaches taken by the 
judicial and legislative branches with regard to religion and freedom of speech). 
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A. Is Inconsistency Troubling? In This Case, Yes. 
Differences in the accommodation of claims for different sorts 
of religious accommodations are not in themselves surprising or 
necessarily troubling.143 There are good arguments for and 
against such accommodations,144 and so we would not expect any 
liberal democracy to be either absolutely accommodating or 
absolutely unaccommodating. Thus, it is not difficult to 
understand why we prohibit religiously motivated murder even 
while we embrace many other religious accommodations.145 There 
is no contradiction here, for there is broad agreement that in the 
extreme case of human sacrifice, the liberal values that require 
society to protect human life and impose an absolute ban on 
private killings easily supersede the values favoring individual 
religious freedom.146 
Thus, some of our laws that decline to accommodate religious 
objectors can be understood as principled efforts to balance the 
benefits of religious liberty against its costs.147 If all of the laws 
                                                                                                     
 143. As seen in Employment Division v. Smith, generally applicable laws 
that are neither intended to limit nor applied to limit, nor only incidentally 
limit, religious freedom are subject to a weaker scrutiny analysis. See 494 U.S. 
872, 878 (1990) (“[I]f prohibiting the exercise of religion (or burdening the 
activity of printing) is not the object . . . but merely the incidental effect of a 
generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has 
not been offended.”). 
 144. See supra Part II.B (discussing the development, and loosening of, 
strict scrutiny analyses in freedom of religion case law). 
 145. States have an interest in protecting their residents and, under their 
police powers, have the power to establish laws governing health, safety, and 
welfare. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (“The States’ 
traditional police power is defined as the authority to provide for the public 
health, safety, and morals, and such a basis for legislation has been upheld.”). 
 146. A similar analogy can be made to abortion cases. For example, the 
Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
found that, at the beginning of the third trimester of pregnancy, the state has a 
compelling interest in protecting the life of the mother and the child, thus 
permitting a state to illegalize third trimester abortions. 505 U.S. 833, 872 
(1992). 
 147. Hence the focus on a law’s intent and the degree to which it impairs the 
free exercise of religion; if a state passes a general law that happens to 
incidentally affect the free exercise of religion without intent to do so, the courts 
interpret this as a legitimate use of state power. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 
(“The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars 
application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action 
have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause 
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concerning minority religious rights and their limits reflected 
such a principled approach, then we would be unconcerned with 
the lack of uniformity. Further, recognizing that different 
policymakers and communities may balance the interests 
differently in specific cases, we would even expect and accept for 
different laws to encode different policymakers’ views as to the 
proper balance.148 Indeed, a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, 
multi-jurisdictional society such as ours is sure to produce 
varying policies. 
Perhaps the most noncontroversial operative balancing 
principle is that a religious practice that imposes significant costs 
or harms on participants in the practice or on third parties should 
not be tolerated, but that in the absence of such harm, we should 
be entirely accommodating of religious minorities’ deviations 
from general social and legal expectations.149 This essentially 
encodes a Millian view that one person’s rights stop at another’s 
nose.150 Under this approach, virtually all would agree that ritual 
murder imposes a significant harm, and therefore that it cannot 
be tolerated.151 In other cases, however, different groups will have 
different views as to what constitutes a third-party cost or harm 
that is significant enough to overcome American baseline 
accommodationism.152  
                                                                                                     
in conjunction with other constitutional protections . . . .”). 
 148. A perfect example of biased policymaker views that the court found 
troubling can be found in United States v. Windsor. See 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 
(2013) (“The House concluded that DOMA expresses ‘both moral disapproval of 
homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports 
with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality.’” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 
104-664, at 16 (1996))). 
 149. As seen in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the government had an interest in an 
educated citizenry, but the additional two years of required attendance did not 
outweigh the burden placed on Amish people because the additional two years 
would do little to promote the state interest. 406 U.S. 205, 222 (1972).  
 150. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2791 (2014) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In sum, with respect to free exercise claims no less 
than free speech claims, ‘[y]our right to swing your arms ends just where the 
other man’s nose begins.’” (quoting Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in 
War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 957 (1919))); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 
22–23 (1859) (explaining that liberty should be without impediment as long as it 
does not harm others). 
 151. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (discussing states’ inherent 
police powers to protect the health and safety of the people within their state). 
 152. Take, for example, polygamy. While polygamy was a part of the 
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The question of what constitutes a harm—or enough of a 
harm—is not a trivial or easy one.153 To take a straightforward 
example, if we accommodate a Sabbath-observant Jew’s religious 
need to leave her office early enough on a winter Friday to make 
it home in time for the Sabbath, there may well be a cost imposed 
on third parties—namely, the coworkers who must fill in during 
her absence.154 Reasonable minds can differ as to whether such 
costs are significant enough to outweigh the value of religious 
liberty. It may depend on the type of job and nature of the 
work.155 It may depend on the quality of the relationships 
between the coworkers. It may depend on the degree to which all 
coworkers enjoy workplace flexibility to observe their own 
holidays, take care of loved ones, or pursue interests that are 
important to them at the expense of work hours. And different 
people may simply have different levels of tolerance for this kind 
of cost being imposed on them. Consequently, we would not be 
surprised if different workplaces adopt different policies or norms 
on this question or if there are few hard and fast laws that 
provide certainty for how to resolve individual cases.156 Thus, 
                                                                                                     
Mormon religion, states have consistently passed laws prohibiting it that have 
survived challenges in court, finding the states interest in preserving monogamy 
compelling. See Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1070 (1985) (“Monogamy 
is inextricably woven into the fabric of this country’s society . . . . In light of 
these fundamental values, the state is justified, by a compelling interest, in 
upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to protect the monogamous 
marriage relationship.”); Barlow v. Blackburn, 798 P.2d 1360, 1365 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1990) (“[W]e find that, assuming that Barlow’s practice of polygamy is 
constitutionally protected, Arizona’s compelling state interest, as described 
below, justifies an infringement upon Barlow’s religiously-motivated conduct.”). 
 153. Compare Blackburn, 798 P.2d at 1365 (finding preservation of 
monogamy a compelling state interest), with Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222 (finding an 
interest in school attendance insufficiently strong to overcome the burden on 
religion placed on Amish groups). 
 154. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710–11 (1985) 
(“We hold that the Connecticut statute, which provides Sabbath observers with 
an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their Sabbath, violates the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”). The statute in Thorton 
violated the Establishment Clause because it was not secular; the “primary 
effect” of a law “must not advance or inhibit religion.” Id. at 708.  
 155. See id. at 711–12 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that Establishment 
Clause protection applies only to government action, not that of private 
employers). 
 156. What case law does make clear is that states cannot establish laws 
mandating private employers to give time off for one particular religious group, 
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rules in different places may appear inconsistent with one 
another on their surface, but they are at least consistent to the 
extent that they appropriately consider the conflict between the 
same underlying values. 
What is troubling, however, is that many of our laws seem to 
lack any principled balancing at all. That is, there seem to be no 
principles at play in the degree to which we permit or limit 
religious freedom in individual cases. Sometimes we allow 
religious groups to impose significant costs and harms on third 
parties; consider, for instance, parents who refuse to vaccinate 
their children against deadly diseases for reasons of religion, thus 
putting at grave risk both their own children and other children 
who cannot be successfully vaccinated.157 Or consider parents 
who are shielded by law from criminal charges when they 
withhold necessary medical treatment from their children for 
religious reasons.158 Here, we seem to have embraced an extreme 
                                                                                                     
especially when doing so would substantially burden the private employer. See 
id. at 709–10 (“[T]here is no exception when honoring the dictates of Sabbath 
observers would cause the employer substantial economic burdens or when the 
employer’s compliance would require the imposition of significant burdens on 
other employees required to work in place of the Sabbath observers.”). However, 
states may pass laws of general applicability that affect an entire group that 
may contain members of a particular faith. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 
599, 606–10 (1961) (finding a Pennsylvania law requiring stores to be closed on 
Sundays valid, even though Orthodox Jews claimed that it imposed an undue 
burden because the law did not target Jews as a group). 
 157. See supra notes 117–118 and accompanying text (discussing statutes 
mandating vaccination before entry into public schools); see also Michaeleen 
Doucleff, How Vaccine Fears Fueled the Resurgence of Preventable Diseases, 
NPR (Jan. 25, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2014/01/25/265750719/ 
how-vaccine-fears-fueled-the-resurgence-of-preventable-diseases (last visited 
Jan. 21, 2016) (listing the rise of several preventable diseases such as measles, 
whooping cough, and rubella, to name a few) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); Alexandra Sifferlin, 4 Diseases Making a Comeback Thanks to 
Anti-Vaxxers, TIME (Mar. 17, 2014), http://time.com/27308/4-diseases-making-a-
comeback-thanks-to-anti-vaxxers/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) (noting the rise of 
preventable diseases, including measles, in New York City) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 158. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1654–55 
(arguing that, if posed the question of the constitutionality of universal 
vaccination laws, the Court would find that religious individuals would not be 
exempt on religious grounds). But see, e.g., State v. Neumann, 832 N.W.2d 560, 
591 (Wis. 2013) (ruling that prosecuting parents for reckless homicide because 
they did not seek medical treatment for their child did not violate the parents’ 
free exercise rights). 
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degree of religious liberty that ignores severe harms to children 
and third parties.159  
On the other hand, sometimes statutes or regulations 
prohibit the exercise of religious freedom even where there is 
little or no harm to anyone. Consider, for example, the plaintiff in 
Smith, who wished to use controlled substances as part of his 
religious worship ceremonies but was denied even though the 
Government could articulate no third party harms, or even harms 
to the people who used the drugs in their rituals.160 Also consider 
the plaintiff in Holt v. Hobbs,161 a prisoner who wished to grow a 
beard of one half inch in length to comply with his religious 
beliefs but was denied for reasons so transparently baseless that 
Supreme Court Justices laughed at them.162 In these cases and 
others,163 there is apparently no regard for the value of religious 
liberty despite the absence of documented harm to any 
individual. 
In short, the puzzle is not that individual laws appear to 
reflect different assessments of how to balance the underlying 
principles, but rather that there appear to be no consistent 
principles in play. Why? 
                                                                                                     
 159. See Janna C. Merrick, Spiritual Healing, Sick Kids and the Law: 
Inequities in the American Healthcare System, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 269, 297 
(2003) (arguing that members of a pluralistic society should value the rights of 
children and their health over the rights of parents who constitute a religious 
minority). 
 160. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (denying 
unemployment benefits to individuals who took peyote for religious purposes).  
 161. 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015). 
 162. See id. at 859 (finding that a jail’s no-beard policy was not the least 
restrictive means of furthering its compelling interest in preventing the 
trafficking of contraband). 
 163. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1675 
(discussing how there was clear animosity directed towards particular religious 
groups in Tenafly and Lukumi); see also Church of Lukumi Bablu Aye v. City of 
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540 (1993) (invalidating state laws that suppressed 
animal sacrifice); Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1116, 1132–33 (10th Cir. 2012) 
(invalidating a state anti-Sharia law statute); Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 168 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that the borough 
violated the Free Exercise Clause by enforcing an ordinance selectively against 
Orthodox Jewish conduct); Danika Fears, Developer Ditches Plan for ‘Ground 
Zero Mosque,’ N.Y. POST (Apr. 30, 2014), http://nypost.com/2014/04/30/developer-
ditches-ground-zero-mosque-to-create-museum-for-islam/ (last visited Jan. 22, 
2016) (explaining that a mosque was allowed to be built at Ground Zero 
following expressed outrage) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
952 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915 (2016) 
B. Explaining Inconsistency: Religious Groups in the Political 
Economy 
The apparent absence of consistency in our provision of 
religious accommodations can best be explained by basic insights 
of a school of political science known as public choice theory.164 
Public choice theory seeks to understand political decisions and 
behavior by considering the incentives and self-interest of 
stakeholders165 and policymakers. Public choice theory is 
concerned with how even small interest groups are able to 
influence and capture the political process.166  
In applying this approach to the question of religious 
accommodation, it is useful to think of religious groups as 
functioning like any other special interest group in society, 
although few religious groups, politicians, or voters choose to 
express it this way.167 Once we orient ourselves in this manner, 
we can quite readily understand why the decision to grant or 
refuse religious accommodations is often unmoored from 
consideration of underlying values and, consequently, yields 
inconsistent and incoherent results.168 We also can model the 
circumstances in which the political branches will under-protect 
and overprotect religious liberty. 
To be clear at the outset, we define “religious interest groups” 
broadly, to include everything from those groups that operate 
through sophisticated and official lobbying arms,169 to those that 
                                                                                                     
 164. See Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the 
Theory of Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 43 (1988) (considering the 
social and economic impacts on legislation).  
 165. See id. at 50 (discussing how powerful interest groups and lobbyists 
negatively affect, for example, environmental legislation and lead to ineffective 
laws that greatly benefit certain interest groups at the expense of others). 
 166. See id. at 48 (noting that some of the most politically powerful interest 
groups are small in size). 
 167. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1663 
(recognizing that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was heavily lobbied for 
by small religious groups).  
 168. See supra Part II.C (discussing the inconsistency of freedom of religion 
case law).  
 169. See, e.g., Lauren Markoe, Liberal Jewish Group Launches Political 
Lobbying Arm, WASH. POST (July 26, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
national/on-faith/liberal-jewish-group-launches-political-lobbying-arm/2012/07/25/ 
gJQAsC8Z9W_story.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) (describing how a liberal 
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operate—particularly at the local level of governance—on an ad 
hoc basis by offering to politicians and lawmakers a coherent and 
cohesive audience and, potentially, a reliably supportive voting 
bloc.170 An example of the former is Moral Majority, associated 
with the Christian right;171 a hypothetical example of the latter is 
a priest who calls a local politician to explain his church's need 
for a no parking zone nearby.172 
The similarities between how religious groups and other 
interest groups operate in the policymaking arena are striking 
and make the case for why we should analyze the behavior of 
religious groups in this manner. Like other interest groups, 
religious groups aim to maximize their political influence to 
shape public policy in a manner that represents the groups’ 
interests on issues they care about.173 A religious interest group 
may focus on a single issue, may represent its own interests 
broadly, or may participate in a coalition of religious and perhaps 
other groups.174 As with other interest groups, some religious 
groups are more organized, powerful, and successful than 
                                                                                                     
Jewish group, Bend the Arc, has initiated lobbying activities) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); About JFNA, JEWISH FED’NS OF N. AM., 
http://jewishfederations.org/about-jfna (last visited June 21, 2015) (stating that 
the group lobbies in Washington, D.C. to get $10 billion in public funds for 
Jewish communities) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 170. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1663 
(explaining that elected officials have an incentive to work with religious groups 
that may provide them with support and votes). 
 171. See ROBERT C. LIEBMAN & ROBERT VUTHNOW, THE NEW CHRISTIAN 
RIGHT: MOBILIZATION AND LEGITIMATION 54–55 (1983) (describing the Moral 
Majority as a lobbying arm to influence legislation that “became the byword for 
the entire New Christian Right”). 
 172. For an in-depth discussion of this sort of ad hoc accommodationism in 
action, see Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1 at 1635–42 
(discussing the experience of a religious community in Memphis, Tennessee that 
received favorable treatment from local officials). 
 173. See Zoë Robinson, Rationalizing Religious Exemptions: A Legislative 
Process Theory of Statutory Exemptions in Religion, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
133, 135 (2011) [hereinafter Robinson, Rationalizing Religious Exemptions] 
(explaining the premise that political actors act in a way to maximize the value 
of political outcomes for themselves). 
 174. See Zoë Robinson, Lobbying in the Shadows: Religious Interest Groups 
in the Legislative Process, 64 EMORY L.J. 1041, 1045 (2015) [hereinafter 
Robinson, Lobbying in the Shadows] (discussing the range of religious groups 
from well-known church lobbies to lesser-known coalitions and single-issue 
groups). 
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others.175 And, like other interest groups, they sometimes have 
interests that overlap with those of other interest groups and lead 
them to work together in pursuit of common goals.176 
The interests that religious groups pursue may include the 
reification into law of religiously motivated stances on broad 
public policy issues like abortion,177 education,178 same-sex 
marriage,179 drug policy,180 immigration,181 criminal law,182 and 
more; and they can also include practical issues of concern 
primarily to the religious group itself, such as securing permits to 
build a house of worship or obtaining religious exemptions from 
laws that may impede specific religious practices.183  
If religious interventions in the political sphere are so 
conceptualized, it becomes possible to apply public choice theory 
to understand why religious groups sometimes win and 
sometimes lose without any apparent principles explaining when 
                                                                                                     
 175. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1682 
(describing how the nature of interest group politics results in stronger religious 
groups winning battles against less-organized and less-powerful minority 
groups). 
 176. See id. at 1662 (“[Religious groups] therefore tend to work together to 
lobby for religious accommodations, both in the legislature and in the courts.”). 
 177. See Robinson, Lobbying in the Shadows, supra note 174, at 1080 
(“Religious interest groups including Priests for Life, Texas Right to Life, 
Concerned Women of America for Texas, and Texas Alliance for Life actively 
pursue the restriction of the availability of abortions in America.”). 
 178. See id. at 1065 (discussing the educational goals of the Association of 
Jesuit Colleges and Universities). 
 179. See id. (“The interests of the USCCB advocated for by the OGR include 
prohibition of same-sex marriage . . . .”). 
 180. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1648 
(stating that federal legislative exceptions, exemptions, and accommodations 
granted to religious institutions include regulation of drug laws). 
 181. See id. (stating that federal legislative exceptions, exemptions, and 
accommodations granted to religious institutions include regulation of 
immigration). 
 182. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 113, at 1446 (discussing the exemption from 
gambling laws given to religious groups). 
 183. See, e.g., Charlie Frago, Clearwater Issues Conditions Scientology Must 
Meet to Hold its Events, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www. 
tampabay.com/news/scientology/clearwater-issues-conditions-scientology-must-meet-
to-hold-its-events/2151572 (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) (stating that the Church of 
Scientology had to obtain permits for tents and fences) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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or why.184 Interest groups compete in the political marketplace 
alongside, and sometimes against, other interest groups.185 In the 
modern American political marketplace, good policy and coherent 
principles are not the primary determinants of the laws that are 
enacted.186 Rather, like all other rational actors, politicians and 
other policymakers respond to incentives.187 To the extent that 
laws enacted represent good policy and coherent principles, they 
generally do so because the lawmakers’ incentives are aligned 
with those values.188 
At the same time, laws are not decided on the basis of pure 
majority preferences.189 This is because the incentives for 
policymakers do not revolve around what the majority prefers, 
but rather around the complicated interaction between voter 
preferences, the magnitude of those preferences, and the levels of 
support—voting, financial, or other—that competing blocs of 
voters can deliver.190 Thus, a small but organized and focused 
interest group will often achieve its policymaking goals even 
when it externalizes heavy costs on society at large, if the forces 
that might object to the policy are disorganized, dispersed 
throughout society, and of relatively low priority to potential 
                                                                                                     
 184. See Robinson, Rationalizing Religious Exemptions, supra note 173, at 
135 (“The public choice model supposes that any exemptions and 
accommodations for religion enacted by the legislature are the product of the 
conflation of religious lobbying efforts and the individual self-interest of 
legislators.”). 
 185. See id. at 145 (explaining that religious firms compete for policy 
outcomes). 
 186. See id. at 148–49 (stating that legislators will enact legislation 
primarily for reelection).  
 187. See id. at 143–44 (discussing that one aspect of the public choice is the 
positive theory, which assumes that politicians will act rationally to maximize 
their interest). 
 188. See Robinson, Lobbying in the Shadows, supra note 174, at 1100–01 
(explaining how legislators are “benefit maximizers” and act based on 
incentives). 
 189. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1663 
(“Even in the absence of coordinated lobbying by diverse religious groups, 
elected officials may still have political incentives to work with small religious 
groups.”). 
 190. See Robinson, Lobbying in the Shadows, supra note 174, at 1076 
(describing how politicians respond to religious interest groups that represent 
large voting blocs and will help the groups that attract the most votes). 
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opponents.191 In short, a focused minority group often will defeat 
a numerically overwhelming but disorganized majority, or a 
majority for whom the issue is not a priority.192 This is because 
the focused minority group can reliably deliver votes and other 
means of support to a politician or other policymaker, who 
therefore responds to the group’s policy preferences; whereas the 
amorphous “larger public good” can deliver no support at all.193  
These dynamics amply explain why religious groups have 
been so successful in the legislative, executive, and 
administrative arenas in obtaining religious accommodations 
even when these were not constitutionally required according to 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.194 Indeed, thousands of 
statutes and regulations include religious accommodations in 
areas ranging from tax law to employment law, criminal law to 
regulations governing food preparation, and healthcare law to 
zoning ordinances, most of which are not required by the 
Constitution.195 For instance, after the Supreme Court upheld a 
military regulation prohibiting service members from wearing 
religious garb, Congress voted to generally permit it.196 Likewise, 
when the Court held that the Constitution did not require an 
accommodation that would allow Native American Peyotists to 
ingest peyote, Congress passed a law permitting it.197 And, of 
                                                                                                     
 191. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1664 
(explaining that “a concentrated and focused interest group” is often successful 
over a “diffuse opposition that ranks the issue low among their priorities”). 
 192. See id. at 1667 (stating that the political realities, not just a group’s 
headcount, must be considered when assessing a group’s political power). 
 193. See id. at 1663 (explaining that politicians will be willing to help out 
religious minorities who otherwise would not have a voice because the 
politicians recognize that certain groups that are minorities are more likely to 
be politically active than other groups). 
 194. See Ryan, supra note 113, at 1445–46 (discussing various areas where 
the legislature has carved out religious exceptions, including inspection and tax 
law).  
 195. See id. (“Religious exemptions, in turn, exist in over 2,000 statutes.”). 
 196. Compare Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 510 (1986) (stating 
that the Air Force’s dress code policy is related to the military’s interest in 
having a uniform dress code, and therefore, the Air Force has not violated the 
petitioner’s First Amendment right), with 10 U.S.C. § 774 (2012) (explaining 
that “a member of the armed forces may wear an item of religious apparel while 
wearing the uniform of the member’s armed force” except when the apparel 
would interfere with the member’s ability to perform his duties). 
 197. Compare Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (“But to say 
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course, after the Supreme Court ruled in Smith that neutral, 
generally applicable laws need not include exceptions and 
accommodations for religious minority groups, Congress and 
several state legislatures responded by enacting laws like RFRA 
and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalize Persons Act 
(RLUIPA) to establish minority religious rights that would be 
free from legislative and administrative incursions that might be 
supported by the majority.198 In each of these cases, religious 
interest groups organized focused campaigns to achieve their 
goals and faced little opposition, either because other interest 
groups actively supported the accommodation or simply had no 
organizing interest in fighting it.199 
These same dynamics also explain why even small minority 
religious groups are sometimes able to obtain benefits that inflict 
harm on third parties.200 Only a small minority of the population 
supports immunization exemptions on the basis of religion or 
conscience,201 but this minority is quite focused and motivated.202 
On the other hand, the lobbies supporting compulsory 
immunization, consisting principally of various medical 
organizations, are concerned with multiple issues and are not as 
                                                                                                     
that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or even that 
it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required, and that the 
appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned by the courts.”), with 42 
U.S.C. § 1996a (2012) (overruling the decision in Smith and making it illegal to 
prohibit the use of peyote for religious purposes).  
 198. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 
Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (1994)), invalidated by 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2012)).  
 199. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1645 
(explaining that the majority effectively agreed to give the minority special 
rights when the RFRA was passed). 
 200. See James G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence O. Gostin, School Vaccination 
Requirements: Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 KY. L.J. 831, 848 
(2001–2002) (discussing how the minority view has been effective in protesting 
mandatory vaccinations, despite the harm that can be caused by allowing some 
people to avoid being vaccinated). 
 201. See id. (describing the minority anti-vaccinationist sentiment). 
 202. See id. (“Antivaccinationist sentiment largely remained the view of a 
vocal minority, although the fervor with which it was expressed remained 
influential.”). 
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focused.203 While vaccination exemptions expose everyone in 
society to increased risks, most people are not motivated enough, 
except, perhaps, in the wake of a well-publicized medical crisis, to 
organize in opposition.204 The same is true for laws that provide 
religious exceptions to medical neglect laws; such laws may be 
bad for children and society at large, but there are few votes to be 
won by politicians for fighting them.205 
On the other hand, religious interest groups can lose in the 
political marketplace as well, and the basic dynamics we have 
described operate here as well.206 A religious interest group will 
fail to achieve its goals in the political arena where (1) a broad 
majority becomes focused on defeating it;207 or (2) the issue puts 
the religious interest group in competition with another, more 
powerful interest group.208 In addition, the religious interest 
group may also lose to an evenly matched or smaller competing 
interest group that is able to exert more influence over 
policymakers then in power.209 
                                                                                                     
 203. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1682 
(explaining that groups that are more organized are more likely to be successful 
in achieving their goals, even if they are advocating the minority view).  
 204. See Hodge & Gostin, supra note 200, at 874 (“Virtually all states also 
grant religious exemptions for persons who have sincere religious beliefs in 
opposition to immunization.”). 
 205. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1654–55 
(discussing medical neglect laws and that “there has been too much 
majoritarianism favoring religious liberty claims”). 
 206. See id. at 1655–56 (“[E]ven when the courts have held back in these 
areas, rightly recognizing the competing nature of some public interests that 
might trump free exercise concerns, political decisionmakers have pushed 
forward nonetheless—effectively protecting religious autonomy even at the 
expense of countervailing public health and safety interests.”).  
 207. See id. at 1664–65 (offering examples of majority groups focusing on 
preventing religious accommodation). 
 208. See id. at 1667 (discussing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and 
how, “in the political debates that produced the laws in question, the lobbying 
power of religious liberty groups was diminished, and the lobbying power that 
remained was met and exceeded by the lobbying power of the opposing side”). 
 209. See, e.g., Peter Baker, President Calls for a Ban on Job Bias Against 
Gays, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/22/us/ 
politics/obama-job-discrimination-gays-executive-order.html (last visited Dec. 
20, 2015) (stating that President Obama faced heavy pressure from 
organizations representing gays—a Democratic core constituency—before 
rejecting requests by religious groups to exempt them from the executive order 
prohibiting discrimination against gays) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
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At times, the majority may not tolerate a religious group’s 
preferences because the cost on involved individuals or on third 
parties is too great, and the religious principles involved seem too 
outrageous to those outside the religion.210 Presumably, this is 
why, no matter how focused and organized a religious interest 
group is, society will never tolerate sumptuary laws or laws that 
permit ritual murder.211 Often, though, there are simply basic 
disagreements between the various groups as to the relative 
values underlying the policy being debated.212 A religious interest 
group may wish to limit women’s ability to obtain abortions, 
whereas a competing women’s rights interest group may oppose 
such limitations.213 Or a religious interest group may favor more 
liberal immigration laws,214 whereas a competing labor union 
may favor more restrictive immigration laws.215 However strong 
the disagreement in these examples, each side is comprehensible 
to the other, in contrast to the case with permitting ritual 
murder.216 In such cases the relative size and power of the 
                                                                                                     
Law Review).  
 210. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1674 
(“Laws that prohibit murder are not driven by a desire to harm religious groups 
that wish to practice human sacrifice but by a widely shared communal belief 
that the taking of a human life (absent special circumstances) is a moral and 
ethical evil and harms the interests of society.”). 
 211. See id. (discussing the limits that are placed on religious exemptions for 
minority groups). 
 212. See id. at 1666 (“Rather, there are simply issues on which different 
groups hold opposing views very strongly. Such conflicts may present a 
zero-sum equation in which either the religious liberty interest or the opposing 
equality interest can prevail, but not both.”). 
 213. See id. at 1666–68 (discussing interest group lobbying in the Hobby 
Lobby case). 
 214. See Michael Lipka, Catholics, Other Christians Support Immigration 
Reform, But Say Faith Plays Small Role, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 1, 2014), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/04/01/catholics-other-christians-
support-immigration-reform-but-say-faith-plays-small-role/ (last visited Dec. 20, 
2015) (describing religious groups of a number of different faiths that are 
supporting immigration reform and many are asking President Obama to use 
his power as President to limit deportation of immigrants who are already in the 
United States) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 215. See Developments in the Law Immigration: Policy and the Rights of 
Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1440 (1983) (“Labor unions, fearing that 
undocumented aliens displace United States workers, have pressed for greater 
restrictions . . . .”). 
 216. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1680–81 
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interest groups, their influence over the policymakers then in 
power, and the policymakers’ own personal beliefs, commitments, 
and assessment of the political risks will determine which side 
wins.217 
Sometimes a religious group will lose to the majority in the 
political sphere because of the majority’s base animus toward 
that group, even where the religious group’s practices impose no 
clear harm on the broader society.218 The Lukumi case is such an 
example.219 There, the majority of the citizens in the City of 
Hialeah were so disgusted by the Santería practice of animal 
sacrifice—and perhaps by Santería in general—that they passed 
a law prohibiting animal sacrifice but permitting all manner of 
animal killing that those outside Santería might choose to engage 
in.220 Likewise, in Tenafly Eruv Ass’n,221 the majority of the 
citizens were so opposed to the establishment of a vibrant 
Orthodox Jewish community in their town that they enforced a 
neutral law in a blatantly discriminatory manner to prevent it.222 
Other cases based in animus may include broad efforts to prohibit 
Muslims from building houses of worship and attempts to pass 
                                                                                                     
(explaining that often groups on both sides of an issue are sophisticated parties 
who are able to negotiate with one another). 
 217. See Robinson, Lobbying in the Shadows, supra note 174, at 1100–01 
(explaining how groups that represent the minority opinion are able to enact 
changes by using the political process to their advantage). 
 218. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1664 
(“First, when a religious practice or group is perceived to challenge or threaten 
the majority’s cultural norms, all bets are off. In these conditions, the opposition 
becomes focused and coordinated enough to defeat the religious interest 
promoted by the minority.”). 
 219. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520, 526–30 (1993) (explaining how in response to the establishment of a 
Santeria church, the city council passed a law prohibiting the unlawful killing of 
animals and making it illegal for the church to carry out part of their religious 
practices of sacrificing animals). 
 220. See id. at 526–28 (“The prospect of a Santería church in their midst was 
distressing to many members of the Hialeah community, and the announcement 
of the plans to open a Santeria church in Hialeah prompted the city council to 
hold an emergency public session on June 9, 1987.”). 
 221. 309 F.3d 144 (3d. Cir. 2002).  
 222. See id. at 151–52 (explaining that, although the city ordinance 
preventing citizens from advertising or placing signs on utility poles or trees in 
the city applied to all citizens equally, in practice this ordinance was not applied 
to all people equally).  
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laws that ban Sharia law, even to arbitrate private 
agreements.223 Ultimately, the courts may strike down such 
discriminatory laws as unconstitutional,224 but the point is that 
group animus can sometimes be sufficient to mobilize and focus 
opponents and defeat a religious interest group through the 
elected branches even where the principle of pluralism ought to 
be sustained.225 
In short, religious groups operate in the political marketplace 
like other interest groups.226 As such, whether they win or lose on 
a particular political issue is related less to a principled balancing 
of the competing underlying values than it is to the political 
dynamics in play.227  
C. The Problems with Leaving Accommodations to Politics 
The absence of a principled approach to these issues is deeply 
troubling.228 It is a basic principle of ethics as well as law that 
like things should be treated alike,229 and so we should always be 
                                                                                                     
 223. See Fears, supra note 163 (explaining that a mosque was allowed to be 
built at Ground Zero following expressed outrage); Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 
1111, 1132 (10th Cir. 2012) (invalidating a state anti-Sharia law). 
 224. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 524 (“The challenged laws had an 
impermissible object; and in all events the principle of general applicability was 
violated because the secular ends asserted in defense of the laws were pursued 
only with respect to conduct motivated by religious beliefs.”); Tenafly, 309 F.3d 
at 151 (upholding the injunction that the lower court ordered because the law 
was facially neutral); Awad, 670 F.3d at 1132 (applying a heightened level of 
review to uphold the lowers court injunction). 
 225. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1664 
(discussing how if the minority opinion conflicts with the majorities view point, 
the majority will use its power to ensure the minority does not prevail). 
 226. See id. (discussing how the political process plays a vital role in 
determining which interest group is able to have its voice heard). 
 227.  See id. at 1667 (“[C]areful attention to the political realities in which 
public officials and religious groups operate illuminates why political majorities 
so often accommodate religious beliefs and practices, even where the courts do 
not require them to.”). 
 228. See Hillel Y. Levin, A Reliance Approach to Precedent, 47 GA. L. REV. 
1035, 1039 (2013) [hereinafter Levin, Reliance Approach] (explaining why 
reliance on precedent is concerning and is being used too often).  
 229. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, BOOK V 71 (W. D. Ross trans., 1999); 
see H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. 
REV. 593, 622–24 (1958) (“The connection between law and moral standards and 
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bothered by gross inconsistencies in the law. We can ask why, 
given that the vast majority of our laws are produced through the 
very same political dynamic as we have identified in this context, 
and therefore display similar inconsistencies and pathologies 
throughout the law, we should be especially wary of this dynamic 
in the context of religious accommodationism.230 Indeed, this 
formal equality principle is hardly a feature of our system, for the 
law does, indeed must, tolerate all kinds of inconsistencies.231 
There are perhaps four possible answers to this question, 
only one of which we find persuasive.232 First, these political 
dynamics might be so corrosive and pathological that the 
lawmaking process as a whole should be reordered in a way to 
reflect greater consistency and principle in the law.233 In other 
words, gross inconsistency is not only, or even especially, a 
problem in the context of religious accommodation; this is simply 
the context in which we happen to be writing.234 We need not 
take sides on this position because it is outside the scope of our 
project.  
Second, the context of religious accommodation might 
warrant special scrutiny because the concerns we have identified 
take on special force where the rights or interests of small and 
                                                                                                     
principles of justice is therefore as little arbitrary and as ‘necessary’ as the 
connection between law and sanctions . . . .”). 
 230. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1655 
(explaining how the courts have not “adequately delineated the boundary 
between permissible religious accommodations and impermissible ones”). 
 231. See Levin, Reliance Approach, supra note 228, at 1039 (discussing the 
way that the courts apply precedent often results in inconsistent outcomes and 
the way that precedent is applied should be reevaluated). 
 232. See id. at 1044 (explaining that the debate about precedent is not a new 
debate and that there have been several theories on the issue); David L. 
Shapiro, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Adjudication: An Introspection, 
86 TEX. L. REV. 929, 929 (2008) (“In recent years, there has been a surprising 
outpouring of academic literature on the proper role of precedent in 
constitutional cases.”). 
 233. See Shapiro, supra note 232, at 935 (explaining that some scholars 
believe that the law should be applied strictly adhering to the constitution and 
precedent). 
 234. See Drew C. Ensign, Note, The Impact of Liberty on Stare Decisis: The 
Rehnquist Court from Casey to Lawrence, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1137, 1141 (2006) 
(“At the Supreme Court level, it generally requires that the Court adhere to its 
prior resolution of a particular issue, even if a majority of the Court believes 
that the prior decision is flawed.”). 
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marginalized religious minority groups, children, and unaware 
third parties are at stake and are at the mercy of the whims and 
power dynamics of the political marketplace.235 The competing 
rights and interests of both sides in these cases—disfavored 
religious minority groups on the one hand and children and the 
silent public on the other—are already underrepresented and 
under-protected in the political arena,236 and we should aim to do 
better than merely accept that the political marketplace will 
decide the fate of such groups according to its internal political 
dynamics rather than by reference to underlying values. This 
views the problems with our political system through an 
Ely-esque lens237 and suggests that there are certain contexts in 
which the political system alone, given its pathologies, cannot be 
left to operate as it normally does. To be clear, this merely 
narrows the universe of cases in which we should reject “politics 
as usual”—it does not limit these cases to the religious context 
because there are many other underrepresented groups who 
cannot get a fair shake in the political system.238 For our part, we 
agree with this critique as an ethical matter—legislators should 
do better by bringing a principled approach to these questions—
but we cannot say that the Constitution demands this approach. 
A third possible response is that religion is indeed special 
and deserving of special protection under the Constitution.239 
Proponents of this approach are those who believe the Supreme 
                                                                                                     
 235. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1655–56 
(explaining how precedent differs when religion is at issue because of the 
various issues that are presented with religion issues before the courts). 
 236. See id. (“[R]ecognizing the competing nature of some public interests 
that might trump free exercise concerns, political decision makers have pushed 
forward nonetheless—effectively protecting religious autonomy even at the 
expense of countervailing public health and safety interest.”). 
 237. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (explaining John Ely’s view that the courts should strive 
to protect both the majority position while also guarding the minorities’ rights). 
 238. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1623–24 
(noting that the minority position is not always protected by the political 
process).  
 239. See McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, supra note 20, at 688–89 
(“Accommodations of religion are government policies that take religion 
specifically into account not for the purpose of promoting the government’s own 
favored form of religion, but of allowing individuals and groups to exercise their 
religion—whatever it may be—without hindrance.”). 
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Court got Smith wrong.240 They would maintain that the 
unpredictable and unprincipled political process that sometimes 
produces too little accommodation cannot be trusted to 
adequately protect the constitutional value of religious free 
exercise.241 But our project is not to re-litigate the merits of 
Smith, and so we do not rest on this justification either. Also, it is 
critical to note that this approach would only touch one side of 
the equation: under-accommodation of religious practices would 
be of constitutional concern, but over-accommodation as a result 
of the political economy dynamic we have identified would be 
acceptable.242 We, in contrast, are bothered by both. Furthermore, 
Smith is unlikely to be reversed in the near to intermediate term, 
and a serious discussion of religious accommodations must accept 
a legal regime in which Smith is good law.243  
Instead, we offer a fourth reason that we should demand 
more than “politics as usual” in the context of religious 
accommodations that potentially harm children or third parties: 
both sides of the equation implicate constitutional values. On the 
one hand, the Free Exercise Clause embodies a respect for 
religious liberty and, at the very least, demands that individuals 
and groups not be prevented from practicing their religious 
obligations as a result of bias, animus, or stereotyping on the part 
of lawmakers and officials.244 Further, to the degree that different 
                                                                                                     
 240. See Marc O. DeGirolami, Predictably Unpredictable: Thoughts on the 
Free Exercise Clause, CTR FOR L. & RELIGION FOR. (Mar. 8, 2013), 
http://clrforum.org/2013/03/08/predictably-unpredictable-thoughts-on-the-free-
exercise-clause/ (last visited on Dec. 23, 2015) (explaining how Smith has 
produced an unpredictable outcome that the opinion aimed to eliminate) (on file 
with Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 241. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1621–22 
(noting that Douglas Laycock, a well-known scholar and advocate of religious 
freedom, has warned that Smith will produce an outcome that will lead the 
minority religious groups not being properly represented). 
 242. See id. at 1652–56 (describing how majoritarian institutions have 
sometimes been more likely to over-accommodate minority religious groups, 
more than is required by the courts and the Constitution).  
 243. See DeGirolami, supra note 240 (noting that the Smith decision has 
been followed). 
 244. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion . . . .”); Church of Lukumi Bablu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 
508 U.S. 520, 538 (1993) (“We also find significant evidence of the ordinances’ 
improper targeting of Santeria sacrifice in the fact that they proscribe more 
religious conduct than is necessary to achieve their stated ends.”); Tenafly Eruv 
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religious groups may receive different treatment from 
legislatures as a result of the political power of the groups, 
constitutional questions also arise.245  
On the other hand, religious accommodations that impose 
harms to children and third parties raise substantial questions 
under the Establishment Clause.246 After all, in permitting a 
religious practice that harms others who do not choose to subject 
themselves to the same religious strictures, the state is in effect 
subjecting some of its citizens to the rule of those favored 
religions to which those citizens belong.247 These competing 
constitutional values demand careful and principled balancing 
and consistent resolution on the part of policymakers and judges 
confronting these cases.248 It is not enough to say, “leave it to 
politics as usual.”249 
                                                                                                     
Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 168 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Borough’s 
selective, discretionary application of Ordinance 691 against the lechis violates 
the neutrality principle of Lukumi and Fraternal Order of Police . . . .”); Levin, 
Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1665 (“[T]he city of Hialeah 
enacted a facially neutral ordinance against animal sacrifice that was 
nevertheless clearly directed at . . . adherents of Santeria. Citizens were free to 
kill animals for reasons other than ceremonial sacrifice, and the record was rife 
with evidence of animus towards practitioners of Santeria.”). 
 245. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 
U.S. 418, 432–34 (2006) (discussing the RFRA’s exception for peyote and 
comparing it to hoasca).  
 246. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1655 
(discussing the line of cases interpreting the Establishment Clause to limit the 
accommodation of religious practices that harm third parties). 
 247. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005) (“This Court has long 
recognized that the government may . . . accommodate religious 
practices . . . without violating the Establishment Clause.” (quoting Hobbie v. 
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144–45 (1987))). See 
generally Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions 
from the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of 
Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343, 344–49 (2014) (discussing religious 
exemptions and their effects on third parties). 
 248. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1682 
(explaining that there are times when the court is unable to properly balance 
the competing interests at issue).  
 249. See id. at 1683 (“Thus, although the majoritarian branches and courts 
may both make poor decisions on such questions, the majoritarian branches 
enjoy two critical advantages over courts: (a) they can revisit policy choices at 
will; and (b) they have some majoritarian legitimacy.”).  
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IV. Balancing Religious Liberty Against Protection of Children 
and Third Parties: A Proposed Test 
This Part offers and describes a principled test that balances 
the competing interests in these cases according to the yin and 
yang of the First Amendment Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses.250 It first lays out the test, then explains it and unpacks 
its individual provisions, and finally demonstrates how the test 
would apply in a variety of cases, in some cases tracking current 
laws and in others requiring different results.251 
A. The Test252 
1.  BASES FOR POSSIBLE RESTRICTION: A religious 
practice related to the needs of its members with regard to 
health and safety may be restricted if it creates a deleterious 
effect in one or both of the following two ways:253  
                                                                                                     
 250. See id. at 1655–56 (noting the presence of case law favoring one 
religious group over another; however, the line that courts use to make this 
determination is unclear).  
 251. Infra Parts IV.A–C.  
 252. The test is modified from previous iterations described in Allan J. 
Jacobs, The Ethics of Circumcision of Male Infants, 15 ISRAEL MED. ASS’N. J. 60 
(2013) and Allan J. Jacobs & Kavita Shah Arora, Ritual Male Infant 
Circumcision and Human Rights, 15 AM. J. BIOETHICS 30 (2015). Prior versions 
were written from a general ethics perspective; this version is adapted to be 
applicable to American constitutional law. It has been modified in three 
important respects. First, the content of the restrictions (first prong) has been 
disaggregated from the constraints (second and third prongs). Second, this 
iteration of the test is phrased as determining what government may restrict; 
other iterations were phrased in terms of what government ought to permit. 
Finally, the test stipulates circumstances in which government is not only 
permitted, but also expected to restrict certain practices. This iteration was 
crafted to conform with the religion clauses of the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, and to guide lawmakers bound by those clauses. The connection 
between the test and the religion clauses will be discussed infra. While 
affirming that government has a responsibility to protect vulnerable people 
against severe injuries, the authors acknowledge that other societies may find a 
different balance between the need for such protection and the demands of faith. 
This is particularly true in States with established religions that contain a 
strong praxis component.  
 253. See infra notes 406–411 (discussing the tension surrounding the debate 
of infant circumcision and whether this practice, which is a required practice for 
certain religions, could also be a human rights violation). 
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a.  Direct effects: The practice affects children and other 
vulnerable members of the religious group254 (i) by creating a 
substantial chance of death or major disruption of a 
physiological function or (ii) by creating other objectively 
severe harmful effects, such as malnutrition or major 
psychological morbidity.255 If the effect is severe, the 
government has a constitutional obligation to limit the 
practice.256 Enforcing this obligation is generally the province 
of legislatures rather than courts, although in extraordinary 
cases it may be appropriate for courts to enforce this provision. 
b.  Indirect effects: The practice creates unreasonable 
burdens for (i) society as a whole or (ii) members of society 
outside the religious group. If the effects are severe, the 
government has a constitutional obligation to limit the 
practice. Enforcing this obligation is generally the province of 
legislatures rather than courts, although in extraordinary 
cases it may be appropriate for courts to enforce this provision. 
2.  LIKELIHOOD OF EFFECT: In order to constitute a 
basis for restricting a religious practice, the burdens, costs, 
risks, or harms must be actual, rather than merely 
hypothetical, and must not be unlikely. 
3. MAGNITUDE OF EFFECT: Notwithstanding the 
foregoing provisions, if society tolerates harms from 
comparable mainstream practices that impose harms of a 
similar magnitude to the harms posed by the religious practice 
at issue, then it should not restrict that religious practice. 
Conversely, if a mainstream practice that imposes severe 
harms is forbidden, then a comparable religious practice that 
imposes harms of a similar magnitude should likewise not be 
tolerated. Legislatures should be mindful of this provision 
when considering religious accommodations, and courts should 
be active in enforcing it. 
                                                                                                     
 254. Henceforth collectively denoted as “children” for stylistic reasons.  
 255. See Jacobs & Arora, supra note 252, at 31–32 (noting that the risks 
associated with infant circumcision are minimal; critics argue, however, that 
this irreversible procedure takes away an important decision for a person to 
make on his own). 
 256. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1657 
(discussing how religiously diverse the United States is and how this has 
contributed to a high level of religious tolerance in the United States). 
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B. Explaining the Test 
1. The Thrust of the Test and Its Audience 
This test is intended to (1) impose consistency on the 
accommodation and non-accommodation of religious practices 
that may harm children and third parties; (2) to embody and 
reflect the constitutional values at stake; and (3) to provide 
appropriate guidelines for legislators and other officials, judges, 
medical practitioners, and other professionals who are confronted 
with the question of whether to participate in or enable religious 
practices at the request of their patients. 
The Bases for Possible Restriction prong is designed to 
balance the interests of religious groups and individuals against 
those of in-group children and members of society at large who 
may be harmed by religious practices. It provides a default rule 
that religious practices should be respected unless they unduly 
interfere with the real and measurable interests of children 
within the religion and others outside the religious group. This 
embodies a healthy respect for religious liberty and the 
accommodationist commitments of a liberal society but also 
affirms an important societal duty to protect children and third 
parties from harms imposed upon them by others. This part of 
the test also provides that where the harms to children or third 
parties are sufficiently severe, the government has an obligation 
to prevent the conduct, because of the Establishment Clause 
concerns identified in Part III.C.257 In general, it is up to 
legislators and other policymakers, rather than courts, to assess 
risks of harm. However, as we discuss below,258 in extraordinary 
circumstances courts may be required to act in order to prevent 
the harm. This should be the case only where the risk of harm 
created by a practice is obvious to all and especially severe. In 
many (and perhaps most) such cases, though, courts will not have 
to undertake independent analysis of the magnitude of the risk 
and its tolerability because they may apply the Magnitude prong 
as a lodestar. 
                                                                                                     
 257. See supra Part III.C (discussing the issues created by not remedying 
the lack of uniformity with how religious accommodations are addressed). 
 258. See infra Part IV.C (discussing examples of how the test will be applied 
to required religious practices that cause harm). 
TO ACCOMMODATE OR NOT 969 
The Likelihood prong is designed to prevent abuse of the 
Bases for Possible Restriction by foreclosing pretextual action 
against religious practices as a result of supposed harms that 
may be hypothetical, slight, rare, or even nonexistent. As with 
the first prong of the test, this prong is primarily for legislators 
and other policymakers to enforce. In cases where those 
policymakers have obviously used a minimal risk of harm as a 
pretext to target religious practices, courts may intercede. Here 
again, though, courts will often have the benefit of the Magnitude 
prong to serve as their guidepost. 
The Magnitude prong of the test also serves as a limitation 
on the Bases for Possible Restriction. Effectively, it captures the 
Supreme Court’s admonition in Lukumi that society may not 
target religious practices for censure when it permits comparable 
mainstream practices, thus enforcing Free Exercise 
boundaries.259 In so doing, this limitation, in concert with the rest 
of the test, also serves four other important functions, which we 
introduce here because they help to explain the thrust and basic 
functions of the test.  
First, the test, especially the Magnitude prong, offers a 
guideline for sorting through the Establishment Clause problem 
introduced supra.260 The Establishment Clause prohibits some 
third-party harms from being imposed by religious 
accommodations but permits others.261 Neither the courts nor 
legal scholars have offered much guidance for where the 
demarcating line is.262 The Magnitude prong suggests that where 
society has chosen to permit mainstream practices that are 
comparable to the religious conduct in question and that impose 
similar harms, the Establishment Clause is not violated. In other 
words, it does not constitute religious oppression or coercion for 
                                                                                                     
 259. See Church of Lukumi Bablu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 536 
(1993) (finding that the ordinance targets religious animal sacrifice but allows 
other types of animal killings). 
 260. See supra Part III.C (explaining why it is problematic that religious 
accommodations are not treated uniformly). 
 261. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1655 (“The 
Court has never adequately delineated the boundary between permissible 
religious accommodations and impermissible ones.”). 
 262. For example, scholars have suggested that there is an Establishment 
Clause problem where the third-party harm is “significant” or “substantial,” but 
these terms do little to offer practical guidance to courts. 
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society to allow a religious practice that imposes the same kind of 
harm that society has generally chosen to tolerate for itself for 
other reasons. This evokes symmetry between the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. 
Second, the test protects Free Exercise interests. The 
Likelihood prong prevents restriction of religious practices on 
frivolous grounds, and the Magnitude prong, as noted, tracks 
Lukumi,263 in precluding pretextual laws that functionally, but 
not explicitly, single out religious practices for restriction. Third, 
the test, taken as a whole, responds to the concerns raised by the 
troubling political economy dynamics discussed above.264 On the 
one hand, the Bases for Possible Restriction provide that religious 
groups cannot use their relative lobbying power in the political 
branches to enjoy the benefits of religious freedom while imposing 
the costs on the dispersed and unrepresented minority. On the 
other hand, the Likelihood and Magnitude prongs prevent the 
reverse dynamic, by prohibiting other groups—whatever their 
motivation—from exploiting their relative political power by 
granting themselves freedoms that they would not extend to 
religious minorities.  
Finally, the test is meant to be applied by decision makers in 
a variety of contexts. Legislators and other officials can use it to 
decide prospectively how to treat a particular religious practice. 
Judges can use it as a baseline reference for interpreting and 
applying unclear legislative and administrative guidance,265 and 
also as a tool for making constitutional determinations as to 
whether the legal treatment of a religious practice violates the 
Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause. Medical 
clinicians, educators, and other practitioners who do not 
                                                                                                     
 263. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 545–46 (“We conclude, in sum, that each of 
Hialeah’s ordinances pursues the city’s governmental interests only against 
conduct motivated by religious belief. The ordinances ‘have every appearance of 
a prohibition that society is prepared to impose upon [Santeria worshippers] but 
not upon itself.’” (quoting Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 542 (1989) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment))). 
 264. See supra Part III (discussing why the way religious accommodations 
are granted in the United States is troubling).  
 265. For example, “best interests of the child,” open-textured statutory 
provisions like RFRA, and cases related to the provision of medical treatment 
over parents’ objections. See supra notes 130–134 and accompanying text 
(discussing the protection given to religious groups under RFRA). 
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formulate laws can look to the test for guidance as to whether 
they should accede to a patient’s or client’s request that they 
participate in a particular religious practice.266 As we have 
already noted, the test is flexible enough that it may apply 
differently in each of these different contexts due to the different 
institutional strengths and weaknesses of each type of decision 
maker. 
2. Unpacking the Test: Explanations and Definitions 
a. Identifying a “Religious Practice” 
As used in the test, a “religious practice” can be either an 
affirmative act or an affirmative decision to refrain from an act. 
Religious education267 and circumcision268 are examples of 
affirmative acts that can constitute religious practices and 
support religious identity. Refusal of blood transfusion,269 
conscientious objection to military service,270 and abstinence from 
specific food products271 are examples of affirmative 
                                                                                                     
 266. For example, non-vaccination or hiring a person who will not dispense 
contraception. See generally Adam Sonfield, Rights vs. Responsibilities: 
Professional Standards and Provider Refusals, GUTTMACHER INST. (Aug. 2005), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/08/3/gr080307.html (last visited Jan. 20, 
2016) (“[P]olicymakers have engaged for decades in an ever-broadening debate 
over whether and in what circumstances individuals or institutions involved in 
the provision of health care or related services can refuse to provide services or 
information on moral or religious grounds.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
 267. See generally Steven M. Cohen, The Impact of Varieties of Jewish 
Education upon Jewish Identity: An Inter-Generational Perspective, 16 
CONTEMP. JEWRY 1 (1995) (discussing how education has allowed the Jewish 
faith to remain culturally distinct). 
 268. See generally Joseph Mazor, The Child’s Interests and the Case for the 
Permissibility of Male Infant Circumcision, 39 J. MED ETHICS 421, 426–27 (2013) 
(discussing the religious practice of circumcision of male children). 
 269. See Donald T. Ridley, Jehovah’s Witnesses’ Refusal of Blood: Obedience 
to Scripture and Religious Conscience, 25 J. MED. ETHICS 469, 469–70 (1999) 
(explaining the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ objection to blood transfusion). 
 270. See Alfred J. Sciarrino & Kenneth L. Deutsch, Conscientious Objection 
to War: Heroes to Human Shields, 18 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 59, 80–81 (2003) 
(documenting that Quakers do not serve in the military).  
 271. See Stephen F. Rosenthal, Food for Thought: Kosher Fraud Laws and 
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 951, 953 
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renunciations that also can be central to religious identity.272 
Endogamy273 and refusal to abandon religion-specific garb in 
certain public areas274 display aspects of each. In all these cases, 
the religious person does something or refrains from doing 
something because of religious claims.275 Thus, religious practices 
go well beyond beliefs and ceremonies.276 
b. Identifying a “Religious Group” 
Typically, religious groups that are subject to our proposed 
test will be minority religious groups, for three reasons. First, 
every religious group in the United States constitutes a minority 
group.277 That is, there is no single religious sect that counts as 
adherents more than 50% of the population.278 Second, to the 
extent that mainstream Christianity places demands on religious 
                                                                                                     
(1997) (explaining the Jewish dietary practices and which foods the Jewish laws 
prohibit). 
 272. See Lanse Minkler & Metin Cosgel, Religious Identity and 
Consumption 5 (Univ. of Conn. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 5, 2004) (“A 
religious commitment is often at the core of an individual’s sense of identity.”), 
http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1118&context=econ
_wpapers.  
 273. See M. Christian Green, Religion, Family Law, and Recognition of 
Identity in Nigeria, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 945, 957–58 (2011) (documenting the 
rates of religious endogamy in different countries); Farrah Ahmed, Personal 
Autonomy and the Option of Religious Law, 24 INT. J.L., POL’Y & FAM. 222, 225 
(2010) (discussing issues involved with the religious forms of marriage).  
 274. See Roberta Medda-Windischer, The Contribution of the European 
Court of Human Rights to the Accommodation of Contemporary Religious 
Diversity, 9 EUR. Y.B. MINORITY ISSUES 453, 460 (2010) (“For instance, what is 
likely to cause substantial offence to persons of a particular religious persuasion 
will vary significantly from time to time and from place to place, especially in an 
era characterised by an ever growing array of faiths and denominations.”). 
 275. See Mazor, supra note 268, at 421 (discussing the role that circumcision 
plays in the Jewish faith). 
 276. See id. (exploring the freedom-of-choice concerns that are raised by the 
Jewish practice of infant circumcision). 
 277. See Religious Landscape Study, PEW RESEARCH CTR., http://www. 
pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2015) (showing 
that no sect within a religious group in the United States constitutes more than 
50% of the population) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 278. See id. (listing the percentages of the different religious groups in the 
United States). 
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practices, they tend to be compatible with mainstream behavior, 
and are therefore likely to be untroubling to most. For example, 
American laws against selling horse meat279 or nudity280 are 
unlikely to trouble many people. However, immigrants from a 
nation in Central Asia where consumption of equine meat and 
dairy products is a major part of the diet281 might be bothered by 
the unavailability of their accustomed dishes. Third, to the extent 
that popular and mainstream religious groups do face barriers to 
performing religious practices, they are unlikely to conflict often 
with state law or to be perceived by the state as being inherently 
dangerous. After all, mainstream practice typically corresponds 
with social acceptability.282 
For these reasons, the test will most often apply to the 
practices of insular groups that operate outside of, or on the 
margins of, the broader society. Chasidic283 Jews, for example, 
attempt to isolate themselves from the larger society and observe 
a markedly different lifestyle from most Americans.284 Chasidim 
“lead lives of intense piety,”285 attempting to follow and exceed 
                                                                                                     
 279. See Cavel Int’l, Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551, 557–59 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(upholding law that banned the slaughter of horse meat for human 
consumption).  
 280. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M. 529 U.S. 277, 296–97 (upholding city 
ordinance that banned nudity in public places).   
 281. See Kazakh National Cuisine, VISIT KAZAKHSTAN, http://visit 
kazakhstan.kz/en/about/80/ (last visited Feb. 29, 2016) (describing a traditional 
Kazakh dish made out of horse meat) (on file with the Washington & Lee Law 
Review). 
 282. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1647 
(explaining that mainstream religions rarely need accommodations because 
their interests are usually reflected in the law). 
 283. Chasidut (תודיסח) is a Hebrew word that incorporates piety and 
kindness. It, or Chasidism (its English equivalent), also applies to a movement 
in traditional Judaism. A Jew who follows Chasidism is called a Chasid (plural, 
Chasidim). The “Ch” in these words is guttural not found in English, 
pronounced like the Spanish “j.” 
 284. See Judith Lynn Failer, The Draw and Drawbacks of Religious 
Enclaves in a Constitutional Democracy: Hasidic Public Schools in Kiryas Joel, 
72 IND. L.J. 383, 387 (1997) (“[E]ven though Jewish law does not require Jews to 
live apart from non-Jews or to eschew modern conveniences, many Hasidic Jews 
assume the responsibilities of these additional requirements in order to ensure 
that they are living as holy a life as they can.”). 
 285. See id. at 386–87 (citations omitted) (explaining that Orthodox Jews 
believe that if they do not follow all Jewish laws then they will face unfavorable 
consequences). 
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the demands of Jewish orthodoxy.286 Their communities are led 
by a rebbe287 believed to have special awareness of God.288 
Acceptable food and clothing choices are narrow.289 Marriages are 
endogamous and arranged.290 Chasidim consult the rebbe before 
they “marry, choose an occupation, settle in a neighborhood or 
undergo surgery or infertility treatments,”291 and before other 
important personal decisions.292 Religious dictates, as interpreted 
by the rebbe in each individual case, would even determine when 
they would report a crime to the authorities.293 As M. Herbert 
Danziger says, “Traditionalists [such as Chasidim] allow their 
leaders authority in political and personal matters, and the 
leadership attempts to exercise authority beyond the specifics of 
halakhah [Jewish law].”294 Chasidic Jews are at an extreme in 
                                                                                                     
 286. See id. at 387 (explaining that Orthodox Jews live their lives in 
isolation, to ensure that they do not accidentally break any Jewish laws).  
 287. Yiddish יבר, pronounced “reb’-buh;” often translated as “grand rabbi.” 
 288. See Failer, supra note 284, at 387–88 (explaining the influential role 
the Rebbe plays in the Jewish religion). 
 289. See id. at 387 (“In his excellent study of Hasidic Jews, Jerome R. Mintz 
notes, ‘[t]o protect the community from contaminating offenses, the Hasidim 
post additional strictures as a protective buffer to the law. These may be 
precepts regarding clothing, customs, diet, and the separation of the sexes.’” 
(citation omitted)).  
 290. See Steven H. Resnicoff, Jewish Law and the Tragedy of Sexual Abuse 
of Children—The Dilemma Within the Orthodox Jewish Community, 13 
RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 281, 330–31 (2012) (discussing the process of 
becoming married under Jewish law). 
 291. See Joseph Berger, Are Liberal Jewish Voters a Thing of the Past?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/sunday-review/are-
liberal-jewish-voters-athing-of-the-past.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2016) (“Yet 
Hasidim need to be better understood, not just because of their numbers but 
also because of their tendency to vote in blocs according to the wishes of a sect’s 
grand rabbi, who often makes his choices based on pragmatic rather than 
ideological reasons.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 292. See Failer, supra note 284, at 387–88 (explaining the influence of the 
Rebbe in the Jewish religion and how Jews make important life decisions in 
accordance with the views of the Rebbe). 
 293. See Resnicoff, supra note 290, at 355 (discussing the likelihood of 
Orthodox Jews consulting their rabbinic authority as opposed to non-Orthodox 
Jews).  
 294. See M. HERBERT DANZGER, RETURNING TO TRADITION: THE 
CONTEMPORARY REVIVAL OF ORTHODOX JUDAISM 164 (Yale Univ. Press, 1989) 
(explaining that traditionalists seek guidance for their leader for matters 
beyond Jewish law but that modernists limit the guidance they receive from 
their leader to matters specific to Jewish Law). 
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religious separation from society in the United States, though 
they are not alone.295 Protestant communities such as the Amish 
and Hutterites, as well as Catholic monastic communities, are 
comparably isolated by dress and behavior from the general 
population.296  
That said, some conflicts between more integrated religious 
groups and state law do arise.297 Many doxis-oriented 
mainstream religious groups that are well integrated into the 
broader society impose at least some prohibitions on conduct.298 
For example, some mainstream Christian faiths prohibit 
abortion, and upholding this prohibition may, in some cases, 
conflict with some state-imposed obligations.299 Quakers will not 
swear oaths or fight in the armed forces,300 while Christian 
Scientists prefer not to use medical care;301 but most are 
otherwise undistinguishable from their neighbors. Reform Jews 
are also well integrated,302 placing few unique demands on their 
                                                                                                     
 295. See Gabriel Rauterberg, The Treatment of Isolationist Minorities, 22 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 105, 112 (2010) (“In North America today, there are 
religious minorities that withdraw from the dominant society and seek to create 
radically different ways of life.”). 
 296. See id. at 112–20 (discussing the different cultures and legal treatment 
of the Hutterites and Amish).  
 297. See Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and 
the Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1793, 1814–15 (2006) (“And Quakers were unwilling to conscript others 
while exempting themselves; the Franklin-drafted preamble recited that such a 
law would be ‘inconsistent and partial,’ and many Quaker legislators appear to 
have believed that voting to conscript anyone would violate their conscience.”). 
 298. See Deborah Abbott & Stephen Gottschalk, The Christian Science 
Tradition: Religious Beliefs and Healthcare Decisions, PARK RIDGE CTR. FOR THE 
STUDY OF HEALTH, FAITH & ETHICS 1–3 (2002), http://www.che.org/members/ 
ethics/docs/1276/Christian%20Science.pdf (discussing the healing process that 
Christian Scientists believe in). 
 299. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014) 
(“The contraceptive mandate, as applied to closely held corporations, violates 
RFRA.”). 
 300. See Laycock, supra note 297, at 1803 (discussing the Quakers’ refusal to 
take oaths or serve in the military). 
 301. See Abbott & Gottschalk, supra note 298, at 1, 2–4 (explaining 
Christian Scientists’ beliefs about illness and healing). 
 302. Half are married to non-Jews, 61% of adults are college educated, and 
29% live in households with an income over $150,000. A Portrait of Jewish 
Americans, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 1, 35–46 (2013), http://www.pewforum.org/files/ 
2013/10/jewish-american-full-report-for-web.pdf. 
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neighbors, save for the need to celebrate certain religious 
holidays and the preservation of infant circumcision.303  
The secular liberal state, then, is routinely confronted by 
groups within the state whose members, collectively and 
individually, not only prioritize their transcendental beliefs over 
commitment to the state and its institutions, but in fact 
experience conflicts with societal norms laws.304 Thus, although 
more conflicts (in magnitude and in number) are likely to arise 
with respect to the practices of small and marginal religious 
groups,305 the test we propose may apply to any religious group, 
no matter what its size or popularity. 
In deciding whether there exists a religious group that has 
religious claims mandating variant practices, we must look to a 
group’s self-definition.306 Mistaken attempts by outsiders to 
define a religious group in order to characterize its beliefs could 
lead to injustice and are clearly prohibited by the Supreme 
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence. For example, one 
cannot look at practices of “Jews” as a single group to evaluate 
the validity of claims regarding the centrality of circumcision by, 
                                                                                                     
 303. See B’rit Milah: The Circumcision Ritual, REFORM JUDAISM, 
http://www.reformjudaism.org/brit-milah-circumcision-ritual (last visited July 6, 
2015) (explaining the Jewish ritual of infant circumcision) (on file with 
Washington and Lee Law Review); The Jewish Calendar, REFORM JUDAISM, 
http://www.reformjudaism.org/brit-milah-circumcision-ritual (last visited July 6, 
2015) (describing the Jewish calendar and providing information about each 
holiday) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 304. See supra notes 299–301 and accompanying text (discussing examples 
of groups prioritizing their religious beliefs over societal norms and state 
commitments such as contraceptive mandates and modern medicine). 
 305. See supra note 282 and accompanying text (explaining that “a 
mainstream practice typically corresponds with social acceptability,” which 
supports the notion that conflicts are more likely where the religious group is 
small or marginal and thus not widely accepted by society). 
 306. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 
S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012) (explaining a religious group has the “right to shape its 
own faith and mission”); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 
U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (noting that the Free Exercise Clause protects all religious 
beliefs, even beliefs that others cannot comprehend); Richard W. Garnett, Do 
Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion 
Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 295 (2008) (“[T]he existence and independence of 
religious institutions—self-defining, self-governing, self-directing institutions—
are needed . . . to ‘check the encroachments of secular power and preserve [the] 
immunities’ of our ‘basic human things.”’ (citation omitted)).  
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for example, Reform Judaism, which supports it,307 or the small 
Humanistic Jewish movement, for which infant circumcision is 
optional.308 Neither can one examine “Christians” as a totality to 
decide whether Quakers are obliged to refrain from swearing 
oaths.309  
It is reasonable for the state to test the sincerity of claimant’s 
religious belief, but the state may not judge one person’s claims 
by comparison to those espoused by other members, or even 
leaders, of the same faith.310 For example, if a group identifying 
itself as the “Blue Jews” claimed draft exemption on the basis of a 
heterodox scriptural interpretation311 that required that they 
wear only blue clothes, it would be reasonable for the government 
to determine whether this was a sincere belief. It would be 
inappropriate, however, for the government to deem that this 
group’s belief was not Jewish.312  
                                                                                                     
 307. See Resolution on Anti-Circumcision Initiative, UNION FOR REFORM 
JUDAISM (June 13, 2011), http://urj.org/about/union/governance/reso/?syspage= 
article&item_id=68500 (last visited Feb. 12, 2016) (stating that infant male 
circumcision is “an integral part of the divine covenant (brit milah) that has 
existed for five thousand years between God and the Jewish people” and “a 
central religious ritual”) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 308. See, e.g., Statement on Circumcision and Jewish Identity, ORAYNU 
CONGREGATION, http://www.oraynu.org/about-us/philosophy/statement-on-
circumcision-and-jewish-identity/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2016) (“We welcome into 
the Jewish community all who identify with the history, culture and fate of the 
Jewish people. Circumcision is not required for Jewish identity.”) (on file with 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 309. See James Bradley Thayer, A Chapter of Legal History in 
Massachusetts, 9 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (1895) (discussing Quakers and whether 
they have to take an oath); Steve Sheppard, What Oaths Meant to the Framers’ 
Generation: A Preliminary Sketch, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 273, 279 
(2009) (explaining the meaning of an oath and whether Quakers could take the 
oath). 
 310. See United States v. Seeger 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) (“But we hasten to 
emphasize that while the ‘truth’ of a belief is not open to question, there 
remains the significant question whether it is ‘truly held.’”); United States v. 
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88–90 (1944) (Stone, J., dissenting) (arguing that the jury 
correctly found that the petitioners did not honestly believe religious 
experiences had occurred). 
 311. See Numbers 15:38 (“Speak to the Israelites and say to them: 
‘Throughout the generations to come you are to make tassels on the corners of 
your garments, with a blue cord on each tassel.’”). 
 312. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185 (emphasizing that “the truth of a belief is 
not open to question” by the government or any other party). The term “group” 
here may be misleading, because in the United States, even a single individual’s 
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Finally, American law does not even require membership in a 
recognized religious group at all for a person to enjoy religious 
freedom.313 In fact, laws that give special accommodations to only 
“recognized” religious groups are struck down as unconstitutional 
under the Establishment Clause.314 To be sure, people who 
profess idiosyncratic religious beliefs present a significant 
challenge to the legal system.315 Policymakers will often be 
unaware of a generally applicable law’s potential conflict with the 
beliefs and practices of such a person and so will be unable to 
consider whether to make such an accommodation.316 Moreover, 
there is a greater concern that professed idiosyncratic beliefs may 
not be truly sincere—and that they therefore may be adopted 
principally as a “cover” for a person’s non-religious preferences—
than there is when it comes to recognized religious 
                                                                                                     
idiosyncratic religious beliefs generally are treated as deserving of the same 
legal protection as those of more recognized groups. It may be easier for a group 
with a long history, canonical texts, a well-established hermeneutic tradition, a 
large membership, formal rules, and sources of authority to demonstrate 
sincerity than for a single individual to do so. However, these should not be 
dispositive. It is also reasonable to ask whether a religious rationale is 
pretextual whether the religion in question has one adherent or millions. 
 313. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”); Frazee 
v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (asserting that a personal religious 
faith is “entitled to as much protection as one espoused by an organized group”). 
 314. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) 
(“The establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment means at least 
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither 
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over 
another.”); McCarthy v. Boozman, 212 F. Supp. 2d 945, 950 (2002) (striking 
down an Arkansas statute that required applicants for religious exemptions to 
vaccinations to belong to a “recognized religious organization” that opposed 
vaccination as a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments). 
 315. See Vinning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591, 593–95 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(discussing a prison inmate’s belief that his interpretation of the Moorish 
Tenants of America and the State’s conflict as to whether his idiosyncratic 
interpretation of the religion’s established practices were constitutionally 
protected, and holding that the inmate was entitled to protection if he could 
prove his beliefs were sincere). 
 316. See Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 
46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1524 (1999) (posing an example of an employer with 
idiosyncratic religious beliefs that conflict with a generally-applicable minimum 
wage mandate, and discussing the potential for a common-law exemption 
regime as opposed to a regime where those beliefs go unnoticed by 
policymakers). 
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communities.317 Strictly speaking, though, membership in a 
recognized religious group is not a prerequisite for religious 
freedom claimants.318 
c. The Types of Risks, Burdens, Harms, and Costs Contemplated 
by the Test 
Although the test and our discussion uses the terms risks, 
burdens, harms, and costs in variety, as appropriate for the 
particular issue, we generally recognize that these terms are 
often interchangeable.  
The burdens on society at large or on non-members of the 
religious group contemplated by the Indirect Effects basis 
obviously can include health- and safety-related concerns.319 For 
instance, refusal to vaccinate a child directly jeopardizes those 
outside a religion who are unable to be vaccinated successfully.320 
Likewise, whether a state may ban a Sikh from carrying his 
kirpan (ceremonial dagger) to school also relates to health and 
safety concerns.321 However, the Indirect Effects prong also might 
                                                                                                     
 317. See supra note 310 and accompanying text (discussing the 
constitutionality of testing the “sincerity” of a party’s religious beliefs, and 
examining the Ballard and Seeger holdings where proper methods and 
limitations on this testing were discussed); see also Vinning-El, 657 F.3d at 595 
(exploring the concern of the state and courts over whether an individual’s 
idiosyncratic religious mandate was “sincerely held” and allowing that test to go 
to a jury). 
 318. See supra note 313 and accompanying text (demonstrating the law’s 
considerable protection for individual religious freedom claims).  
 319. See supra Part IV.A.1.b (discussing the operation of the “Indirect 
Effects” basis of the test, and that where a practice “creates unreasonable 
burdens for (i) society as a whole or (ii) members of society outside the religious 
group,” the government “has a constitutional obligation to limit the practice”). 
 320. See Daniel A Salmon et al., Compulsory Vaccination and Conscientious 
or Philosophical Exemptions: Past, Present, and Future, 367 LANCET 436, 436 
(2006) (explaining the danger presented to members of society who cannot 
obtain a successful vaccination by exposure to a child who is not vaccinated for 
religious reasons, but could have been otherwise). We discuss the issue of in 
greater detail infra Part IV.C.2. 
 321. Without taking a position as to whether this practice may (or should) be 
outlawed under our proposed test, we note that the Canadian Supreme Court 
allowed the practice, deciding that the kirpan posed minimal risk to other 
children. See Multani v. Comm’n scolair Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 1 S.C.R. 6 
(2006) (finding that the Orthodox Sikh’s religious freedom had been infringed); 
980 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915 (2016) 
apply to cases that do not involve concerns of health or safety, but 
rather the imposition of substantial material or financial costs on 
society.322 For instance, a society might choose to decline to pay 
for prolonged or indefinite care for a terminally ill and 
unconscious child who is not expected to regain consciousness 
because of the costs this imposes on society, both with respect to 
the monetary expense and the use of medical resources. 
In contrast, the Direct Effects prong, which seeks to protect 
the children of the religious group from harmful religious 
practices directed at them, contemplates only major health 
(physical and psychological) and safety-related harms.323 General 
standards of medical ethics and the laws of most jurisdictions 
recognize the best interests of the child as a key factor for 
determining how best legally to protect a child.324 All U.S. 
jurisdictions recognize this standard as determinative with 
regard to custody cases.325 The best interest standard is poorly 
                                                                                                     
see also Shaheen Shariff, Balancing Competing Rights: A Stakeholder Model for 
Democratic Schools, 29 CAN. J. EDUC. 476, 481–89 (2006) (discussing the social 
implications of the Multani holding). 
 322. For example, the daily cost of caring for a patient in a pediatric 
intensive care unit from 2004 to 2007 was $3,565. See Jeffrey D. Edwards, Chris 
Rivanis, Sheila S. Kun, Aaron B. Caughey & Thomas G. Keens, Costs of 
Hospitalized Ventilator-Dependent Children: Differences Between a Ventilator 
Ward and Intensive Care Unit, 46 PEDIATRIC PULMONOLOGY 356, 356–61 (2011). 
If a minority practice incurred large volumes of such care, the Indirect Care 
prong might be invoked. 
 323. See supra Part IV.A.1.a (introducing the “Direct Effects” prong and 
explaining that if the practice affects children by creating a “substantial chance 
of death or major disruption of a physiological function” or other “severe harmful 
effects, such as malnutrition or major psychological morbidity,” then the 
government has a constitutional obligation to limit it).  
 324. See Tom L. Beauchamp, Methods & Principles in Biomedical Ethics, 29 
J. MED. ETHICS 269, 269–70 (2003) 
Well before autonomy and privacy were pervasively applied through 
law and morals to the decisions of surrogates for incompetents and 
minors, the best interests standard—rather than an autonomy 
standard—was recognized as having authority over parental rights. It 
is the fitting standard for analysis of the case before us. The best 
interests standard validly overrides parental rights of control 
whenever the welfare interest of the child is substantial. If the 
interests of the child were less than substantial—for example, if the 
outcome of a surgical intervention had merely the effect of an 
unobtrusive scar—then deference to parental wishes would be 
reasonable. 
 325. Julia Halloran McLaughlin, The Fundamental Truth About Best 
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defined, though, and is often conclusory in practice.326 Legislation 
typically lays out guidelines with numerous factors and gives 
judges broad discretion to balance these factors in deciding 
individual cases.327 It is fair to say as a general matter, that in 
the United States “[t]he best interests of the child are served by a 
parenting arrangement that best maintains a child’s emotional 
                                                                                                     
Interests, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 113, 117 (2009) (“State legislatures have 
universally adopted the BICS [Best Interests of the Child Standard] and applied 
it to determine custody and visitation disputes.”). 
 326. See Sylvia A. Law & Patricia Hennessey, Is the Law Male?: The Case of 
Family Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 345, 350 (1993) (arguing that the “best 
interest” standard is vague and uncertain and result in conclusory judgments by 
the trial court judges). 
 327. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b–56 (2013)  
[T]he court shall consider the best interests of the child, and in doing 
so may consider, but shall not be limited to, one or more of the 
following factors: (1) The temperament and developmental needs of 
the child; (2) the capacity and the disposition of the parents to 
understand and meet the needs of the child; (3) any relevant and 
material information obtained from the child, including the informed 
preferences of the child; (4) the wishes of the child’s parents as to 
custody; (5) the past and current interaction and relationship of the 
child with each parent, the child’s siblings and any other person who 
may significantly affect the best interests of the child; (6) the 
willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such 
continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other 
parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders; 
(7) any manipulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an 
effort to involve the child in the parents’ dispute; (8) the ability of 
each parent to be actively involved in the life of the child; (9) the 
child’s adjustment to his or her home, school and community 
environments; (10) the length of time that the child has lived in a 
stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability of 
maintaining continuity in such environment . . . ; (11) the stability of 
the child’s existing or proposed residences, or both; (12) the mental 
and physical health of all individuals involved . . . except that a 
disability of a proposed custodial parent or other party, in and of 
itself, shall not be determinative of custody unless the proposed 
custodial arrangement is not in the best interests of the child; (13) the 
child’s cultural background; (14) the effect on the child of the actions 
of an abuser, if any domestic violence has occurred between the 
parents or between a parent and another individual or the child; 
(15) whether the child or a sibling of the child has been abused or 
neglected . . . ; and (16) whether the party satisfactorily completed 
participation in a parenting education program . . . . The court is not 
required to assign any weight to any of the factors that it considers. 
(emphasis added). 
982 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915 (2016) 
growth, health and stability, and physical care.”328 The best 
interests of the child are, however, balanced in most jurisdictions 
against “a parent’s constitutionally protected right to raise a child 
and maintain a relationship with that child, without undue 
interference by the state.”329 Not only do parents have rights, but 
there is a rebuttable presumption that parental decisions are in 
the child’s best interest.330  
Dangerous practices that can subject a child to the possibility 
of death can include withholding transfusion,331 withholding 
other forms of medical care,332 or sacramental venomous snake 
handling.333 Some practices may not endanger life, but create a 
                                                                                                     
 328. In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 172 (Wash. 2005) (quoting WASH. 
REV. CODE § 26.09.002 (2007)). 
 329. N.J. Dep’t of Children & Families, Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. 
A.L., 59 A.3d 576, 585 (N.J. 2013) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. 
E.P., 952 A.2d 436, 444 (N.J. 2008)); see Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 
534–35 (1925) (holding that parents have the liberty to direct the upbringing 
and education of their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) 
(stating that it is the natural duty of the parents to give their children suitable 
education). 
 330. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S 57, 68–69 (2000) (explaining that there 
is usually no reason for the State to get involved in family issues as long as the 
parent adequately cares for his or her children). 
 331. See In re McCauley, 565 N.E.2d 411, 412 (Mass. 1991) (explaining that 
parents who were Jehovah’s Witnesses refused to consent to blood transfusions 
for their daughter); State v. Perricone, 181 A.2d 751, 753 (N.J. 1962) (stating 
that parents who were Jehovah’s Witnesses refused to grant permission for 
their son to get a necessary blood transfusion). 
 332. See State v. Neumann, 832 N.W.2d 560, 591 (Wis. 2013) (ruling that 
prosecuting parents for reckless homicide because they did not seek medical 
treatment for their child did not violate the parents’ free exercise rights); 
Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d. 852, 855 (Cal. 1988) (concluding that 
prosecution is permitted against a mother whose child died after receiving 
prayer instead of medical treatment). 
 333. See Mary L. Daugherty, Serpent-Handling as Sacrament, 33 THEOLOGY 
TODAY 232, 232 (1976) (“For many years mountain people have suffered terrible 
pain and many have died from snake bite. Small wonder that it is considered 
the ultimate act of faith to reach out and take up the serpent.”). Daugherty 
states that children do not handle snakes. See id. at 241 (“Children are kept far 
away.”). However, others claim that children may occasionally participate in 
these rituals. See Steven M. Kane, Holy Ghost People: The Snake-Handlers of 
Southern Appalachia, 1 APPALACHIAN J. 255, 260 (1974) (“Although devotees 
report that children as young as six have handled snakes, I have not observed 
any person younger than nineteen do so.”). There are documented incidents over 
seventy years old of children handling snakes at religious services. See Michael 
J. McVicar, Take Away the Serpents from Us: The Sign of Serpent Handling and 
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substantial chance of major physiological disruption. For 
example, the obsolete Chinese practice of binding the feet of 
girls334 can sufficiently limit locomotion that it could be banned 
under this justification. Extensive female genital alterations that 
make sex painful or vaginal delivery dangerous335 also could be 
banned on this basis.  
The Direct Effects provision also allows for the restriction of 
a religious practice if it causes other kinds of objectively severe 
harmful effects to a child of the religious group.336 Here, too, we 
focus on health and safety concerns, but it is critical to note that 
psychological impairment can be sufficient to constitute such 
harm.337 These could be, for example, major psychological 
morbidity or physical mutilation that would reduce a child’s 
                                                                                                     
the Development of Southern Pentecostalism, 15 J. S. RELIGION (2013) (discussing 
the rise of serpent-handling and “holiness worship” beginning in the 1930s).  
 334. See Yuhui Li, Women’s Movement and Change of Women’s Status in 
China, 1 J. INT’L WOMEN’S STUD. 30, 30 (2000) (explaining the practice of 
foot-binding). 
 335. See Utz-Billing & Kentenich, supra note 6, at 227 (giving an overview of 
vaginal alteration procedures and discussing negative consequences relating to 
health and reproduction); S.H.A. Andersson et al., Sexual Quality of Life in 
Women Who Have Undergone Female Genital Mutilation: A Case-Control Study, 
119 INT’L J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1606, 1608 (2012) (discussing the 
painful side effects and other sexual repercussions experienced by a majority of 
women studied who had experienced female genitalia mutilation). But see 
Bergitta Essén et al., No Association Between Female Circumcision and 
Prolonged Labour: A Case Control Study of Immigrant Women Giving Birth in 
Sweden, 121 EUR. J. OBSTETRICS GYNECOLOGY REPROD. BIOL. 182, 182–83 (2005) 
(comparing the labor statistics of sixty-eight African women who underwent 
female circumcision to 2,486 uncircumcised Swedish women and finding that 
the former bore a lower risk of prolonged labor); S. Wuest et al., Effects of 
Female Genital Mutilation on Birth Outcomes in Switzerland, 116 INT’L J. 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1204, 1207 (2009) (discussing study results that 
found a lower rate of prolonged labor and birth risks in Swedish females who 
underwent female genitalia mutilation, and stating that the same women under 
managed care did not show a propensity for higher maternal and female 
morbidity). See generally Taha Abd El-Naser et al., Sexual Side Effects of 
Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting May Be Type Dependent: A Hospital-Based 
Study, 1 KOSR AL-AINI J. OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 65, 67–72 (2010).   
 336. See supra Part IV.A.1.a (explaining that where “the practice affects 
children and other vulnerable members of the religious group . . . by creating 
other objectively severe harmful effects,” the state has an obligation to limit the 
practice). 
 337. See id. (establishing “major psychological morbidity” as an example of a 
sufficient harm to constitute a direct effect under the test). 
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ability to function in the general society.338 Thus, even if labial 
reduction did not constitute a danger to a major physiological 
function, it nonetheless would likely cause major psychological 
morbidity if it were performed without anesthesia upon a 
non-consenting adolescent.339 It might also apply to practices that 
markedly limit the child’s future occupational capacity; for 
example, permanent facial alterations such as tattooing340 or 
scarification341 religious rituals, which are not often seen in the 
                                                                                                     
 338. To the extent that liberal pluralists accept illiberal minorities, they 
tend to require that there be free egress from the group—some have made this 
point explicitly. See, e.g., Galston, supra note 19, at 528 (arguing for enforcing 
prohibitions against preventing someone from leaving a group); Mark D. Rosen, 
The Educational Autonomy of Perfectionist Religious Groups in a Liberal State, 
1 J. L., RELIGION & ST. 16, 17 (2012) (arguing for autonomy of illiberal minorities 
subject to an “opt-out” constraint). Others have made it implicitly, in asserting 
that freedom, religion, or human rights in general must constrain acceptance for 
minority groups. See generally Amy Gutmann, Introduction to CHARLES TAYLOR 
ET AL., MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 10–11 
(Amy Gutmann, ed. 1994); WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL ODYSSEYS 92–94 
(2007). This is in contrast to a regime such as the Ottoman millet system, in 
which members of minorities were under the jurisdiction of that community, 
and egress from the community was restricted. See generally Karen Barkey, 
Islam and Toleration: Studying the Ottoman Imperial Model, 19 INT. J. POL., 
CULTURE, & SOC’Y 5 (2005); Timur Kuran, The Economic Ascent of the Middle 
East’s Religious Minorities: The Role of Islamic Legal Pluralism, 33 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 475 (2004). Israel maintains remnants of this system, giving religious 
courts exclusive jurisdiction over marriage and divorce. See Yüksel Sezgin, The 
Israeli Millet System: Examining Legal Pluralism Through Lenses of 
Nation-Building and Human Rights, 43 ISR. L. REV. 631, 631 (2010) (“The millet 
system that Israel adopted upon its independence was a highly pluralized and 
decentralized legal system under which the Ottoman and British imperial 
authorities granted juridical autonomy over matters of personal status.”). 
 339. See generally Arora & Jacobs, supra note 7 (discussing ethics and policy 
surrounding female genital mutilation, and potential psychological impacts on 
non-consented operations). 
 340. See John Barker & Anne Marie Tietjen, Women’s Facial Tattooing 
Among the Maisin of Oro Province, Papua New Guinea: The Changing 
Significance of an Ancient Custom, 60 OCEANIA 217, 217 (1990) (describing the 
tradition of facial tattooing); Christian Palmer & Mervyn L. Tano, Mokomokai: 
Commercialization and Desacralization, N.Z. ELEC. TEXT CENTRE (2007), 
http://www.iiirm.org/publications/Articles%20Reports%20Papers/ 
Genetics%20and%20Biotechnology/mokomokai.pdf (discussing the Maori 
culture and the practice of facial tattooing). Tattooing was a puberty ritual 
imbued with sacred significance. See id. (“For women of chiefly rank, tattooing 
was an important ceremony that accompanied puberty and marked the entry 
into womanhood.”). 
 341. See, e.g., Ọlanikẹ Ọla Orie, The Structure and Function of Yoruba Facial 
Scarification, 53 ANTHROPOLOGICAL LINGUISTICS 15, 15 (2011) (stating that the 
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United States,342 might negatively affect a child’s social 
acceptability and employability.343 Therefore, although ritual 
tattooing and scarification have no major physiological effect, a 
liberal society might be justified in prohibiting them under this 
provision. 
d. The Likelihood of Burdens Associated with the Test 
The test, through the Likelihood prong, addresses whether 
the religious practice imposes substantial risk of direct or indirect 
harms.344 It could not be otherwise, for it is often impossible to 
say with certainty whether the withholding of a particular 
medical treatment—or, even more obviously, of a vaccination—
will cause an actual harm to a specific individual.345 Society may 
still choose to protect itself and children of the religious group 
from the increased risk of harm imposed by the religious 
practice.346  
                                                                                                     
Yoruba etched identification marks into their faces). 
 342. But see Jana C. Saunders & Myrna L. Armstrong, Experiences and 
Influences of Women with Cosmetic Tattooing, 17 DERMATALOGICAL NURSING 23, 
23 (2005) (discussing tattooing procedures performed for exclusively aesthetic 
reasons in some developed cultures). 
 343. See Randy K. Chiu & Richard D. Babcock, The Relative Importance of 
Facial Attractiveness and Gender in Hong Kong Selection Decisions, 13 INT. J. 
HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 141, 141 (2002) (“This field experiment found that Hong 
Kong human resources management specialists were influenced by the 
attractiveness bias in evaluating short-listed candidates for an entry-level 
trainee position.”); Marlene Rankin & Gregory L. Borah, Perceived Functional 
Impact of Abnormal Facial Appearance, 111 PLASTIC RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 
2140, 2140 (2003) (“The purpose of this study was to establish a large, 
sample-based evaluation of the perceived social functioning, interpersonal 
characteristics, and employability indices for a range of facial appearances 
(normal and abnormal).”). 
 344. See supra Part IV.A.2 (“In order to constitute a basis for restricting a 
religious practice, the burdens, costs, risks, or harms must be actual, rather 
than merely hypothetical, and must not be unlikely.”).  
 345. See, e.g., Harrison v. Tauheed, 235 P.3d 547, 557 (Kan. App. 2010) 
(evaluating whether it was important to determine actual harm to the 
individual in applying a standard of review to religious beliefs and practices of a 
parent applying for custody of their child). 
 346. See Harriet Hall, Faith Healing: Religious Freedom vs. Child 
Protection, SCIENCE-BASED MED. (Nov. 19, 2013), https://www.science 
basedmedicine.org/faith-healing-religious-freedom-vs-child-protection/ (last visited 
Jan. 21, 2016) (discussing various religious exercises that have denied children 
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The issue of “risk of harm” is hardly a novel one in the law; 
courts have long had to deal with environmental hazards and 
product safety cases in which plaintiffs seek relief based on the 
risk of harm, rather than on an actual occurrence.347 The 
question in these cases is whether a risk is sufficiently great to 
provide the plaintiff with standing to sue. This is analogous to 
our question of whether a risk of harm is sufficiently great to 
allow restrictive legislation. To be considered a controversy under 
the current interpretation of the Cases and Controversies Clause 
of the Constitution,348 a claim must allege injuries that are 
“(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical.”349 We suggest a similar, though 
perhaps slightly broader, approach to the question of risk in our 
test.350  
Thus, as the Likelihood prong clarifies, the risk of harm must 
be actual, rather than merely hypothetical, and it may not be 
unlikely.351 That is, the nature of the injury must be known, and 
although it is not necessary to identify the specific individuals 
who will suffer the injury, it is sufficient to identify a reasonably 
increased risk of injury.352 In other words, there is an inchoate 
                                                                                                     
medical treatments or care, and certain actions by states an social groups to 
limit these religious exercises where the danger to children is too great) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 347. See, e.g., Birdsong v. Apple, Inc., 590 F.3d 955, 956 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(explaining that the plaintiff brought suit because Apple’s iPod posed a risk of 
hearing loss); Comm. to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 449 (10th 
Cir. 1996) (requiring a litigant to show an increased risk in environmental 
harm).  
 348. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (limiting the jurisdiction of federal 
courts established by Article III to certain “cases” and “controversies” mostly 
involving the United States or a state as a party, or cases arising under the 
Constitution or an international treaty). 
 349. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). 
 350. Current standing doctrine appears to not consider increased risk if it is 
broadly shared throughout society and not specifically focused on an individual 
person. See F. Andrew Hessick, Probalistic Standing, 106 NW. L. REV. 55, 67 
(2012) (discussing the development of the “probabilistic standing” doctrine, 
which places less emphasis on increased risk where an individual claimant is 
not the sole focus). Our conception for the purpose of our test is slightly broader. 
 351. See supra note 344 and accompanying text (defining the scope and 
operation of the Likelihood prong). 
 352. See, e.g., Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 570–75 (6th 
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class of individuals who definitely will suffer harm, and the 
nature of the harm can be identified, but the identity of those 
individuals within the group who will experience the harm 
cannot be known in advance.353 That said, the degree to which a 
risk becomes intolerable for society and thus that it becomes 
defensible for a practice to be prohibited is uncertain, subject to 
reasonable disagreement, requires the application of judgment, 
and is typically the province of legislators and other 
policymakers. 
Consider, for example, a hypothetical religion that initiates 
children using baptism by immersion in water at the age of four. 
The state proposes to abolish this practice because it might create 
phobias with regard to water and because a convincing scientific 
model shows a risk of death due to the shock of the immersion of 
1 in 4 billion.354 Neither of these justifications passes muster 
under our test; the notion that a practice “might” create phobias 
is a hypothesized, rather than an actual harm, and a risk of death 
of 1 in 4 billion surely qualifies as unlikely.355  
                                                                                                     
Cir. 2005) (deciding that there is standing based upon an increased risk of 
future harm); Covington v. Jefferson Cty., 358 F.3d 626, 639 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(stating that the question for injury-in-fact is whether the defendant’s actions 
caused reasonable concern of injury); Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 628 (2d Cir. 
2003) (concluding that “exposure to an enhanced risk of disease transmission may 
qualify as injury-in-fact”). The D.C. Circuit, which hears the bulk of appeals of 
challenges to regulations, rejected rare events as a basis for action. Tracking the 
reasoning of the D.C. Circuit, we also reject restriction based on rare or 
hypothetical events.  
 353. See Allan J. Jacobs, Is State Power to Protect Health Compatible with 
Substantive Due Process Rights?, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L. 113, 116 (2011) 
(“Second, it will characterize the beneficiaries of public health laws as those 
persons who would actually suffer injurious consequences from the 
government’s failure to act. The identity of these individuals, however, often 
cannot be determined in advance.”). 
 354. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 440 F.3d 476, 483 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(holding that a plaintiff did not have standing to sue for an injury that had a 
probability of 1 in 4.2 billion per person per year). 
 355. In addition, the Magnitude prong of the test prohibits such a ban 
because there is no law against taking a child of the same age into a swimming 
pool and quickly dunking them as part of the process of learning to swim. 
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e. The Magnitude Limitation: Tolerance of Harmful Mainstream 
Practices Requires Tolerance of Comparably Harmful Religious 
Practices 
To understand the limitation imposed by the Magnitude 
prong, consider a hypothetical case in which 50,000 Americans 
have settled in a non-Western nation, forming 1% of that nation’s 
population. The Americans, seeking to maintain their cultural 
identity, belong to churches that sincerely believe that American 
football develops character traits that boys should possess. The 
Americans educate their children in church schools that 
incorporate football as an integral part of the boys’ curriculum. 
Eventually, the number of injuries football players incur appalls 
the general public in the host nation,356 and it is considering 
criminally penalizing adults who organize football programs. The 
injury rate of 2% per high school game or practice, with 
concussions occurring once in every 300 athletic-exposures,357 
may be sufficient to allow prohibition under our test. However, 
the inquiry does not end there; if the host society encourages its 
boys to box and play ice hockey, the Magnitude prong would 
make it impermissible to abolish football.358 In that case, the host 
society has a comparably dangerous sports ritual, and the ban on 
football would represent discrimination.359 However, a gentle 
nation that discourages competitive violent sports would 
appropriately ban football, despite the desires of participating 
parents and children to the contrary.  
                                                                                                     
 356. See generally Randall Dick et al., Descriptive Epidemiology of Collegiate 
Men’s Football Injuries: National Collegiate Athletic Association Injury 
Surveillance System, 1988–1989 Through 2003–2004, 42 J. ATHLETIC TRAINING 
221 (2007) (collecting data of injuries among college football players); Prasad R. 
Shankar et al., Epidemiology of High School and Collegiate Football Injuries in 
the United States, 2005–2006, 35 AMER. J. SPORTS MED. 1295 (2007) (comparing 
the number of injuries between high school and college football players).  
 357. Shankar, supra note 356, tbl.1. An athletic exposure is a single athlete 
in a single competition or practice.  
 358. See supra Part IV.A.3 (“Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, if 
society tolerates harms from comparable mainstream practices that imposes 
harms of a similar magnitude to the harms posed by the religious practice at 
issue, then it should not restrict that religious practice.”). 
 359. See id. (applying the logic of the test’s operation to this hypothetical 
and determining that it would treat the sports exercises as “comparable” under 
the Magnitude prong). 
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Thus, similar to Likelihood prong, the Magnitude prong 
imposes constraints on the Bases for Possible Restriction, 
providing that in order to ban a religious practice that meets the 
criteria set forth in the Bases, society cannot simultaneously 
tolerate comparable mainstream practices—religious or not—that 
impose similar harms. For a realistic example, if a society 
tolerates infant circumcision performed by a doctor in hospitals 
for non-religious reasons, it must also tolerate religious Jews’ 
practice of home infant circumcision performed by a trained 
mohel (Jewish circumciser) unless the risks associated with this 
religious practice are of greater magnitude than those associated 
with the non-religious practice.360  
The limitation reflected in the Magnitude prong serves three 
functions. First, as a substantive matter, it aids policymakers and 
judges in identifying those religious practices that impose 
intolerable burdens on children and third parties under the first 
prong. In a vacuum, it can be difficult to determine whether the 
risks associated with a religious practice merit the legal sanction 
of the practice.361 Society tolerates and sometimes encourages 
harmful secular practices of all sorts, after all.362 Courts are 
particularly ill-suited to decide whether the risk of harm imposed 
by a particular practice is too great for society to bear.363 By 
requiring policymakers, and judges in particular, to compare the 
religious practice in question with other comparable practices, 
the substantive intolerability of the religious practice would be 
illuminated. If society tolerates the risk for the comparable 
mainstream practice, then the risk is evidently not intolerable; 
but if it has outlawed the mainstream practice, then society has 
apparently already deemed the risks intolerable. In either case, it 
                                                                                                     
 360. See supra notes 306–308 and accompanying text (discussing the Jewish 
circumcision custom and issues in greater detail). 
 361. See Richard W. Garnett, Note, Taking Pierce Seriously: The Family, 
Religious Education, and Harm to Children, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 115–
16 (2000) (discussing the balance between free-exercise values and protecting 
children). 
 362. See supra notes 356–357 and accompanying text (providing statistics of 
the dangers of playing football, a secular activity that children are often 
encouraged to play and is tolerated in America). 
 363. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1683 
(explaining why majoritarian branches should decide on religious 
accommodation instead of courts). 
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must treat the religious practice comparably. Broadening 
policymakers’ and judges’ focus when considering a ban on a 
religious practice to include comparing to mainstream practices 
with similar sorts of risks can thereby serve as a powerful and 
useful heuristic for determining whether the potential harms 
arising from the practice are substantively intolerable. 
Second, this symmetrical sorting mechanism also responds to 
the concerns raised by the public choice problem identified 
above364 by giving policymakers and judges a principled tool for 
considering religious accommodations and restrictions on 
religious practices. Rather than relying on ad hoc determinations 
and the dynamics of the political marketplace, and thus 
empowering cohesive lobbying groups (whether 
pro-accommodation or pro-restriction) at the potential expense of 
the diffuse majority,365 they would instead consider such 
individual questions in the broader context of the law. If a 
religious group lobbied to permit a practice that imposes harms 
on others that are not tolerated with respect to the analogous 
secular practices, that religious group would not receive the 
accommodation.366 At the same time, if a majority within society 
or a powerful non-religious lobbying group lobbies to outlaw a 
religious practice, the effort would be denied if society at large 
was unwilling to impose the same restrictions on its own similar 
practices.367 In turn, this could reduce the outsize power of 
                                                                                                     
 364. See supra Part III.B (introducing the concept of public choice theory 
and discussing how implementing the test “can model the circumstances in 
which the political branches will underprotect and overprotect religious 
liberty”). 
 365. See C. EUGENE STEUERLE, THE GOVERNMENT WE DESERVE 59 (1998) 
(discussing the rise of modern cohesive lobbying strategies and how they are 
empowered or diffused when “complex public policies [produce] different impacts 
for different groups”). 
 366. See Michael W. McConnell, Why Protect Religious Freedom?, 123 YALE 
L.J. 530, 531–35 (2013) (discussing several theories on why religious practices 
that are potentially harmful should or should not receive accommodations or be 
“singled out”). 
 367. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520, 536 (1993) (describing a city ordinance that targets religious animal 
sacrifice but allows other killings, which was invalidated); Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, 
Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 178–79 (3d Cir. 2002) (invalidating the 
discriminatory enforcement of a law that required the removal of attachments to 
utility poles affixed by Orthodox Jewish residents but allowed other materials to 
be attached to the poles).  
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interest group lobbying in our political system by giving voice to 
the diffuse majority, while at the same time encouraging religious 
groups and other groups to work collaboratively to find principled 
or mutually-satisfactory compromises that are not currently the 
norm in American politics.368 
Third, this limitation on the ability of society to ban religious 
practices also helps to resolve the difficult Establishment Clause 
problem we have identified.369 The Supreme Court has suggested 
that legal tolerance or accommodation of religious practices that 
impose third-party harms potentially violate the Establishment 
Clause.370 That is, when the state’s legal apparatus permits 
religious groups to impose costs on unwilling third parties, it is 
essentially permitting a kind of religious rule within society.371 
On the other hand, it is also the case that society has long 
accommodated many religious practices that impose costs and 
harms on third parties; for instance, tax benefits given to 
religious non-profit institutions impose costs on others because 
they shift costs elsewhere in society.372 The longstanding practice 
of granting draft exemptions on the basis of religious belief harm 
those who must be drafted in place of those granted such 
exemptions.373 Yet courts have not questioned these practices 
under the Establishment Clause.374 And so we are left with a 
                                                                                                     
 368. See Robinson, Lobbying in the Shadows, supra note 174, at 1066–67 
(explaining why it is currently not the norm for religious groups to compromise 
with others). 
 369. See supra Part III.C (discussing the Establishment Clause and the 
conflicts that arise when potentially limiting the exercise of religious practices 
and beliefs). 
 370. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1655 
(discussing the line of cases that interpret the Establishment Clause to limit the 
accommodation of religious practices that harm third parties). 
 371. See id. at 1656 (stating that “majoritarian branches are often eager—
overeager, perhaps—to accommodate religious groups’ interests” and concluding 
that the phenomenon is resulting in religious minorities somewhat dictating 
majoritarian public policy). 
 372. See supra notes 241–242 and accompanying text (discussing the Smith 
holding and the contrasting viewpoints on religious accommodation that spring 
from it).  
 373. See supra note 243 and accompanying text (discussing the Free 
Exercise Clause of the Constitution and its impact on several cases, including a 
military draft exemption). 
 374. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165 (1965) (discussing the 
Establishment Clause’s role in adjudicating draft exemptions for religious 
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difficult question: When a religious practice imposes costs and 
risks on third parties, how can we tell whether tolerance of that 
practice violates the Establishment Clause? In other words, how 
do we draw the line? 
The Magnitude prong offers a potential means of resolving 
this question in many cases.375 If a society accepts similar costs 
when imposed on non-religious grounds, then there is no 
Establishment Clause violation, because society has decided that 
these are tolerable costs of living in that society.376 On the other 
hand, if society rejects these costs when imposed by non-religious 
practices, then it has in fact said that there is something so 
intolerable about the risks and harms associated with the 
practice that we will not allow anyone to be subjected to them. 
Consequently, giving legal dispensation to religious groups alone 
to impose such costs on others strongly suggests an 
Establishment Clause violation.377  
Consider again the military draft exemption.378 Society has 
always chosen to exempt some people from the draft for a variety 
of reasons, thereby imposing risks and harms on others: People 
pursuing certain educational opportunities;379 people in certain 
jobs or positions of power;380 people with certain family 
                                                                                                     
reasons, and framing the appellant’s successful argument within its language).  
 375. See supra Part IV.A.3 (defining the test’s Magnitude prong). 
 376. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (discussing the 
evils which the Establishment Clause aims to protect against, and tests for 
finding an Establishment Clause violation based upon whether “its principal or 
primary effect . . . neither advances nor inhibits religion”). 
 377. See id. at 635 (Douglas, J., concurring) (using the example of a 
Christian schoolteacher to discuss the potential for an Establishment Clause 
violation where religious accommodations are used to “indoctrinate” or unfairly 
impose costs on society). 
 378. See supra note 373 and accompanying text (laying out the military 
draft example). 
 379. See Anne Yoder, Military Classifications for Draftees, SWARTHMORE 
COLL. PEACE COLLECTION, http://www.swarthmore.edu/library/peace/ 
conscientiousobjection/MilitaryClassifications.htm (last updated Mar. 2014) 
(last visited Feb. 12, 2016) (compiling the different classifications and 
exemptions for each draft statute) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 380. See id. (discussing ministerial students in category 2–D and student 
postponements in the notes below the latest table in the 2002 Act, as well as 
various student exemptions in previous iterations). 
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obligations;381 people who, though physically fit and capable, age 
out of the draft;382 people whose draft numbers simply are not 
called;383 and non-religious people with conscientious objections 
to military service.384 All of these people may be free from the 
burden of military service, thus imposing the burden of military 
service on others in society who do not share these criteria.385 
Evidently—for better or worse—we have collectively chosen to 
bear the costs of these exemptions, accepting them across society. 
Extending the same sort of accommodation to those who have 
religious beliefs that prohibit them from serving in the military, 
and the consequent cost on third parties, therefore does not 
violate the Establishment Clause.386  
C. The Test in Action 
In explaining the contours of our test, we have already briefly 
discussed some examples. We now discuss several of those 
examples in greater detail and consider several others to 
demonstrate how the test would apply in a variety of cases. For 
the sake of argument we assume that each of the practices we 
                                                                                                     
 381. See id. (showing various “essential employment” deferral categories 
throughout the history of the Selective Service Act, such as “essential civilian 
employment” and “essential agricultural employment”). 
 382. See id. (offering exemptions for “hardship” to families, or where 
“dependents” exist). 
 383. See Fast Facts About Selective Service, SELECTIVE SERV. SYS., 
https://www.sss.gov/Public-Affairs/Juvenile-Justice-Toolkit/Fast-Facts (last 
updated Aug. 21, 2014) (last visited Feb. 12, 2016) (“In a crisis requiring a draft, 
men would be called in sequence determined by random lottery number and 
year of birth.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 384. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 1300.06, CONSCIENTIOUS 
OBJECTORS (2007), http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/130006p.pdf 
(outlining exemptions for conscientious objectors under the current Selective 
Service Act). 
 385. See Yoder, supra note 379 (showing various “available for service” and 
“limited service” classifications for those who do not meet exemption criteria). 
 386. Such an accommodation would likely pass muster under a modern 
Establishment Clause evaluation. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–
13 (1971) (discussing the three “main evils” that constitute a violation of the 
Establishment Clause, including a “secular legislative purpose” and not 
fostering “government entanglement with religion”).  
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introduce has a religious basis.387 We also consider how our 
analysis compares to the decisions of American policymakers and 
judges. In some cases, the law is aligned with our test; in others, 
our test would require changes to the law. 
1. Cases Involving Religious Practices that Allegedly Harm 
In-Group Children 
First, consider cases on opposite sides of the harm spectrum. 
On the one hand are religious practices that involve withholding 
medical treatment of children.388 State legislatures have treated 
this practice with astonishing solicitude—“Nearly every state 
provides exemptions in their child abuse, neglect, or 
endangerment statutes for spiritual healing”389—while three 
states go so far as to allow parents to “assert their religious 
beliefs as an affirmative defense to murder.”390 In other words, 
although the state typically demands, at pain of criminal 
sanction, that parents provide appropriate health care and 
treatment for their children, virtually every state legislature has 
decided to accept greater risk to the health and life of children of 
religious parents.391  
For a specific example of denial of medical care, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses do not accept blood transfusion, and some have 
attempted to prevent their children from obtaining transfusion.392 
                                                                                                     
 387. Not all of them necessarily do, in fact, and people may disagree about 
others. We do not take a practical stand on this question and instead simply 
assume that each of the practices has a religious basis. 
 388. See supra note 346 and accompanying text (describing treatment of 
various religious practices denying children medical treatment or care). 
 389. Jennifer L. Hartsell, Comment, Mother May I . . . Live? Parental 
Refusal of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment for Children Based on Religious 
Objections, 66 TENN. L. REV. 499, 509 (1999). 
 390. Id. 
 391. See id. at 510 (“Most state exemptions provide either that a parent is 
not abusive or neglectful ‘for the sole reason’ that the parent uses spiritual 
treatment[,] or that a child being treated spiritually is not abused or neglected 
‘for that reason alone.’”). 
 392. See Jehovah’s Witness (WTS) Opposition to Blood Transfusions, 
RELIGIOUSTOLERANCE.ORG (Sept. 29, 1996), http://www.religioustolerance.org/ 
witness13.htm (last updated July 27, 2008) (last visited Jan. 22, 2016) 
(“The Jehovah’s Witnesses urge[] its members to refuse to accept blood 
transfusions and to not allow them to be given to their children. This is 
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Our test would allow—indeed, require, under the Establishment 
Clause—governments to prohibit parents from denying such care 
because such denial represents a threat to the life of a child, thus 
comprising a direct effect, that is actual and likely, thus 
satisfying the Likelihood prong.393 There are no comparable 
mainstream practices permitted by the law, so the Magnitude 
prong is satisfied.394 Indeed, parents who withhold medically 
necessary treatment from their children for non-religious reasons 
can be criminally and civilly sanctioned.395 Furthermore, courts 
can reduce parental rights, at least to the extent of appointing a 
guardian to make health care decisions on the child's behalf.396 
Indeed, courts have required transfusions under these 
circumstances,397 but they should go further and strike down as 
unconstitutional those laws that prevent criminal and civil 
punishment of parents who successfully refuse to allow their 
children to be transfused or who withhold other critically 
necessary medical care. 
The practice of piercing the ears of infants and minors is at 
the other end of the spectrum.398 This practice is an essentially 
innocuous one, apart from a small amount of momentary pain 
                                                                                                     
primarily based upon four passages in the Bible which they interpret as 
prohibiting the consuming of blood.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 393. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the Direct Effect and Likelihood prongs 
of the test, and their operation). 
 394. See supra Part IV.A.3 (defining the operation of the Magnitude prong of 
the test). 
 395. See Hartsell, supra note 389, at 510 (discussing statutes in West 
Virginia, Arkansas, and Oregon that limit murder exemptions to cases where 
the practices meet certain requirements and act according to the beliefs of a 
“recognized religious denomination”). 
 396. See Health Care Decision-Making Authority: Who Makes The Decision?, 
ABA COMMISSION ON L. & AGING (2015), http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/Who_Makes_the_Decision.authcheck
dam.pdf (displaying tables with various statutes and ordinances authorizing 
courts to appoint guardians and terminate parental rights for health care 
decision-making). 
 397. See, e.g., State v. Perricone, 181 A.2d 751, 757 (N.J. 1962) (finding that 
there was a compelling necessity to protect the child). 
 398. See infra notes 399–402 and accompanying text (examining the costs 
and effects of ear piercing and suggesting that ear piercing has little impact on 
children). 
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and a small possibility of minor local infection.399 Ritual ear 
piercing would be permissible under our test, both because it does 
not meet the criteria of the Bases for Possible Restriction and 
because, in any event, it fails under the Magnitude prong because 
minors, including infants, commonly have their ears pierced for 
esthetic reasons.400 Not surprisingly, we have found no evidence 
of American courts or legislatures attempting to ban parentally 
approved ear piercing of children.401 
Now consider how the test would apply in some more 
contentious cases.402 Male infant ritual circumcision has become a 
controversial issue in some Western countries403 and even in 
certain communities in the United States.404 Ritual circumcision 
of infant boys, practiced by Jews and Muslims, is claimed by some 
to cause major loss of sexual function.405 If this were true, it 
                                                                                                     
 399. See Jennifer Felsher, Ear Piercing No Longer a Pain, NEWSWISE (Sept. 
22, 2000), http://www.newswise.com/articles/ear-piercing-no-longer-a-pain (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2015) (discussing advances made in ear-piercing technology that 
may allow metal-sensitive individuals to have their ears pierced) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 400. See supra Part IV.B.2 (describing the Bases for Possible Restriction and 
Magnitude prong of the proposed test). 
 401. Schools, however, can impose, for the purpose of controlling gang 
activity, dress codes that preclude wearing of body piercings. See, e.g., Long v. 
Bd. of Educ., 121 F. Supp. 2d 621, 629 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (reflecting for reference 
the school dress code prohibiting body piercings in a case considering whether 
the dress code enforcement was discriminatory). If the gangs were organized as 
religious organizations that preyed violently on outsiders, the earring ban might 
be acceptable under the Indirect Effects prong. Of note, piercing the ears of 
kittens is criminal in Pennsylvania. See Commonwealth v. Crawford, 24 A.3d. 
396, 405 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) (confirming sentence of appellant who used a 
14-gauge needle to pierce the ears and scruff of a three-pound kitten, finding 
that she acted willfully and maliciously). 
 402. See infra notes 403–410 and accompanying text (considering infant 
ritual circumcision, facial tattooing and scarification, and limiting child 
education in the context of the test). 
 403. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (noting the opposition of 
Swedish and Danish medical associations and their efforts to ban the 
procedure). 
 404. See, e.g., Jennifer Medina, Efforts to Ban Circumcision Gain Traction in 
California, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011 
/06/05/us/05circumcision.html?_r=0 (last visited Jan. 17, 2016) (reporting that 
one group obtained over 7,100 signatures to ban circumcision of minors) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 405. See generally Morten Frisch et al., Male Circumcision and Sexual 
Function in Men and Women: A Survey-Based, Cross-Sectional Study in 
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would likely allow states to ban it under our test.406 However, 
this claim has not been borne out by randomized and large 
case-control trials.407 To the contrary, these have shown no 
adverse effect.408 Further, serious complications from ritual 
circumcision are extremely rare.409 Finally, under the prevailing 
norms in the United States, the third prong of test would also 
preclude banning ritual circumcision410 because infant 
circumcision is a legal mainstream practice.411 To prohibit only 
religiously motivated infant circumcision would thus violate the 
Free Exercise Clause. Consequently, circumcision fails to meet 
the criteria required for regulation under our test as causing 
objective harm.412 Of course, if credible scientific evidence of 
serious adverse effects of circumcision emerges and if society then 
bans all medically elective circumcision practices, and not merely 
ritual circumcision, the status of circumcision under our test 
would change as well.413 
Next, we previously discussed briefly the practice of 
extensive facial tattooing and scarification.414 Consider a religious 
                                                                                                     
Denmark, 40 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1367 (2011) (studying circumcision and its 
effects on sexual function). 
 406. See infra notes 407–414 and accompanying text (discussing the impacts 
of ritual circumcision and analyzing them in reference to the authors’ proposed 
test). 
 407. See Helen A. Weiss et al., Complications of Circumcision in Male 
Neonates, Infants and Children: A Systematic Review, 10 BMC UROLOGY 3–5 
(2010) (surveying twenty-six studies regarding the outcomes of circumcision 
procedures in infants and young children). 
 408. See id. at 3 (stating that most of the studies surveyed reported no 
severe adverse events, indicating no significant loss of sexual function). 
 409. See id. (noting that three studies of infants found that 1%–2% of boys 
experienced a serious complication as a result of circumcision). 
 410. See supra Part IV.A.3 (acknowledging societal tolerance for certain 
activities under the Magnitude prong of the test). 
 411. See Sarah E. Waldeck, Using Male Circumcision to Understand Social 
Norms as Multipliers, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 455, 457 (2003) (discussing why male 
circumcision is a social norm). 
 412. See supra Part IV.A (proposing that the government may restrict a 
religious practice if it has high likelihood of significant negative effects as long 
as society does not tolerate harms from a similar practice). 
 413. See supra Part IV.A.3 (recognizing that if the government restricts a 
secular practice that is comparable to a religious practice, the analysis for the 
third prong of the proposed test changes).  
 414. See supra Part IV.B.2.c (referencing facial tattooing as an example of a 
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culture whose members traditionally cover most of their faces 
with tattoos at the onset of puberty.415 The tattoo designs are 
simultaneously both an indicator of status and an expression of 
religious devotion.416 However, a face largely covered with tattoos 
likely would be a barrier to employment and to social integration 
in the United States. Arguably, then, the practice would trigger 
the Direct Effects prong, and the state could try to prevent 
underage children from having facial tattoos, even over the 
objection of the parents and children.417 Notably, laws already 
prohibit elective tattooing of minors,418 and so a ban on ritual 
tattooing would be consistent with the Magnitude prong.419 
A similar analysis might apply to religious groups that limit 
the education of children to an extent that makes it difficult for 
them to function economically in society.420 In Wisconsin v. 
Yoder,421 the Supreme Court allowed Amish parents to terminate 
their children’s education before the age otherwise mandated by 
the state.422 The Court did not support the Amish categorically, 
however.423 Rather, it balanced the interests of the Amish against 
those of the state.424 While it found that the state requirements 
                                                                                                     
practice that may have an adverse social stigma affecting employability). 
 415. See generally Palmer & Tano, supra note 340 (describing Maori cultural 
tradition of facial tattoos, which provided information about the individual). 
 416. See id. (discussing the moko, which is connected to religious life of the 
Maori and also showed the status of an individual). 
 417. See supra Part IV.A.1.a (proposing that a state could regulate religious 
activities that have a negative direct effect on societal engagement and 
integration). 
 418. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-71 (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any 
person to tattoo the body of any person under the age of 18 . . . .”); FLA. STAT. 
§ 381.00787 (2012) (“A person may not tattoo the body of a minor child younger 
than 16 years of age . . . .”).  
 419. See supra Part IV.A.3 (proposing that a religious practice may only be 
restricted where it is not similar to an activity accepted by society). 
 420. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (comparing the 
state’s interest in the importance of education to an individual’s ability to 
engage in and contribute to society with the Amish belief in limited education). 
 421. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 422. See id. at 234–35 (holding that “the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
prevent the State from compelling residents to cause their children to attend 
formal high school to age 16”). 
 423. See id. at 213–15 (noting the state’s interest in educating its citizens). 
 424. See id. (weighing the state’s interest in education against the 
fundamental Amish interest in directing their children’s education). 
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would be highly disruptive to the Amish “community and 
religious practice,”425 it also found that the Amish were 
“successful and self-sufficient,”426 and that the education they 
gave their children did “not impair the physical or mental health 
of the child, or result in an inability to be self-supporting or to 
discharge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or in any 
other way materially detract from the welfare of society.”427 
Today, this analysis is open to renewed question, as the decision 
not to formally educate children past the eighth grade may 
prevent those who wish to leave Amish society from successfully 
integrating into broader society.428  
Importantly, some lower courts have rejected parallel 
educational accommodations for other religious groups that did 
not have a similar track record of successfully preparing their 
children to function economically.429 Even if the Amish continue 
to enjoy the protections of Yoder, legislatures and courts must 
carefully consider whether other religious individuals and groups 
who refuse to meet state-imposed educational requirements 
impose direct costs on the children or indirect costs on society (by 
making society responsible for their economic maintenance as 
adults) by limiting their education. Thus, private religious 
schools that refuse to teach children English or foundational 
skills should be subjected to intense legal scrutiny and, perhaps, 
outlawed.430 
                                                                                                     
 425. Id. at 218.  
 426. Id. at 235. 
 427. Id. at 234. 
 428. See Gage Raley, Yoder Revisited: Why the Landmark Amish Schooling 
Case Could—and Should—Be Overturned, 97 VA. L. REV. 681, 694–95 (2011) 
(arguing that Amish children are not prepared to be economically productive if 
they leave the Amish community because the skillset necessary for successful 
engagement in modern society has changed since the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Yoder). 
 429. See, e.g., Duro v. Dist. Attorney, Second Judicial Dist., 712 F.2d 96, 99 
(4th Cir. 1983) (holding that North Carolina’s interest in compulsory education 
outweighed the Pentecostalists’ religious interest); Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 
F. Supp. 106, 148 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that New York’s minimum standards 
of instruction for school-aged children were valid). 
 430. See, e.g., Jennifer Miller, Yiddish Isn’t Enough, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/23/nyregion/a-yeshiva-graduate-fights-
for-secular-studies-in-hasidic-education.html?_r=0 (last visited Jan. 18, 2016) 
(describing the limited education provided by Jewish private schools in New 
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We do not mean to suggest that homeschooling and other 
means of privately educating children for religious reasons should 
be prohibited because of assumed direct harm to children.431 
Indeed, studies show that homeschooled children are typically 
well-prepared for higher education or to obtain jobs as adults.432 
However, we do think that states have an obligation to monitor 
and regulate alternative educational arrangements to ensure that 
children receive basic education in critical subjects to allow them 
to seek a range of employment opportunities as adults. This could 
include mandatory testing in some subjects or basic curricular 
requirements.433 Note, though, that if states allow people to 
homeschool for both religious and non-religious reasons, the 
Magnitude prong of our proposed test would only require that all 
groups are subjected to the same requirements for setting 
standards for educational progress and for monitoring those 
standards.434 
                                                                                                     
York) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Frimet Goldberger, 
When Hasidic Boys Grow up Without Real School, FORWARD (Mar. 11, 2014), 
http://forward.com/sisterhood/194267/when-hasidic-boys-grow-up-without-real-
school/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2016) (discussing the effects of Hasidic schools in 
Canada, where students learn only rudimentary English) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 431. See Nicole Stelle Garnett & Richard W. Garnett, School Choice, the 
First Amendment, and Social Justice, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 301, 313–14 (2000) 
(discussing when the state should intervene in parents’ educational decisions).  
 432. See Lynn O’Shaughnessy, Can Homeschoolers Do Well in College?, CBS 
NEWS (July 20, 2010, 7:09 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/can-
homeschoolers-do-well-in-college/ (last updated July 22, 2010) (last visited Jan. 
18, 2016) (discussing new research showing the success of homeschooling) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 433. States currently impose a range of different requirements on 
homeschoolers, from virtually none at all to extensive testing. See McMullen, 
supra note 8, at 87 (describing the three categories of homeschooling laws in 
effect in various states). It is beyond the scope of this Article to consider all 
possible approaches, but we believe that states that impose no requirements are 
derelict in their obligations. On the other hand, some states may impose too 
many requirements if they require educational achievement beyond that which 
would be sufficient to prepare adequately children for a range of careers, or if 
they require testing beyond that which is required in public schools.  
 434. See supra Part IV.A.3 (proposing a test prong that compares religious 
practices with mainstream acceptance of a practice with a similar magnitude of 
harm). 
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2. Cases Involving Potential Harm to Third Parties 
Now consider mandatory childhood vaccination laws. Every 
state requires children to be vaccinated against deadly diseases 
to attend school.435 When the federal government enacted the 
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974436 and adopted 
related regulations, it conditioned federal funding for states upon 
their inclusion of religious exceptions to mandatory vaccination 
laws.437 Although the Act’s religious exception mandate was later 
repealed,438 the vast majority of states had by then adopted such 
exceptions.439 Fully forty-seven states now accommodate religious 
and other conscientious objectors by allowing them to opt out of 
childhood vaccination schedules.440 These carve-outs for religious 
objections to vaccination laws aptly illustrate the interest group 
dynamic that sometimes privileges and protects even disfavored 
religious practices.441 The majority of people support mandatory 
vaccination laws and oppose such exemptions.442 Yet those who 
                                                                                                     
 435. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 433.267 (2015) (requiring that children shall 
provide records of their vaccinations “[a]s a condition of attendance in any 
school or childrens facility” in the state). 
 436. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5119c (2012).  
 437. See Ross D. Silverman, No More Kidding Around: Restructuring 
Non-Medical Childhood Immunization Exemptions to Ensure Public Health 
Protection, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 277, 282 (2003) (noting the effect of the federal 
act on the enactment of “state laws offering medical exemptions based on 
religious grounds occurred”). 
 438. Id. 
 439. Id. Only seventeen states appear to extend these exemptions to 
non-religious objectors. Id. at 284. Note that California has recently become the 
third state to eliminate all exemptions, except where there are medical reasons 
that a child cannot be vaccinated. See Michael Martinez & Amanda Watts, 
California Governor signs vaccine bill that bans personal, religious exemptions, 
CNN (June 30, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/30/health/california-vaccine-
bill/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2016) (discussing California’s Senate Bill 277) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 440. Silverman, supra note 437, at 282. 
 441. See supra Part III.B (outlining the relationship between public 
accommodations and interest group advocacy and suggesting that religious 
groups function as interest groups). 
 442. See Alistair Bell, Big U.S. Majority Favors Mandatory Vaccinations, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 24, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.huffington 
post.com/2015/02/24/poll-big-us-majority-fa_n_6742162.html (last updated Apr. 
26, 2015) (last visited Jan. 18, 2016) (stating that 78% of the people surveyed 
said children should be vaccinated unless they have a health risk) (on file with 
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support the exemptions are passionate and active proponents of 
practices they consider vital, whereas opponents are dispersed and 
disorganized because the issue is of low priority for them.443 
Consequently, politicians have been responsive to the minority.444 
The practice of withholding vaccinations against serious 
illnesses could be analyzed under the Direct Effects basis because 
it carries risks for the unvaccinated children of the religious 
group.445 However, it also falls under the Indirect Effects basis 
because it also imposes risks on outsiders.446 Children who cannot 
be vaccinated because of compromised immune systems or due to 
allergies to ingredients in vaccines, and others for whom 
vaccination fails, rely on high vaccination rates.447 Indeed, there 
have been recent deadly outbreaks of preventable diseases, and 
outsiders as well as the children of those engaged in the religious 
practice have suffered as a result.448 Under our test, states may—
indeed, perhaps must—eliminate such exemptions.449 The risks of 
non-vaccination are likely in certain communities and grave for 
both children within the group and the vulnerable outside the 
                                                                                                     
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 443. See supra notes 191–193 and accompanying text (discussing how a 
minority advocate for a measure may be more successful when there is a weak 
majority opposition). 
 444. See Silverman, supra note 437, at 282 (noting the almost universal 
adoption of state law religious exemptions from school immunization 
requirements). This dynamic is not preordained, however. In the wake of deadly 
outbreaks of preventable childhood diseases, the broader public sometimes 
becomes focused on the issue sufficiently to provoke changes in the law to limit 
or eliminate such exemptions. This recently occurred in California. See Martinez 
& Watts, supra note 439 (providing coverage for California’s passage of a bill 
removing all exemptions for vaccinations except where children have a health 
reason). 
 445. See supra Part IV.A.1.a (proposing that a practice should be regulated 
if it subjects vulnerable populations, such as children, to severe risk of harm or 
death). 
 446. See supra Part IV.A.1.b (proposing that a practice should be regulated 
if it places a severe burden on society). 
 447. See Silverman, supra note 437, at 278–79 (discussing the benefits of 
mandatory childhood vaccinations). 
 448. See Sifferlin, supra note 157 (describing the recent cases of measles in 
New York City); Doucleff, supra note 157 (discussing the outbreaks of whooping 
cough).  
 449. See supra Part IV.A (proposing that religious practices may be 
regulated when their direct or indirect effects are severe as long as there is no 
comparable secular practice accepted by society). 
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group (satisfying the Likelihood prong).450 Many states also 
provide for directly observed therapy for tuberculosis medications 
or quarantine for health professionals exposed to Ebola 
(satisfying the Magnitude prong).451 Consequently, legislatures 
should act to change their vaccination laws. Failing that, courts 
should perhaps strike down vaccine exemptions under the 
Establishment Clause. 
The test also applies to the question of whether and how to 
accommodate medical practitioners whose religious beliefs 
prohibit them from providing certain medical services.452 In some 
cases, allowing these medical practitioners to decline to provide 
certain medical services can harm individuals seeking those 
services.453 Several federal statutes allow health care 
professionals and institutions with religious objections to refuse 
to provide care related to abortion and sterilization procedures.454 
                                                                                                     
 450. See Silverman, supra note 437, at 278–79 (outlining the significant 
societal benefits of vaccines). We think that parallel exemptions for 
conscientious objectors are reasonably considered religious in nature, but we 
recognize that some may disagree and argue that these are better understood as 
comparable mainstream practices. If so, then a state that offers such exemptions 
must also offer religious vaccination exemptions, but a state may not offer only 
religious exemptions. In any event, we believe that the risks associated with 
non-vaccination are so severe for certain childhood diseases that only 
well-documented medical exceptions should be granted. 
 451. See generally Jeffrey M. Drazen et al., Ebola and Quarantine, 371 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 2029 (2014); Self-Study Modules on Tuberculosis, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/tb/education/ 
ssmodules/module9/ss9reading2.htm (last updated Sept. 1, 2012) (last visited 
Jan. 18, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 452. See infra notes 453–464 and accompanying text (discussing the 
application of the proposed test in the context of contraception). 
 453. See, e.g., Erin Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and 
the New Rhetoric of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 77, 78 
(1995) (“Despite forceful and increasingly frequent arguments that the harm 
caused by restrictive abortion laws deny equal protection, at least as much as 
they impinge on personal privacy, the Court has steadfastly refused to consider 
abortion in this light.”). 
 454. See 42 U.S.C. § 238n (2012) (prohibiting discrimination by government 
licensing entities of an entity that refuses to participate in or offer trainings in 
the performance of induced abortions); id. § 300a-7 (addressing the exceptions 
for sterilization and abortion); 45 C.F.R. § 88.1 (2015) (stating that the purpose 
of the section is “to provide for the enforcement” of several acts “referred to 
collectively as the ‘federal health care provider conscience protection statutes’”); 
Maxine M. Harrington, The Ever-Expanding Health Care Conscience Clause: 
The Quest for Immunity in the Struggle Between Professional Duties and Moral 
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States have overwhelmingly followed the lead of the federal 
government and in some respects have gone much further.455 
According to the Guttmacher Institute, forty-five states allow 
individual health care providers to refuse to provide abortion 
services normally provided by identical professionals.456 Of these, 
forty-three allow even government-owned health care institutions 
to refuse to provide such services, while thirteen give the 
dispensation only to private institutions.457 Moreover, eighteen 
states allow providers to refuse to provide sterilization services; 
ten allow providers to refuse to provide services related to 
contraception; between six and twelve permit pharmacists to 
refuse to dispense contraceptives; and nine allow health care 
institutions to refuse to provide contraceptive services.458 This 
does not tell the whole story, as participation is not necessarily 
explicitly required in other states, and we are unaware of 
situations in which government has sanctioned health care 
professionals for refusing to provide services in the area of 
reproductive control.  
Under the proposed test, whether such accommodations are 
advisable, or even permissible, is highly fact-dependent.459 The 
nature of the service being sought matters a great deal, as does 
the relative ease with which the person seeking the service may 
obtain them elsewhere.460 Both factors go to the nature of the 
burdens that the religious practitioner imposes on others.461 If a 
proposed law allows a pharmacist to decline to fill a prescription 
for contraception, but only where another employee in the 
                                                                                                     
Beliefs, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779, 781 (2007) (discussing the trend of legislation 
that allows physicians to refuse treatment options). 
 455. GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: REFUSING TO PROVIDE 
HEALTH SERVICES (2016). 
 456. Id. 
 457. Id. 
 458. Id. 
 459. See supra Part IV.A (outlining the proposed test as an analysis of 
various factors which are heavily reliant on the specific context of the religious 
practice in question). 
 460. See supra Part IV.A (proposing the test’s prongs that consider the 
direct effects of the religious practice on individuals and the burden or likelihood 
of those effects). 
 461. See supra Part IV.A.2 (describing the Likelihood prong of the proposed 
test). 
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pharmacy is available and willing to do so, then the medical and 
economic costs are almost altogether mitigated and the religious 
practice must be tolerated.462 If, on the other hand, a proposed 
law provides an absolute right for every pharmacist to decline to 
fill the prescription and there is no other pharmacy in close 
proximity, then the harms and costs may be substantial enough 
to prohibit the religious practice.463 A proposed law that allows a 
pharmacist to decline to provide the medication, but only if she 
will transfer the prescription to a vendor within a radius of five 
miles who is available and willing to fill it, presents a middle 
case.464 We encourage policymakers and judges to apply our test 
in this fact-specific manner using accepted medical criteria for 
harm (such as considering unwanted pregnancy to be a harm) to 
resolve such questions. 
V. The Test’s Implications and Limitations 
Our test for resolving these conflicts has potential 
implications for a wide range of clashes between law and religion, 
but it also has some important limitations.465 We identify and 
address these in this Part. 
A. The Test Primarily Applies Only to a Limited Category of 
Cases, but It May Have Important Implications for Many Others 
As currently conceived, the test is intended to apply 
primarily to cases in which the risks and harms associated with a 
                                                                                                     
 462. See, e.g., 49 PA. CODE § 27.103 (2015) (declaring that a pharmacy should 
reasonably accommodate the pharmacist’s beliefs while assuring the delivery of 
services that the patients need). 
 463. On the other hand, compelling professionals to perform acts that they 
conscientiously object to might cause them to leave localities where such 
professionals are scarce, further compounding problems of access to care. It may 
also dissuade people from entering those specialties. Even if a government 
action is permissible under our test, it is not necessarily wise.  
 464. See, e.g., 49 PA. CODE § 27.103 (creating obligations for pharmacists 
who refuse to fill prescriptions based on religious beliefs). 
 465. See infra Parts V.A–C (discussing the application of the proposed text 
to a limited category of cases, its constraints on prohibiting religious practices 
altogether, and its inability to resolve certain cases). 
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religious practice are primarily health or medically related, 
though economic and education-related applications also may 
come into play.466 In contrast to other kinds of harms, these 
harms are relatively concrete and often quantifiable, and 
therefore reasonably susceptible to the kind of balancing and 
comparisons the test demands.467 The test does not necessarily 
apply in the same way to a variety of other kinds of cases 
involving conflicts of rights in which such quantifiable risks and 
harms are not implicated.468 
For instance, one of the highest profile and most politically 
charged contemporary law and religion debates concerns whether 
there should be religious accommodations for laws that prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.469 Such 
accommodations plainly impose costs and harms on third parties, 
and anti-discrimination laws typically do not include comparable 
exceptions for mainstream practices.470 However, the primary 
harms in such cases are not usually of the sort contemplated by 
the test; rather, they are dignitary harms.471 We do not mean to 
suggest that such harms are not “real.” Indeed, dignitary harms 
of the sort imposed by a real or proverbial “no gays allowed” sign 
on a business are in some senses among the most painful.472 But 
                                                                                                     
 466. See supra Part IV.C (examining the application of the proposed test in 
the contexts of ear piercing, facial tattooing, circumcision, contraception, and 
education). 
 467. See supra Parts IV.A–C (outlining the prongs of the proposed test, the 
analysis associated with each prong, and the application of the test to several 
more concrete religious practices, such as ear piercing and circumcision). 
 468. See infra notes 469–473 and accompanying text (introducing and 
discussing religious accommodations for sexual orientation discrimination as an 
example of a category of cases that the test is not equipped to address). 
 469. See generally George W. Dent, Jr., Civil Rights for Whom? Gay Rights 
Versus Religious Freedom, 95 KY. L.J. 553 (2007) (discussing the debate about 
whether religious groups can discriminate based on sexual orientation). 
 470. See Andrew Koppelman, You Can’t Hurry Love: Why 
Antidiscrimination Protections for Gay People Should Have Religious 
Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 125, 131–37 (2006) (discussing the effects of 
religious exemptions from antidiscrimination protection of gay people). 
 471. See Douglas Nejaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, 
Religious Exemptions, and the Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 
100 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1228 (2012) (discussing the extent of the harm to one’s 
dignity that results from discrimination). 
 472. See Melissa Chan, Tennessee Hardware Store Owner Posts ‘No Gays 
Allowed’ Sign on Front Door: ‘I’ll Never Regret This,’ N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 1, 
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they are not quantifiable.473 Thus, while we do not discount the 
possibility that the test could play a guiding role in deciding such 
cases, the matter requires further consideration. 
Of course, in some cases the harms of such religious 
accommodations are indeed economic, such as in geographic 
areas where gay and lesbian individuals may not easily be able to 
obtain services from alternative, non-objecting service 
providers.474 In such cases, the test should certainly guide the 
decision whether and how to accommodate religious objectors.475 
For an example of how policies could be crafted in such cases, 
some states provide that pharmacists with religious objections to 
dispensing certain medications may decline to do so, but only if 
someone else in the same pharmacy is prepared to do so.476 
Similarly, in the same-sex marriage context, Utah recently 
enacted an intriguing compromise that exempts government 
officials with religious objections to same-sex marriage from 
providing marriage licenses but provides that someone must be 
available who is willing to do so.477 These kinds of compromises 
are reasonable attempts to balance the values of pluralism and 
religious freedom against those of monism and the protection of 
the interests of third parties in a manner compatible with the 
mandates of the religion clauses.478 
                                                                                                     
2015), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/tennessee-hardware-store-
owner-posts-no-gays-allowed-sign-article-1.2277673 (last visited Jan. 18, 2016) 
(discussing a business owner that put a “No Gays Allowed” sign on the front 
door) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 473. See Nejaime, supra note 471, at 1228 (considering the distinction 
between a status-based harm and insulted dignity as examples of outcomes from 
discriminatory behavior). 
 474. See, e.g., infra notes 476–477 and accompanying text (discussing 
Pennsylvania and Utah as examples of states where it may be more difficult to 
get access to contraceptives or marriage licenses). 
 475. See supra Parts IV.A–B (providing a framework for applying the 
proposed test where the religious practice is concrete and leads to concrete 
harms). 
 476. See, e.g., 49 PA. CODE § 27.103 (2015) (creating obligations for 
pharmacists who refuse to fill prescriptions based on religious beliefs). 
 477. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-20-201 (LexisNexis 2015) (prohibiting a 
state official from requiring a religious official to solemnize a marriage contrary 
to the religious official’s beliefs); id. § 17-20-4 (enumerating the duties of a 
county clerk). 
 478. See supra Part III (exploring the considerations involved in 
determining whether or not to accommodate religiously motivated exceptions to 
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B. The Test Does Not Always Mandate the Prohibition of Religious 
Practices, Even Where Its Conditions Are Met 
One implication of the test is that at least some religious 
practices that meet the criteria of the first prong should not be 
tolerated by society, so long as the limitations in the Likelihood 
and Magnitude prongs are not implicated.479 This comports both 
with a just society’s interest in and obligation to protect citizens 
from harms imposed by others and with the Establishment 
Clause concern of giving special legal license for religious groups 
to harm others.480 However, we do not mean to imply that society 
must necessarily ban all such practices. There are at least two 
circumstances in which legal prohibition is not necessarily 
warranted and where, ultimately, policymakers’ judgments ought 
to be respected.481  
First, reasonable people may disagree as to what kinds of 
harms meet the criteria under the Bases for Possible Restriction 
to make prohibition of the associated religious practice 
appropriate.482 In using terms like “unreasonable burdens,” 
“sufficiently deleterious effects,” “substantial chance,” and 
“objectively severe” in the first prong, we recognize that these 
terms necessitate judgment.483 Some policymakers and societies 
may tolerate more externalization of risks and costs than others, 
and therefore may come to different conclusions as to whether the 
potential harms associated with a given religious practice are 
intolerable for that society. To be clear, if the society prohibits 
comparable mainstream practices, then the Establishment 
                                                                                                     
laws). 
 479. See supra Part IV (describing the proposed test and providing examples 
of religious practices that satisfy its parameters). 
 480. See supra Part III (discussing the development of accommodations 
through political advocacy for certain activities recognized by society as 
harmful). 
 481. See infra notes 482–489 and accompanying text (noting circumstances 
where there is disagreement about the extent of the harms resulting from a 
practice or where banning a practice may actually create more significant 
problems). 
 482. See supra Parts IV.A–B (discussing the considerations for applying the 
Bases for Possible Restriction to various religious practices). 
 483. Supra Part IV.A.1. 
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Clause may require it to prohibit the religious practice as well.484 
However, where there is no comparable mainstream practice, it 
might better be left to policymakers rather than courts—except 
perhaps in the most extreme cases—to decide whether the 
religious practice is tolerable.485 
Second, even where a religious practice is clearly intolerable 
under the test, it is not necessarily the case that the best or 
necessary course is for society to prohibit the practice as a legal 
matter.486 Sometimes banning a practice can be 
counterproductive and ineffective in achieving the desired result, 
whereas an alternative approach—such as through educational 
initiatives, attempts to persuade, or other “nudges”—may be 
more productive.487 This is true, of course, for non-religious 
practices as well; most American jurisdictions do not ban alcohol 
use despite the potential deleterious effects of drinking.488 Again, 
these are typically decisions to be left to policymakers.489 
C. The Test Does Not Resolve All Cases in Which It Applies 
Perhaps the most important limitation of the test is that, 
even where it is implicated, that is, where religious practices 
potentially impose health or economic harms, it will not provide a 
clear resolution to every church-state conflict.490 In the most basic 
                                                                                                     
 484. See supra Parts III.A–B (providing background for situations when 
religious practices do not receive accommodations). 
 485. See infra Part V.C (discussing the role of policymakers in circumstances 
when the proposed test does not achieve the desired result). 
 486. See infra notes 487–489 and accompanying text (considering the 
potential negative effects of banning or regulating a particular practice). 
 487. See, e.g., Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So 
Many Americans Opting Out of Vaccinating Their Children?, 37 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 353, 437 (2004) (explaining how punishing vaccination resistors was 
ineffective and why it is necessary to educate parents regarding the risks of 
diseases compared to vaccines). 
 488. See Data and Maps, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/alcohol/data-stats.htm (last updated Nov. 16, 2015) (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2016) (reflecting state-by-state binge drinking and listing some 
of the dangers associated with excessive drinking) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 489. See infra Part V.C (discussing the role of policymakers in the context of 
the separation of church and state). 
 490. See infra notes 491–494 and accompanying text (discussing the 
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sense, the test cannot resolve all cases for the same reason that 
other legal tests cannot: reasonable people will reasonably 
disagree. With respect to our test, reasonable people may 
reasonably disagree about the magnitude of the risks associated 
with a particular religious practice.491 Some policymakers will 
consider certain costs tolerable, while others will find the same 
costs intolerable.492 Consequently, they may disagree as to how to 
treat the religious practice under the first prong of the test.493 As 
already noted, terms in the first prong like “unreasonable 
burdens,” “sufficiently deleterious effects,” “substantial chance,” 
and “objectively severe” require the application of judgment, and 
people’s judgment may differ in different cases.494 But this lack of 
certitude is not something that should concern us any more than 
it does in the case of any other legal test. In many cases, the 
correct result is clear, which is a sufficient benefit in itself.495 And 
in those cases where the correct result is reasonably subject to 
dispute, the test still represents an improvement over the current 
ad hoc and unprincipled approach if it succeeds in orienting 
policy debates towards a principled discussion concerning the 
nature, magnitude, and tolerability of the costs imposed by the 
religious practice in question. 
The Magnitude prong of the test presents a different set of 
difficulties.496 This prong asks policymakers, and especially 
                                                                                                     
challenges presented by the uncertain nature of the proposed test’s 
interpretation by different decision-makers in different contexts). 
 491. See infra notes 492–494 and accompanying text (addressing the 
qualitative nature of the assessment in the first prong of the proposed test and 
its susceptibility to varying applications). 
 492. See, e.g., supra Part IV.C (providing examples of religious practices that 
have yielded contrasting responses from policymakers, such as childhood 
education). 
 493. See supra Part III.A (outlining the parameters of the direct and indirect 
effect analysis under the first prong of the test, which requires decision-makers 
to assess the harms associated with a particular religious practice). 
 494. See supra Part IV.A.1 (providing a discussion of the proposed test’s 
specific factors). 
 495. See supra Part IV.C (applying the proposed test to several religious 
practices, such as circumcision and facial tattooing, and finding that the test 
achieves a correct result in these concrete cases). 
 496. See infra notes 497–499 and accompanying text (noting that the third 
prong of the proposed test is not relevant where a unique religious practice does 
not have a mainstream counterpart). 
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judges, to examine challenged religious practices in the context of 
comparable mainstream practices and to treat them similarly.497 
But not every religious practice has a comparable mainstream 
practice.498 Some practices may be unique to certain religious 
groups and not replicated by others.499 Consider some 
ultra-Orthodox500 Jews’s practice of metzitzah b’peh501 during the 
infant circumcision ritual, in which the mohel briefly applies 
direct oral suction to the circumcision wound.502 In rare cases, 
where the mohel carries the herpes simplex virus, this practice 
can transmit the virus to the child, which can be fatal.503 In 
considering whether to tolerate or prohibit this religious 
practice—or to undertake other means to reduce its prevalence 
                                                                                                     
 497. See supra Part IV.A.3 (proposing that a religious practice not be 
restricted if a comparative and commonly practiced secular activity exists). 
 498. See, e.g., James Pellerin & Michael B. Edmond, Infections Associated 
with Religious Rituals, 17 INT'L J. INFECTIOUS DISEASE e945, e945 (2013) 
(exploring the potential infections resulting from the Hindu side roll, where 
devotees lay on their sides and roll along the same path as the icons of various 
deities, contracting skin infections as a result of canine fecal material along the 
same path).  
 499. See infra notes 500–503 and accompanying text (introducing and 
discussing the distinctive religious practice metzitzah b’peh). 
 500. We use the term “ultra-Orthodox” as a term that many of our readers 
will recognize as a descriptor of those Jews whose especially extensive rules of 
conduct creates physical and psychological separation not only from non-Jews, 
but from Jews whose observance is more lenient. Those to whom the term is 
applied do not use it themselves, and this term may be unfair both to them and 
to Orthodox Jews. Rather, they call themselves Charedim (singular, Charedi), a 
term we eschew because many readers would not recognize it. See Jodi Rudoren, 
Israel Prods Ultra-Orthodox to ‘Share Burden,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/world/middleeast/israels-ultra-orthodox-
fight-to-fit-in.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2016) (describing ultra-Orthodox Jews 
in Israel using the term “Haredim,” reflecting the variable spellings of Hebrew 
terms translated to English) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 501. See Pellerin & Edmond, supra note 498, at e946–e947 (reviewing the 
existing medical literature for specific religious practices associated with 
infection, such as metzitzah b’peh and the shared chalice of Christian 
communion). An alternative spelling is “metzitzah be’peh”; the term means 
“suction by mouth” in Hebrew. See Jamie Cole Kerlee, Too Much Religious 
Freedom? Infants Infected with Herpes After Jewish Mohel Applies Oral Suction 
to Circumcised Penises, 19 J.L. & HEALTH 297, 300 (2005) (using the spelling 
“metzitzah be’peh” to refer the practice). 
 502. Pellerin & Edmond, supra note 498, at e945–e946. 
 503. See id. (noting the documented cases linking outbreaks of herpes in 
male infants shortly after undergoing the metzitzah ritual). 
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and the risks it imposes—the Magnitude prong of the test invites 
policymakers to consider how the law treats analogous 
mainstream conduct.504 Yet we are unaware of any comparable 
non-religious practice of placing one’s mouth in brief contact with 
a child’s penis.505 The law simply has no provision for such a 
practice—except, of course, where the contact is sexual in nature, 
which is not an analogous practice506—because the practice is 
unknown to the law outside of this minority religious practice.507 
In such cases, how should policymakers and judges apply the 
test? 
There are at least three different possible approaches to this 
sort of problem.508 The first is to look for the closest mainstream 
practices to compare the religious practice to.509 For example, in 
addressing the practice of metzitzah b’peh, a policymaker or judge 
could consider how the law treats other practices that may lead to 
the transmission of the herpes virus to infants.510 Research shows 
that breastfeeding an infant is a far greater cause of herpes than 
is metzitzah b’peh,511 but the law does nothing to dissuade, let 
                                                                                                     
 504. See supra Part IV.A.3 (suggesting that, under the third prong of the 
proposed test, where a religious practice has a comparable mainstream practice, 
policymakers should not restrict the religious practice). 
 505. This is not analogous to sexual crimes because the statutes in those 
cases require that the intent of the act must be sexual. 
 506. If it were analogous, the sexual abuse laws would not explicitly require 
sexual intent. 
 507. See supra notes 505–506 and accompanying text (discussing the 
absence of any comparable secular practice or any law regulating this specific 
religious practice). 
 508. See infra notes 509–528 and accompanying text (suggesting that 
policymakers look to the closest practice and that courts apply strict scrutiny, or 
that decision-makers apply the test according to their roles, the case, and the 
most relevant test prongs). 
 509. See infra notes 510–512 and accompanying text (introducing a 
comparison between metzitzah b’peh and breastfeeding and considering the two 
against the proposed test). 
 510. See infra note 512 and accompanying text (demonstrating that 
government is supportive of breastfeeding without distinguishing mothers who 
may have the herpes simplex virus).  
 511. See, e.g., Mary Boyd, Herpes: From Mom to Baby—and Back Again, Via 
Breastfeeding, CONSULTANT FOR PEDIATRICIANS (2009), http://www.pediatrics 
consultant360.com/content/herpes-mom-baby%E2%80%94and-back-again-breast 
-feeding (last visited Jan. 22, 2016) (noting that reported incidents of herpes 
transmission due to breastfeeding are extremely rare) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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alone prohibit, carriers of the virus from breastfeeding their 
children.512 From this, some may conclude that the law is 
apparently indifferent to or tolerant of practices that impose far 
greater risks of herpes transmission, and consequently, that it 
must also tolerate metzitzah b’peh.  
We are highly skeptical of this approach, because the 
comparison between the two practices (breastfeeding and 
metzitzah b’peh) is inapt. Breastfeeding, unlike the metzitzah 
b’peh practice, potentially carries with it substantial quantifiable 
health and economic benefits that may outweigh the similarly 
quantifiable health risks.513 Further, even if it were in theory 
sensible to regulate breastfeeding, it would be impossible to do so 
given the nature of the mother-child relationship in which 
breastfeeding takes place.514 It is simply impractical for the law 
to require mothers to be tested for herpes before being “licensed” 
to breastfeed their children.515 In contrast, because mohels are 
trained professionals who offer their services for payment, the 
law could require them to be regularly tested for the herpes 
disease or require informed consent of the nature of the risk on 
the part of the parents before the circumcision takes place.516 In 
short, where there is no directly analogous mainstream practice 
to the religious practice, we caution against using only 
marginally similar mainstream practices as a primary reference 
                                                                                                     
 512. See, e.g., A Look at Enacting Breastfeeding Legislation, LA LECHE 
LEAGUE INT’L, http://www.llli.org/law/lawenact.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2016) 
(reviewing existing government promotion and regulation breastfeeding) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 513. See Olha Lutsiv et al., Women’s Intentions to Breastfeed: A 
Population-Based Cohort Study, 120 INT’L J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1490, 
1490 (2013) (describing the benefits of breastfeeding). 
 514. Cf. Monique Anikwue, Breast Still Best: An Argument in Favor of One 
HIV Positive Mother’s Right to Breastfeed, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 479, 
480 (2003) (pointing out the close bonds formed between mothers and their 
breastfeeding infants and raising the issue of the criminalization of 
breastfeeding for HIV positive mothers). 
 515. See Genital Herpes—CDC Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/std/herpes/stdfact-herpes.htm (last visited Jan. 
20, 2016) (providing facts about herpes, which is caused by the viruses herpes 
simplex type 1 and type 2) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
“About one out of every six people aged 14 to 49 years have genital herpes.” Id.  
 516. See generally Kerlee, supra note 501 (explaining the ritual of metzitzah 
b’peh, including discussions about requiring HSV testing and parental consent). 
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point. There are likely to be so many confounding variables that 
the comparison would be one of apples-to-computers rather than 
apples-to-apples and tend to confuse more than it illuminates.517 
A second possibility is to adopt the approach of the Second 
Circuit and to apply strict scrutiny to any regulation that targets 
unique religious practices that have no mainstream analog.518 
That is, any regulation that targets only religious practices—even 
where the targeting is due to the sui generis nature of the 
practice—must have a compelling justification, be narrowly 
tailored to achieve the desired end, and be no more restrictive 
than necessary.519 We believe that this is certainly the correct 
approach for non-judicial policymakers to adopt, and that this is 
reflected in how the Bases for Possible Restriction prong and 
Likelihood prongs of the test work together.520 That is, any 
practice that meets the exacting requirements of these two 
prongs and thus justifies restriction is almost certain to also pass 
strict scrutiny.521 Consequently, where the Magnitude prong 
cannot be considered due to the simple absence of any comparable 
mainstream practices, decision makers have no choice but to 
consider the Bases for Possible Restriction prong and Likelihood 
                                                                                                     
 517. See, e.g., supra notes 513–516 and accompanying text (comparing 
metzitzah b’peh with breastfeeding and drawing distinctions in terms of 
regulation). 
 518. Cent. Rabbinical Cong. of the U.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental 
Hygiene, 763 F.3d 183, 186 (2d Cir. 2014) (considering whether a requirement to 
obtain written consent before performing metzitzah b’peh violates the First 
Amendment and concluding that the regulation must satisfy strict scrutiny 
because it was neither neutral nor generally applicable). 
 519. Id.; see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 
508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993) (“Although a law targeting religious beliefs as such is 
never permissible, if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices 
because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral and it is invalid 
unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance 
that interest.” (citations omitted)); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. 
Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (“The state may justify an inroad on religious 
liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some 
compelling state interest.”).  
 520. See supra Part IV.B (describing the relationship between the effects of 
a religious practice and the likelihood of those effects). 
 521. See supra Part IV.A.1 (using terms like “unreasonable burdens,” 
“sufficiently deleterious effects,” “substantial chance,” and “objectively severe” to 
establish the high standard of the Bases for Possible Restriction and Likelihood 
prongs). 
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prongs in isolation.522 This probably corresponds to a legislative 
version of strict scrutiny. 
For institutional reasons, however, we are uncertain whether 
this is the proper approach for courts to adopt. The Magnitude 
prong naturally lends itself to judicial inquiry because it plays to 
the institutional strengths of the judiciary—analogizing between 
cases to ensure equal treatment;523 whereas the Bases for 
Possible Restriction and the Likelihood prong, which require 
decision makers to make fact-based policy determinations and 
analyses of risk, is more appropriate for legislators and 
administrative officials.524 Simply put, judges may not be 
equipped to engage in such factual inquiries.525 Perhaps, then, 
judges should defer to legislative and administrative judgments 
in such cases, absent actual evidence of animus (if the practice is 
prohibited by statute or regulation),526 compelling evidence that 
the practice imposes unusually large costs on children or third 
parties (if the practice is permitted),527 or some other reason to 
suspect that the decision-making process was tainted.528  
Thus, it could be that the test requires that 
differently-situated decision makers apply it differently. 
Alternatively, perhaps judicial scrutiny should be the norm to 
police the line between Free Exercise and Establishment Clause 
                                                                                                     
 522. Supra Part IV.A. 
 523. See Michael Gentithes, Precedent, Humility, and Justice, 18 TEX. 
WESLEYAN L. REV. 835, 838 (2012) (discussing judicial reliance on precedents 
and treating like cases alike). 
 524. See supra Part IV.B.1 (noting that policymakers should enforce the first 
and second prongs of the proposed test). 
 525. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1669–70 
(explaining the “preference for policymaking through political engagement 
rather than through judicial fiat,” especially because “judges do a poor job of 
protecting unpopular religions”).  
 526. See, e.g., id. at 1665 (discussing an ordinance that was “rife with 
evidence of animus towards practitioners of Santería” (citing Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534–35 (1993))). 
 527. See supra Parts IV.C.1–2 (discussing the application of the test to these 
populations). 
 528. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1683 (“In 
the absence of institutional advantages or evidence that the political system is 
systematically incapable of taking religious claims of conscience seriously, 
courts should generally defer to those policy decisions, whether or not they are 
sound.”). 
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interests at stake. We do not have a firm view of which approach 
is optimal in these difficult cases and suggest that further 
consideration is warranted. 
VI. Conclusion 
There are certain goals for which it is worth unleashing the 
potential violence of the state—certain evils that the state should 
right—even at the risk of a mutually damaging confrontation 
between the state and component minority religious groups. But 
for both idealistic and pragmatic reasons, liberal states should 
temper their coercive instincts in many cases and adopt an 
accommodationist attitude. In the contemporary United States, 
there is already a marked tendency toward accommodationism, 
but it is inconsistently reflected in the law and, worse, often lacks 
principled application.529 Too often, the decision of whether to 
accommodate or prohibit a particular religious practice is driven 
by interest group politics rather than by thoughtful policymaking. 
Our test is a step forward in that it offers a consistent and 
principled approach to these questions that does not simply leave 
them to the interest group dynamics of the political marketplace. 
Instead, the test balances the needs of the state and those of 
religious people by simultaneously acknowledging the state’s 
need to protect itself and its citizens from religious practices that 
impose costs on others, while also respecting the values of 
pluralism. It also incorporates and respects constitutional 
church-state doctrines and suggests a way to resolve abiding 
tensions between the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses. 
Finally, the test can serve as a valuable tool for different kinds of 
decision makers—legislators, administrative officials, judges, and 
clinicians—and is sensitive to the relative institutional strengths 
and weaknesses of each.  
                                                                                                     
 529. See supra Part II (considering the inconsistent accommodation 
practices of government and judicial entities). 
